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Abstract 
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated to stop the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, resulting from the dangers associated with the use of these 
weapons well visible during 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a nuclear arms race 
as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During NPT Review Conferences, held every 
five years, the strength and integrity of this treaty is tested. Evident in NPT review 
conferences is the disagreement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states over the role and importance placed on nuclear weapons and the 
slow pace of nuclear disarmament. The NPT has been in force for over 40 years; 
however the threat of nuclear weapons still exists. It then becomes necessary to 
understand what role the NPT plays in the international system, which differs 
depending on the theoretical lens used to interpret the NPT. A realist perspective of 
the NPT reveals that this treaty is an instrument used by dominant states to 
safeguard and legitimise their hold over nuclear weapons, while denying other states 
access to these weapons, instead protecting their allies through extended nuclear 
deterrence. A liberal perspective of the NPT highlights the moral influence of this 
treaty as an instrument for the benefit of the greater good, to shield humanity from 
the dangers of a nuclear explosion by delegitimizing nuclear weapons, key to 
shaping the perceptions of the decision makers of states regarding state security and 
nuclear weapons particularly. A constructivist interpretation of the NPT argues that 
this treaty is a social construction by states to impose a measure of order in their 
relations. At particular times in history, the NPT moves between a realist and liberal 
interpretation based on critical events that inform its direction. Social agents 
(decision makers of the state) through their thinking and ideas construct and give 
meaning to “reality” which is constantly negotiated. With that in mind, no 
interpretation of the NPT is fixed and for that reason, a constructivist conclusion 
seems ultimately applicable, namely that the NPT is what states make of it. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also referred to as 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) (NPT) entered into force in 1970 it has played 
an instrumental role in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and put forward the 
proposal of a world free from nuclear weapons, which have inspired the creation of 
regional treaties such as the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (also referred 
to as the Pelindaba Treaty) in Africa. The NPT can be described as a treaty interested 
in protecting the security of all states, and for that reason should be adopted 
universally. The world witnessed the destructive nature of these weapons on human 
beings and the environment when the United States used them against Japan in 
1945 during World War II. Nuclear weapon tests have similarly made the destructive 
power of these weapons evident and resulted in a commonly held view that nuclear 
weapons might proliferate and fall into the wrong hands, threatening international 
peace and security. In fact, some argue that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they 
are a danger to the international community. 
In 1953, under the Atoms for Peace program championed by the United States 
President, Dwight Eisenhower, nuclear information and technology were shared for 
peaceful civilian purposes. Nuclear technology and material have dual use capability; 
that is, they can be used for civilian purposes or diverted for the production of 
nuclear weapons. At this point, background of the nuclear fuel cycle will be necessary 
to distinguish between civilian and military nuclear programmes to shed light on at 
what point nuclear technology might lead to the development of nuclear weapons. 
The dual nature of nuclear technology heightens concerns around nuclear 
proliferation, as it was widely suspected India, Israel and Pakistan used the Atoms for 
Peace program to develop nuclear weapons. 
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The nuclear fuel cycle refers to the process in which nuclear fuel is manufactured to 
generate electricity. Uranium occurs naturally and has to be mined and processed in 
order to produce uranium oxide (yellow cake). Once uranium is refined in the nuclear 
research reactor, it will be used as fuel for the reactor. Through the use of gas 
centrifuges usually the concentration of uranium isotope 235 is enriched to increase 
its quality. Uranium enriched to 2-5%, referred to as low-enriched uranium is used for 
the generation of electricity. Uranium 235 can be further enriched to 90%, for both 
civilian and military purposes. Plutonium is a by-product of the highly enriched 
uranium fuel which is reprocessed to separate fuel from nuclear waste (IAEA, 2009, 
pp. 9-11, 16; Harvey, 2010, p. 9). Recognising the danger and devastation nuclear 
weapons inflict on human life and the environment, together with the nuclear 
proliferation risk of the dual use nature of nuclear technology, state actors such as 
Ireland, the United States and the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an 
international treaty that would limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a more balanced treaty with a nuclear 
disarmament component. This led to the negotiation of the NPT, a treaty prioritised 
around, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, realising total nuclear disarmament 
and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology (Kerr, 2010, pp. 23-24). 
After the negotiation of the NPT, it was open for signature in 1968 and entered into 
force in 1970. The NPT drafters made a distinction between nuclear weapon states; 
that is, those states that tested nuclear weapons by 1967; and non-nuclear weapon 
states, that is, those states that had not tested nuclear weapons by 1967 (Pande, 
1995, p. 11). China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States are the 
five recognised nuclear weapon states under the NPT. All other states are considered 
non-nuclear weapon states and can only join the NPT as such. The NPT represented 
a bargain between member states to pursue the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and their disarmament with the ultimate goal of promoting a world free 
from nuclear weapons. 
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Despite the NPT being in existence for over 40 years nuclear disarmament has been a 
slow process and nuclear weapon states continue to resist or undermine this 
objective. As long as nuclear weapons are in existence others will seek to gain them.  
Emelyanov (1982, p. 170) argues, since nuclear weapons have been developed 
statesmen and politicians looked at these weapons as having the ability to solve 
complicated world problems. From this point, it is argued that having nuclear 
weapons bestows states with strength and prevents others from confronting that 
state. This argument is in line with the view that nuclear weapons play a deterrent 
function in international relations by maintaining order. Associating value of prestige 
and power to nuclear weapons directly threatens the NPT. 
The slow pace of nuclear disarmament only represents one commonly identified 
problem of the NPT. Others include double standards where nuclear weapon states 
shield allies such as India, Israel, and Pakistan from international pressure to join the 
NPT. 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and its pursuit of nuclear weapons 
under this treaty is an issue not effectively addressed. Nuclear weapons continue to 
form a central role in military strategies, despite their use considered taboo. Another 
concern is the unwarranted view that the NPT bestows some states with the right to 
possess nuclear weapons. 
NPT review conferences are convened every five years where member states 
negotiate the way forward for the NPT and tackle its challenges. An inability to 
cooperate between member states weakens the credibility of the NPT itself. Review 
conferences have been criticised as an arena of conflict and disagreement between 
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states respectively. In 1980, 1990 and 2005 
NPT Review Conferences resulted in a failure where member states could not come 
to a consensus and develop a final document. A review conference seen as a failure 
has a detrimental impact on the NPT, review processes will determine the extent to 
which the treaty has realised its objects and goals. However, critical events occurring 
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before review conferences such as the India and Pakistan nuclear test in 1998 and 
North Korea’s treaty withdrawal also influence the direction and strength of the NPT. 
There have been a number of successful review conferences, which positively 
influenced the direction of the NPT and how this treaty is perceived by its member 
states. This study will mainly critically discuss and explain five NPT Review 
Conferences, namely, the first Review Conference in 1975, the 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2010 conference. The 1995 Review Conference witnessed the indefinite extension of 
the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference was marked by great controversy as a final 
document could not be decided and nuclear weapon states, in particular, the United 
States under the Bush Administration showed a disregard for the NPT by not 
approving the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament proposed at the 
2000 Review Conference. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference contributed to a 
decline in the faith and legitimacy of the NPT among member states. Lastly, the 2010 
Review Conference paved the way for a new sense of hope in the NPT by member 
states toward the treaty which came at a critical moment in time. 
Very evident in the arena of nuclear weapons and disarmament member states 
disagree and conflict over how the NPT ought to be interpreted but at particular 
times in history member states cooperate and work together to realise mutual gains 
for the benefit of the international community.  
According to the above background on the NPT, the following questions emerge: 
How is it possible to make sense of the NPT or its purpose and role in the 
international system? Does the NPT safeguard the interests of all its member states? 
Which direction and path has the NPT been placed on? Is the NPT directly subjected 
to the will of powerful states that can dictate its pace and core values? Or, does the 
NPT act as a form of governance in the international system by introducing a 
measure of order and stability? From this view, the NPT facilitates cooperation 
between states and thus introduces a measure of international order in this issue-
area. This thesis aims to answer the questions posed above by looking respectively 
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through the lens of three theories of International Relations, namely realism, 
liberalism and constructivism. These theoretical paradigms will offer a different 
interpretation of the NPT, each employed to critically analyse the role of the NPT in 
international relations. 
Review conferences are practical illustrations of how member states relate to the NPT 
informing its strength and durability. Critical events in world politics occurring before 
review conferences also shed light on the significance of the NPT, how member 
states relate to it and how it effectively resolves and addresses challenges. For 
example, one of the reasons provided for the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 was Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programme. WMD includes three types of weapons; that is, biological, chemical and 
nuclear weapons. The realist, liberal and constructivist paradigms will be linked to 
these practical cases occurring before and during the NPT review conferences. With 
this in mind, the study provides a critical look at the NPT; describing the treaty from a 
realist, liberal and constructivist perspective. By explaining and understanding the 
NPT from these different view's light can be shed on why member states, in 
particular nuclear weapon states, have been slow to realise nuclear disarmament, and 
why others have forgone the nuclear weapons option, while some have chosen to 
remain outside of the NPT and in turn become nuclear armed themselves. 
1.2 Research question and propositions 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how the NPT impacts on the views of 
states regarding security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. The research question 
is: to what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help perceived to be 
intrinsic to the international system and inform state behaviour by setting standards 
and norms in the field of nuclear weapons and disarmament? This question is in 
response to the narrow realist view that “international anarchy” (or the absence of a 
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world government) results in a system where states are pre-determined to pursue 
their self-interest in a self-help way (Walt, 1998, pp. 37-38). From this view, it is 
assumed that international norms and rules associated with institutions and 
“regimes” have little influence over shaping state behaviour. Neoliberalist scholars 
argue that international regimes are, in fact, constructed by dominant powers, 
precisely to benefit their own interest and not as a matter of morality (or for the 
greater good of the international system as a whole). As such, without the presence 
of dominant powers, international regimes would have very little or no influence over 
states (Keohane, 1984, pp. 62-63). 
The term institution will be applied to the NPT. An institution is a system of order, 
arranging human activity, through its norms, standards and rules. The NPT and its 
norms of non-proliferation and disarmament fit this interpretation of an institution. 
Simultaneously, due to the common thread between the term 'institution' and 
'regime', the term regime will also be invoked and applied to the NPT, for example, 
the NPT regime. In this way, the researcher will only refer to one component of a 
regime, namely the NPT (treaty). Regimes refer to a combination of customary 
practices, treaties, and enforcement agencies that apply to a specific area of common 
interests. Thus, the nuclear non-proliferation regime consists of treaties, such as the 
NPT, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaties; enforcement agencies, such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and 
customary practices, such as the nuclear taboo and other non-proliferation norms. 
Disregarding the role of an institution and regime (NPT) or arguing that they are 
merely tools conceived of by the powerful to pursue their interests to the detriment 
of the weak may amount to a presumptive negation of the role which institutions 
and regimes play (Ebaye, 2009, pp. 118-120). It also assumes that weaker states are 
“dupes” that are cheated into signing onto treaties as opposed to seeing treaties as 
an expression of politics defined as the negotiation of acceptable standards to the 
powerful and the weak. Another possible answer to the research question that 
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liberals would favour is that the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation 
regime and as such facilitates cooperation and allows states to coordinate their 
policies to order relations between them (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 83). 
The study will argue that neither the realists’ preferred answer, nor the liberals’ are 
sufficient to explain the role of the NPT in international relations. Rather, a 
constructivist response that provides an epistemologically alternative understanding 
of the international system and in particular, to the NPT should be pursued. 
Constructivism in International Relations acts as a bridge between realist and liberal 
theories that have come to dominate ways of viewing and interpreting the 
international system. It also recognises that treaties, like the NPT, are the 
embodiments of norms, rules and standards of behaviour that evolve over time and 
is therefore, what states make of them. No role (of treaties) is predetermined or 
inevitable, but the product of what actors operational in the issue-area (in this case 
nuclear weapon non-proliferation and disarmament) do. 
 
1.3 Aims of the study 
The aims of this research are therefore to: 
 
 Provide a historical overview of the evolution of the NPT and how it fits into 
the non-proliferation regime.  
 Investigate the challenges to and the successes of the NPT, highlighting the 
politics among nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in the 
NPT review conferences as instances where norms and standards of behaviour 
in this issue-area are negotiated, renegotiated and institutionalised. 
 Broaden knowledge around international norms related to non-proliferation 
and the role they play to facilitate cooperation between states within an 
anarchical international system. 
 Discuss the social realities states construct, which influence their identity, 
interests and the way they respond in international relations, especially in the 
area of nuclear weapons. Here, the impact of respective administrations of 
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states, for example, the Bush versus the Obama administration, on the 
perceptions of treaties will be highlighted.   
 Contribute to the constructivist interpretation of international relations in the 
area of nuclear weapons. 
1.4 Importance of the study 
 
Since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 its challenges became more 
apparent as the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states 
were also indefinitely institutionalised, giving non-nuclear weapon states little 
bargaining power over influencing this privileging of nuclear weapon states, which 
undermines this treaty. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, it appeared that 
member states had lost faith in this treaty, as a final document could not be decided. 
In addition to this, the Bush administration showed a lack of support at this 
conference towards the ‘13 practical steps’ that were agreed to during the 2000 
Review Conference. He later signed the civil nuclear trade agreement with India even 
though it is not an NPT member state. This issue marked a concern for member 
states that this treaty was being violated and used to serve the narrow interests of 
certain states (Mockli, 2010, p. 75). 
According to Johnson’s article entitled, Rethinking the NPT’s role in security: 2010 and 
beyond (2010b, pp. 430, 434), the NPT embodies norms and rules that has slowed the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Member states of the NPT gain access to the right to use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is an incentive not to go nuclear. 
However, there have been views perpetuated by nuclear weapon states to note that 
have negatively affected the NPT. For example, nuclear weapon states expressed that 
nuclear weapons are core to their national security and serve as a deterrent 
mechanism. Tony Blair, a former Prime Minster of the United Kingdom, in a 2007 
discussion surrounding developing nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants for 
Britain expressed that “the non-proliferation treaty makes it absolutely clear that 
Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons” (Johnson, 2010b, p. 434; Johnson, 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
2007, n.p.). These views undermine the NPT, and the confidence that non-nuclear 
weapon states have in the goal of this treaty to promote non-proliferation and 
disarmament of nuclear weapons. 
There are more challenges that affect the strength and the integrity of the NPT. 
These challenges have been highlighted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. For 
example, the conflicts in the Middle East are perpetuated by the fear of nuclear 
weapons and hence the 1995 resolution of the Middle East suggested by Egypt in 
1990 proposes creating a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. Israel and 
Pakistan have not signed the NPT, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT and 
tested its nuclear weapons (Hubert, Broodryk & Stott, 2010, pp. 1-2). An inability to 
resolve these matters threaten the non-proliferation norm. If nuclear weapons and 
facilities are not properly safeguarded and verified by the IAEA, nuclear material may 
fall in the hands of rogue states and terrorist movements and be turned into WMD.  
And yet, despite the major concerns that the NPT has faced, there still seems to be a 
sense that states cannot fathom an international order without the NPT (or an 
equivalent). The notion that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are 
important norms to be pursued, and the gains made during the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference contradict the realist notion of self-help in international relations. How 
treaties function to condition and restrain state perceptions and behaviour, especially 
in the area of nuclear weapons, remains an important topic of study. This is in no 
small way thanks to the ground made by social constructivism as an alternative to 
realist and liberal scholarship in International Relations. This study is theoretically 
important in that it aims to contribute to the constructivist interpretation of 
important issues in the discipline. It is also a topic of policy relevance as nuclear 
weapons and the right to civilian nuclear technology remain important to 
international security generally and South Africa’s foreign policy in particular. 
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1.5 Research Design 
 
The study will utilise a deductive approach to understand and explain whether the 
realist, liberal or constructivist perspective best explains the role of the NPT in the 
international system. It is necessary to explain the two different approaches used to 
begin the research process, namely deductive and inductive. The deductive approach 
is a research strategy that moves from a widely accepted theory, to the formulation 
of a hypothesis and then testing the hypothesis with specific data (phenomena). A 
theory is a widely accepted prediction which has been tested, while a hypothesis 
needs to be tested and proved. A deductive approach begins the research process 
with a theory and then develops a hypothesis, highlighting a relationship between 
two or more variables. Variable A (independent variable) has an impact and effect on 
variable B (dependent variable), this is the prediction. On the other hand, an 
inductive study or research accumulates specific data on an issue which in turn 
informs the selection of theory and lastly, the formation of a hypothesis. In contrast, 
a deductive study moves from theory, to the formation of a hypothesis and its 
application to data (Engel & Schutt, 2005, pp. 40-46). In this study, the research 
question was formulated, asking to what extent is the NPT able to restrain the system 
of self-help, through its norms and standards of behaviour. It was proposed that the 
three dominant theoretical International Relations paradigms (realism, liberalism and 
constructivism) provide different answers to this question, but constructivist lens 
provides a more accurate answer about the NPT’s role. The next step is to test this 
proposition by applying it to the data (NPT review conferences and preceding 
events). 
The study will mainly be a desktop study where primary and secondary sources will 
be analysed and interpreted without conducting interviews and drafting a 
questionnaire. A primary source of information is a first-hand account of a situation 
or event, including, speeches, interviews, diary entries and autobiographies. 
Secondary sources are an analysis or interpretation of an original source of 
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information, useful to broaden knowledge and explanation in more detail (Gravetter 
& Forzano, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
The study will utilise primary sources, such as the official document of the NPT: Text 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Resolution on the Middle 
East (1995), UN Resolution 2028 (XX) on Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (19 
November 1965), the 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)), including 
the now famous speech made in Prague on 5 April 2009 by the United States 
President, Barack Obama, statements made during NPT review conferences by 
nuclear weapon states as well as official final documents of the review conferences 
(1975, 1995, 2000 and 2010). Secondary sources used for the theoretical framework 
include authors, such as Hans Morgenthau (1967), Niccolò Machiavelli (1515), 
Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (realist scholars). Key liberal scholars include 
authors, such as Jean Rousseau (1762), John Locke (1823), Joseph Nye and Robert 
Keohane. Influential scholars in constructivism include authors, such as Alexander 
Wendt (1992), Emmanuel Adler (2005) and Nicholas Onuf (1998). Secondary sources 
that contributed greatly to this study of the NPT include authors, such as David 
Fischer (1992), Regina Karp (1992), Joseph Pilat and Robert Pendley (1995), Susan 
Welsh (1995) Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke (2007), Mario Carranza (2006), Nina 
Tannenwald (2007), Thomas Doyle (2009) and Paul Kerr (2010). 
1.6 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter one has outlined the research problem, research question, aims of the study 
and research methodology. 
Chapter two, the theoretical and conceptual framework, will set out a guide to the 
research by outlining concepts and theories from realism, liberalism and 
constructivism, which will in later chapters be applied to the NPT to understand the 
role of the treaty within the international system. 
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Chapter three provides a historical account (descriptive analysis) of the origin and 
evolution of the NPT and key debates that characterised its review conference. 
Chapter four explores the realist argument that the NPT is an instrument that 
facilitates the interest of nuclear weapon states, by creating an order that is 
favourable to them. It will outline cases where member states have seemingly 
disregarded clauses of the NPT or applied them differently to their allies and foes.  
Chapter five explores the liberal argument that the NPT facilitates cooperation 
between states. It thus explores treaties as instruments to improve the common 
good in international relations. The positive impact that the NPT has had on limiting 
the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting the nuclear taboo will be highlighted.  
Chapter six interprets the NPT from a constructivist point of view. Neither the realist 
nor the liberalist judgement of the NPT is inevitable. Rather, the NPT is what states 
make of it. There have been changes in the direction of the NPT over its life span and 
agents are responsible for these changes.  
Chapter seven will summarise the argument, noting the main conclusions that can be 
drawn from the study and the theoretical and policy implications of these 
conclusions.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
 
International Relations is concerned with global order, how order emerges and is 
altered through the activities and actions of agents and structures that employ 
authority/power to influence and maintain their environment (McGowan & Nel, 2002, 
p. 11). The subject matter of International Relations ranges from human and national 
security, economic issues such as trade, environment, as well as gender issues. 
International actors are involved in a process of creating meaning to understand the 
world and their place in it and for this purpose construct treaties, regimes and 
institutions to order their environment, which is referred to as the international 
system.  
The realm of world politics is made up of a variety of international actors, including 
state actors, such as sovereign territorial states and intergovernmental organisations, 
such as the United Nations (UN), and non-state actors, including non-governmental 
organisations such as Greenpeace, multinational corporations such as Microsoft and 
individuals such as Nelson Mandela, for example. All actors desire to impose a 
measure of order on the world to create a favourable environment so as to realise 
their political, economic or social interests. 
Core theories from International Relations, such as realism and neorealism, liberalism 
and neoliberalism and constructivism offer explanations of the international system, 
the role of state and non-state actors therein, what will influence international 
behaviour and interests and how actors safeguard those interests. Realist and liberal 
theories provide a different interpretation of the NPT and through constructivism, 
these different interpretations will be mediated and reconciled. Thus, it will be shown 
in this thesis how constructivism provides a sensible theoretical framework when 
juxtaposed with realism and liberalism to gauge the direction of the NPT, its role in 
the international system as a form of international governance and the equally 
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influential role individual agents can have on structures responsible for international 
governance, for example the non-proliferation regime. 
This chapter will proceed to discuss the widely recognised and popular theories in 
International Relations, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. Classical 
realism will outline essential pillars of this theory, which informs modern realism with 
its state-centric perspective, unchanging view towards the anarchical international 
system perpetuating conflict and disagreement between states, and the supremacy 
of power measured by military and economic strength. Classical liberalism offers a 
more optimistic account of the international system, including non-state actors such 
as transnational corporations and individuals as influential agents in international 
relations and foreign policy. Liberals attribute a bigger role to morality than realists 
do and believe conflict and disagreement, and ultimately war is not an inevitable 
process. Constructivism, although agreeing with certain neoliberal assumptions will 
demonstrate how a purely realist or liberal study of international events and 
phenomena cannot shed enough light on the true nature of international relations. 
2.2 Realism 
 
This section will briefly discuss the evolution of realism in International Relations, 
beginning with a focus on classical realist scholars (including Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
and Hobbes) and then conclude with an account of neorealism as proposed by 
Kenneth Waltz. The mentioned scholars are regarded as prominent thinkers in 
realism, giving an account of the international system where states are seen as 
dominant actors. Next, the work of realist scholars will be compared and combined 
to find areas of consensus to provide a general view on realism. 
Jackson and Sørensen (2003, p. 70) refer to the work of Thucydides, a Greek historian. 
The precise date of his birth is not known, but it is assumed that he was born around 
454 and died in 395 B.C (Cawkwell, 1997, p. 1). For Thucydides, international relations 
was characterised “as the inevitable competitions and conflicts between” Greek city-
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states (Hellas) and non-Greek empires such as Macedonia and Persia. In addition, 
there was an inherent sense of inequality between states, which was seen as a natural 
phenomenon. States were unequal in power capabilities (for example military 
strength) and this had an impact on the type of option's political rulers or decision 
makers of the state had at their disposal. Key to understanding and conducting 
international relations was the realisation of inequality between states. For this 
reason, Thucydides elaborates and proposes that rulers should act with ‘caution’, 
‘prudence’ and ‘foresight’. If states do not act accordingly they risk the security and 
survival of the state (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 70-72; Daddow, 2009, pp. 84-85).  
The prime objective of decision makers of the state is to project the national interests 
of the state defined as military and economic strength beyond its sovereign borders, 
this activity is referred to as foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus also defined as the 
activities, actions and responses decision makers pursue on behalf of the state in 
reaction to the international system. The purpose of foreign policy is to realise the 
goals and objectives of the state. States achieve their goals and objectives through 
maintaining relations with other states to change and alter relations beyond their 
sovereign borders (Smith, Little & Shackleton, 1981, p. 15). 
2.2.1 Classical Realism 
 
When Thucydides’ description of international inequality is taken into consideration 
then concepts of justice and fairness would be influenced by the nature of power 
between states. In Thucydides’ work entitled, History of the Peloponnesian War, he 
discusses the period in history known as the Peloponnesian War where Athens 
wanted to conquer the Island of Melos which was ruled by Sparta, an enemy of 
Athens. Athens could have used its military might against Melos but sent its 
ambassadors to negotiate the surrender of Melos. Thucydides reports on the 
negotiation process between Athenians and Melians and refers to it as the Melian 
Dialogue (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 23-24; Nel, 2002, pp. 20-21). The Melian dialogue did 
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not represent a negotiation between equals, namely between Athens and Melos. 
Athens instructed Melos to surrender and join its empire despite Melos claiming 
neutrality. Melos requested of Athens to respect its neutrality and drew on concepts 
of fairness and justice. Melos was faced with the ultimatum of joining the Athenian 
empire peacefully or risk being invaded by force. However, Melos did not provoke or 
threaten Athens physically, and for that reason invading Melos would be unjust 
(Walzer, 2006, p. 10). Melos argued the use of violence by Athens would spark fear 
among other independent states and create concerns that they too would be 
attacked.  
Fairness and justice were influenced and defined by power. Athens, a military strong 
empire could determine what was considered just or unjust based on its power 
position among other states. Hans Morgenthau said the most powerful states can 
shape the behaviour of other states. John Mearsheimer defines power as material 
resources which states have at their disposal, this power capability is linked to the 
ability of states to pursue its interests (D’Anieri, 2011, pp. 66-67). According to 
Thucydides (1972, p. 402) “...the standard of justice depends on the equality of power 
to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the 
weak accept what they have to accept”. The moral arguments of Melos were of no 
use and ignored as Athens resorted to violence and war to coerce Melos into 
surrender. For the protection of the Athenian empire and its self-interest, Athenian 
generals argued; Melos needed to be conquered or else their citizens would view the 
empire as being weak for befriending a colony of its enemy Sparta (Thucydides, 
1972, p. 402). 
Thucydides' notion of international inequality is linked to the notion of a power 
configuration wherein states are placed into a hierarchy based on military and 
economic strength. For that reason, states can be categorised into small power, 
secondary power and great powers (Leith & Pretorius, 2009, p. 346). 
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The notion of international inequality and the power position of the state will be 
discussed further under the heading of neorealist system level of analysis. However, 
for now the three categories in which states can be divided and ranked according to 
their respective power positions will be discussed. The power position of the state is 
directly linked to the foreign policy choices it has at its disposal (Neack, 2003, p. 126). 
The concept of great power is described as a state in possession of military and 
economic strength, with universal interests and the political will to safeguard those 
interests. For example, after the Bretton Woods economic system was established the 
United States took on a leadership position of the liberal capitalist world. At this time, 
the United States displayed the qualities of a great power state, but it was also its will 
and capability to protect allies for example through its nuclear umbrella under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Neack, 2003, p. 136). NATO is a military 
alliance which was based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 
comprising of 28 governments from North America and Europe. NATO member 
states work together to realise mutual solutions to security concerns, which initially 
came from the Soviet Union. During the 1940s Western European states did not have 
sufficient conventional military strength in comparison to the Soviet Union, and to 
combat this discrepancy the United States deployed its nuclear weapons in Europe. 
In 1953, the United States began stationing its nuclear weapons in Europe to deter 
the Soviet Union from launching an attack on its allies (Bunn, 1992, p. 61). 
Secondary powers are states such as Japan that may be considered a great power 
because of its economic strength, however, as a result of its Peace Constitution lacks 
military strength and thus cannot be ranked as a great power. Japan’s Peace 
Constitution limits its military strength by introducing three measures to prevent the 
possession, production and use/introduction of nuclear weapons (Fuller, 2009, p. 21). 
The term secondary power is more inclusive by incorporating another term, namely 
middle power. States that fulfil the category of a middle power, such as Brazil, 
Canada (under Lloyd Axworthy as foreign affairs minister), South Africa, Sweden and 
so forth, view themselves as playing a middle power role in the international system 
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based on their identity. Middle powers are regarded as ‘good global citizens’ that 
direct resources towards peacekeeping, human rights and environmental protection 
(Gilboa, 2009, p. 23). For example, South Africa engages in building peace and 
security through the African Union on the African continent in places such as Darfur. 
This role is not inevitable, but a result of South Africa’s self-image. 
In the international system, all states may at some point be influenced by external 
actors. However, states ranked as small powers have limited choice and opportunity 
for making independent foreign policy. A defining feature of small powers is its 
exposure to external influence shaping both its domestic and foreign policy. For 
example, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Lithuania, and Malawi are categorised as small 
powers. For realist scholars, the inability of small powers to have an impact on the 
international system leads them to disregard small powers as unimportant and 
virtually exclude them from study. 
The above discussion of power configurations in the international system places the 
Melian dialogue into perspective and the ability of major powers to impose their will 
onto the weak. The outcome of the Melian Dialogue resulted in Athens conquering 
Melos which became its colony. Thucydides writes that justice is influenced by 
‘equality of power’, that is, the strong can do as they desire given their military 
strength and the weak simply have to accept the will of the strong. This is a central 
realist assumption regarding the nature of international relations (Alker, 1988, p. 806; 
Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 72). 
Another classical realist by the name of Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian philosopher 
from Florence, further elaborates on foreign policy as a pursuit of interests through 
the application of coercive power. As Thucydides indicated, state security and 
survival are of utmost importance, Machiavelli also agrees with this point. In the 
pursuit of foreign policy, rulers or decision makers of the state have to be powerful 
like a lion and wise as a fox. “A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to 
adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot 
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defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves” 
(Machiavelli, 1515, p. 84). As a lion the ruler will be feared and as a fox he/she will be 
able to realise when people are being deceptive and thus uncover the intentions of 
others (Benner, 2009, pp. 197-198). Machiavelli further explains that if leaders are 
unable to conduct international relations in this manner, they will be susceptible to 
the attack and influence of other states. Hence, moral codes of ethics are said to 
hinder state affairs, and in that regard should be neglected. In support of this 
statement, Machiavelli argues that the world is a dangerous place and when the 
opportunity arises rulers need to take advantage of and capitalise on them. It is at 
this point that a distinction between public conduct and private conduct is made and 
an inability to make this distinction will lead to the detriment of the people and the 
state (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 72-74). 
For Machiavelli, leaders should not strive to become virtuous, as other leaders will 
not be bound to a moral code of conduct in their affairs. Rather, a leader, or as 
Machiavelli writes, a Prince, should appear to be “faithful”, “bold and brave”, 
“compassionate” and so forth but also need to be “cruel” and “avaricious” 
(Machiavelli, 1515, p. 72). Leaders thus need to be prudent and know when to use 
these characteristics as the world is a dangerous place rife with potential rivals and 
enemies who also desire to realise their national interests (Walker, 2006, p. 143). If a 
leader is regarded as being weak, it will lead to his/her detriment and the destruction 
of the state. According to Machiavelli (1515, p. 73), “... it will be found that something 
which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which 
looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.” Thus, a good leader 
which is different from a good person needs to act with caution and prudence in 
their affairs. This reason is applicable domestically and internationally and failure to 
do so will lead to criticism from the people and make the state susceptible to foreign 
attacks.   
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A key assumption of realists is the negative view of human nature; human beings are 
only interested in their own well-being and survival. Thomas Hobbes, credited for his 
work in political philosophy, is no different from the classical realists discussed thus 
far. In his explanation of human nature, Hobbes’ conducts a thought experiment 
where he describes a condition without the existence of a sovereign state. Hobbes 
refers to this condition as the ‘state of nature’. The state of nature refers to a natural 
condition where humankind is in constant danger and susceptible to the influence 
and power of others. Humankind is thus in a state of war and conflict, and, with no 
legal entity maintaining law and order, society will crumble (Hobbes, 1651, pp. 77-
78). In such a world, trade could not take place; people could not travel, and no 
culture could develop among human beings. According to Hobbes (1651, p. 78) in 
the state of nature life would be “... solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. 
Hobbes proposes that human beings can only escape this condition (state of nature) 
through the creation of a sovereign state. Due to the collective sense of insecurity, 
where people fear the loss of their property and life, they join to create a sovereign 
and enter a ‘social contract’ with the state (Hobbes, 1651, pp. 105-106). “...if there be 
no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may 
lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men” (Hobbes, 
1651, p. 103). Through the social contract, the sovereign state protects human beings 
from internal and foreign threats. It is at this point which Hobbes notes that as 
people form a social contract with the sovereign to protect them from the fears 
found in the state of nature another problem emerges, that is, international anarchy 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 74, 77-79; Riemer & Simon, 1997, pp. 89-90). 
International anarchy is a condition that characterises the international system where 
peace cannot be guaranteed between states, because just as in Hobbes’s state of 
nature, there is no supra-national authority to appeal to when wronged. Without a 
world government of sorts, states remain the most important actors in the 
international system and will pursue their interests in a self-help way. Due to this 
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condition states engage in disputes and conflict, which are ultimately resolved by war 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 75; Walt, 1998, pp. 35, 37). 
2.2.2 Neorealism and the system level analysis  
 
There is a marked distinction between classical realists and neorealists. The difference 
is that classical realists have been concerned with human nature and provide a 
normative analysis of the international system. They emphasise that rational 
behaviour for a state leader is shrewdness to protect his/her state and increase its 
power in relation to others. While neorealist scholars such as Waltz ignore human 
nature and provide a more scientific approach to the workings of the international 
system by placing the focus on its structure and effects (system level analysis) (Walt, 
1998, p. 31). 
Kenneth Waltz became one of the influential scholars in International Relations 
during the course of his career. Waltz founded theories such as neorealism and 
structural realism. In Waltz’s book entitled, Man, the State and War (1959), he utilises 
the levels of analysis tool in International Relations to understand the reasons for 
conflict and war between states. The levels of analysis tool in International Relations 
is attributed to Kenneth Waltz. The levels of analysis is divided into three lenses, 
namely, individual, state and system. From the individual level (first image), human 
nature is the source of conflict driven by the need for power (Waltz, 1959, pp. 16-18). 
The state level (second image) is focused on the characteristics of the state. That is, 
how political institutions (type of government) and “its modes of production and 
distribution” (economic institutions) determines whether states are peaceful or 
hostile (Singer, 1960, p. 457). The system level (third image) which is central to a 
discussion of power delves into the anarchical nature of the international system, 
lacking order and stability, causing state interests to clash with other states with the 
outcome of war (Waltz, 1959, p. 189). Waltz shifts the focus to the structure of the 
international system and the power capabilities of states therein. States are said to 
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conduct the same tasks, such as the collection of tax and conducting foreign policy. 
However, what make states unique are their capabilities. All states are equal only in 
the legal sense as they are regarded internationally as sovereign territories (Jackson 
& Sørensen, 2003, p. 84; Buzan, 2007, pp. 72-73). 
The origin of state sovereignty stems from the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster 
signed in 1648 where sovereignty became officially institutionalised. This period was 
referred to as the Peace of Westphalia. Sovereign states have a clearly defined 
territory in which public bodies have the legal authority to make laws that apply to a 
community. There are two principles associated with sovereignty that emerged from 
Westphalia, namely non-intervention in domestic affairs of other states and mutual 
respect of territorial integrity since each state is sovereign (Holsti, 2006, pp. 20-23). 
Domestic affairs or domestic policy refer to activities, decisions and laws occurring 
within the state conducted by a government that is applicable to its territory 
(country). The laws and regulations defined as domestic policy ranges from business, 
education, health care, social welfare and so forth. Sovereignty conveys the idea that 
states are equal, yet there is a hierarchy among states defined by their military and 
economic strength. 
State sovereignty is the defining character of the state in the international system; on 
the other hand, state capabilities and power may be more pertinent. Placing the 
focus on the system level of analysis leads to the view that states can be 
characterised according to their power position in the international system.  
Neack (2003, p. 128) provides a useful understanding on how to measure state 
power, “More powerful states, for instance, are those with larger, more industrialized 
national economies and larger, better equipped, better trained national militaries”. As 
discussed earlier under classical realism, states can be characterised as great, middle 
or small powers according to their power position (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 85; 
Smith, Little & Shackleton, 1981, p. 15).  
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The power a state is said to possess within the international system determines its 
ability to realise its national interests. Waltz emphasizes that the position and power 
of the state will influence and determine its foreign policy choices. As a result of 
international anarchy, states have to rely on their own capability to protect their 
interests, and because of this ‘fact’ may use force to realise national interests as each 
state is its own judge (Neack, 2003, pp. 126-127). Power is of utmost importance for 
states because international anarchy creates a condition where states distrust each 
other’s intension and become suspicious of its capability. 
The balance of power is another useful concept in International Relations relating to 
how states cope with the anarchical nature of the international system. The balance 
of power is a system in which states form alliances with one another to promote 
equilibrium of power so that no one state dominates the international system (Waltz, 
2000, p. 38). Hedley Bull (1977, pp. 94-95), prominent as a member of the so-called 
English School, advocates that the usefulness of the balance of power mechanism 
lies in its ability to promote international order and peace.  
However, Waltz argues that even though the balance of power is a natural response 
in relation to international anarchy to create order, it only breeds more insecurity. 
According to Buzan (2007, p. 141), the balance of power reinforces and maintains 
international anarchy, “... and the two are effectively opposite sides of the same coin”. 
An example of the balance of power can be traced to the period referred to as the 
Cold War when the international system was characterised by bipolarity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The problem of the balance of power is that it 
may lead to arms races in the two poles’ effort to balance each other’s power and 
thus more insecurity. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in such a 
nuclear arms race dialectically informed by the security dilemma existing between 
the two superpowers, in turn increasing the probability of a nuclear war (Bull, 1977, p. 
95; Papp, 1984, p. 29). 
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2.2.3 Key realist assumptions 
 
Hans Morgenthau, was a classical realist and a prominent academic thinker in 
International Relations, but also served as a consultant for the United States 
Department Policy and Planning Staff when it was headed by George F. Kennan. In 
his written work entitled, Politics Among Nations Morgenthau (1967) maps out six 
principles, which are the basis of realism in International Relations. Morgenthau’s six 
principles of political realism serve as a connecting bridge between classical realists 
and neorealists. 
For Morgenthau, politics, just like society was shaped and governed by objective 
laws. Here realism serves to offer a rational account or theory on the objective laws 
which govern politics. Realism comprises of a set of facts, which is bestowed with 
meaning through the use of reason and logic. Human nature as described by realists 
is unchanging and constant; this is the starting point of this theory, which is a central 
law of politics. By understanding the objective laws of politics realists are able to 
examine a foreign policy issue and determine which alternatives the state will choose 
to best remedy the problem (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 4; Elias & Sutch, 2007, p. 48). 
Human nature is self-interested, and this logic is also applicable to how states will 
conduct its affairs and respond to other states.  
The “concept of interest defined in terms of power” facilitate realists to comprehend 
international relations and the role of the state therein (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 5). This 
logic sets politics apart from other areas such as economics. Interest defined as 
power guides the actions of the decision makers of the state; this fact informs realists 
and enables them to predict the future and understand past actions or policies 
conducted by the state. All leaders are concerned with state interests defined as 
power making the foreign policy decision making process rational. For this reason, a 
study of the personality or motivations of leaders of the state is inconsequential and 
will not shed light on future foreign policy decisions.   
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Based on the above discussion all states pursue their interests defined as power. 
Morgenthau and other realists believe this is a universal principle which governs 
state interaction. These interests include state survival and improving its economic 
position. The concept of power relates to the resources at the disposal of the state 
used to dominate over others; such as the use of physical violence or coercion and 
also psychological techniques to control the mind of others. Psychological 
techniques relate to the intangible resource used to change the behaviour of another 
actor through persuasion. Another reoccurring phenomenon in international 
relations is the balance of power. All states will continually be concerned with its 
power in relation to others. Realists are inclined to argue the balance of power 
produces stability and brings order to the world (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 8-9; Elias & 
Sutch, 2007, p. 54).  
Morgenthau affirms that moral principles cannot be universally applicable to political 
issues. Individuals can decide to act according to moral standards, but the state has 
to act on the basis of its interests, which is to protect its survival and safeguard the 
well-being of its citizens. When faced with a foreign policy issue, the decision makers 
of the state have to exercise prudence and analyse the consequences of alternative 
policy to remedy a given problem (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 9-10; Rapoport, 1995, p. 
227). Political decisions cannot be limited by moral principles; decisions made by the 
state have to yield the most advantageous outcome. 
Morgenthau’s political realism rejects the claim that moral ambitions of states can be 
brought in accordance with objective laws, which govern politics. When decision 
makers of the state claim political action have a moral basis, this does not provide an 
effective manner to judge political action and its consequences. For example, 
American President, Woodrow Wilson utilised a moral argument in support of his 
decision to conduct war with Germany in World War I. By using the concept of 
interest defined as power effectively serves to judge the decisions of all states and 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
when conducted in this manner the interests and policy of other states will be 
respected (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 10-11; Blacker & Duffy, 1976, p. 29). 
Morgenthau’s final principle of realism relates to the autonomy of the political 
sphere from other schools of thought or standards. The political realist “...thinks in 
terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest 
defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the 
moralist, of conformity of action with moral principles” (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 11).  
2.3 Liberalism 
 
Liberalism in International Relations offers a more optimistic account of the 
international system by highlighting the significance of non-state actors, what factors 
influence the decision making apparatus of the state besides power and how 
cooperation is possible between states within an anarchical world. Moravcsik (1992, 
p. 3) points out that realist scholars such as Machiavelli and Hobbes view "...liberal 
claims not as realistic generalization about human behaviour, but as normative ideals 
of peace and cooperation, which they label as idealist, legalist, moralist, reductionist 
or utopian". There is a close connection between liberalism and idealism where 
liberalism has been guided and influenced by idealism as a theory. Liberalism and 
idealism have been used interchangeably, to clarify; idealism is a philosophy 
commenting on the limitations of the state and its power while liberalism is an 
International Relations theory (Nel, 2002, p. 30). 
Due to the different strands of liberalism, the researcher will include key arguments 
of liberalism and idealism in order to effectively critique and challenge realist 
assumptions. Classical liberals such as Rousseau and Locke are philosophers 
commenting on government while political liberal scholars such as Susan Strange 
discuss the declining influence of the state and the increasing influence of 
transnational corporations over the global economy. Neoliberal scholars, including 
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Keohane (1988) and Nye (1993), advocate that institutions and regimes are a 
mechanism to facilitate cooperation between states. 
2.3.1 Human nature 
 
Liberal scholars have been more inclined to view human nature from a positive 
standpoint, unlike pessimistic views of human nature by traditional realists. This 
positive view is related to the potential of human reason and capability.  
Human capability is visible in technological innovation, which has created new ways 
for humankind to control nature. For example, during the 18th century, the Industrial 
Revolution marked a fundamental change in human history (Mokyr, 1985, p. 1). 
Liberals understood that human beings could also be self-interested. However, when 
working together human beings could establish and realise important gains. This 
reason and capability were said to have both domestic and international 
ramifications. Here, it is assumed that 'human reason' may aid in the reduction of 
conflict and war between states which realists regard as an inevitable process 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 106). 
Idealists affirm this optimistic view of human nature, which has been discussed by 
scholars such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762). Idealists affirmed conflict, and war 
could be overcome through the formation of international law and organisations. 
Idealists are concerned with normative principles and are interested in how the world 
ought to be instead of how it is (Ethridge & Handelman, 2008, p. 535). Rousseau was 
a political philosopher who wrote extensively on the nature of humankind and how 
human freedom could be protected. Rousseau criticised the argument about human 
nature as selfish and wicked. For Rousseau, humankind is naturally good but was 
corrupted by society. Human beings are born free and independent. Even though 
humankind is free naturally they are dependent on others for their survival, but it is 
also through social interaction that the individual learns more about itself, for 
example, through the family unit (Rousseau, 1762, pp. 2-3). John Locke, an English 
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philosopher, in his written work entitled, Two Treaties of Government discusses the 
state of nature just as Hobbes has done. Locke argues that, in the state of nature 
human beings are born with perfect freedom and have a duty to take care of and 
respect the rights, property and well-being of others. Thus, the state of nature is 
governed by laws of nature. Locke thus affirms the intrinsic goodness of humankind 
and its duty towards others (Locke, 1823, pp. 106-107). 
2.3.2 Challenging the importance of the state  
 
Liberals have accused realists of placing too much importance on the state and in 
this regard limits international relations to relations between states. Liberal actor-
centred theories support the idea that the state is not necessarily the most important 
actor in international relations and argue that state interests are not solely influenced 
by international anarchy.  
From this view, it can be argued that non-state actors also play a role in international 
relations and have an impact on the foreign policy decision making process which 
realist scholars indicate are “... a source of disruption of state authority and power” 
(Vincent, 2002, p. 148). Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive realm of the state as 
there are a variety of domestic groups within the state with their own identity, 
interest and beliefs all trying to impact on the type of interests states represent in the 
international system. Domestic actors or groups also referred to as societal interest 
groups, include religious groups, non-governmental organisations, business 
associations, trade unions and so forth (Panke & Risse, 2007, pp. 92-93). 
Huntington (1973, p. 334) argued that Keohane and Nye (both liberal scholars) have 
used the term transnational in a broader and more inclusive sense. When they refer 
to transnational activities, these include all affairs and activities occurring beyond the 
state which do not involve governmental agents. Transnational activities can include 
international trade and international travel for example. This sense of 
interconnectedness between individuals and groups in a pluralistic world can 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
possibly avert tension and conflict between them as they interact and are affected by 
each other (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 110-111). 
Susan Strange was a British academic that played an influential role in the field of the 
International Political Economy. Strange argues that, due to globalisation and the 
increasing presence and significance of transnational corporations the authority and 
power of the state have been on the decline. Globalisation refers to the worldwide 
phenomena where decisions, activities and events from one part of the world have a 
direct bearing on distant regions. As a result of this, state power is on the decline 
over the market and global economy. In this fashion, transnational corporations have 
played a greater role and influence over the market which needs to be scrutinised 
and evaluated (Strange, 2004, pp. 219-221). The term markets refer to the system of 
supply and demand of goods and services. 
Transnational corporations include businesses such as Shell, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, 
General Motors and so forth whose activities, including the production and selling of 
goods are not bound by state boundaries (D’Anieri, 2011, p. 354). There have been 
debates concerning the effects transnational corporations have on government 
power; for these corporations extract resources and may dictate domestic policy and 
influence economic or environmental policy to suit their interests (D’Anieri, 2011, p. 
335). 
Transnational corporations can access loans from banks; provide access to 
technology, employment and access to foreign markets to boost the economic 
strength of the nation (Strange, 1995, n.p.; Leander, 2001, p. 116). 
Domestic actors, groups and organisations do not necessarily displace the role of the 
state, but to exclude their influence and activities is to present an incomplete 
understanding and analysis of the international system and the variety of actors 
therein.   
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2.3.3 Interdependence and multilateralism 
 
A sense of mutual dependence between states and non-state actors has been 
intensified by the process of globalisation. Globalisation is also linked to the term 
‘global village’; as a result of technology in the form of transport and communication 
the world is becoming more interconnected (McGrew, 2005, pp. 20-22). In addition, 
globalisation has expanded political, economic and social activities to the point 
where domestic developments have international ramification (McGrew, 2005, pp. 
21-23). For example, in 2001 the Federal Reserve (Central Bank of the United States) 
lowered interest rate to 3% and since then reduced it to 1% in order to stimulate 
economic growth. This meant that citizens from lower income brackets or citizens 
with a poor credit history could access loans easily. Banks made money easily 
available at low rates and people would take loans out against their home (property). 
The use of property to secure loan agreements had detrimental implications when 
the interest rate rose to 5%, between 2004 and 2006 (BBC News, 2009). With the 
increase in interest rates, citizens were falling behind on their loan payments; banks 
could then legally take possession of their homes, housing prices depreciated, and as 
a result banks tightened access to loans. The mortgage crisis affected the payment of 
loans creating a condition where banks were losing large sums of money, and in 
order to handle the debt crisis they sold debt to global banks (BBC News, 2009). 
Economic losses in the mortgage market affected investor confidence in banks, and 
because the banking system is internationally linked this crisis spilled over to Europe 
for example. Global banks tightened their credit access as they lost confidence in 
each other, and with the shortage of money flowing into banks this situation was 
further worsened (Scott, 2008, n.p.). The decline in global economic activity resulted 
in many citizens losing their homes and jobs and many companies could no longer 
sustain themselves economically requiring government intervention into the 
economy. Also, the 2007 recession in the United States affected the global trade in 
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goods and services. At this time, the demand for imported goods and services to the 
United States declined, affecting the exports of many states (Pettinger, 2009, n.p.).  
Liberals are inclined to argue that interdependency can promote a sense of order 
and cooperation in the international system, and in this way may reduce conflict and 
war between states. According to Milner (1991, pp. 82-83) “The assumption that 
interdependence implies harmony or cooperation is widespread”. However, Milner 
cautions that interdependency is, firstly, not in conflict with international anarchy and 
secondly, does not necessary say anything about the level of order or the intensity of 
war. The presence of interdependency does not necessarily mean state interests are 
in harmony with others, and for this reason power continues to be a factor in 
relations between states (Milner, 1991, p. 83).    
When the term idealist is invoked scholars such as Woodrow Wilson come to mind. 
Woodrow Wilson was a professor of jurisprudence and political economy at the 
University of Princeton and in 1913 he was elected as the 28th president of the United 
States. President Wilson foresaw a world where states can cooperate instead of 
waging war (Elliot & Ali, 1984, p. 79).  
In 1918, in Congress, Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points speech 
contributing towards his vision of a peaceful world. Wilson’s peace program echoed 
in the Fourteen Points emerged before the end of World War I. Wilson noted in his 
speech, “What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is 
that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for 
every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine 
its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the 
world as against force and selfish aggression” (quoted in Copland, Lamm & 
Mckenna, 1999, p. 362). The Fourteen Point’s speech gained criticism but what came 
out of it was the desire to establish the League of Nations, an effort to institutionalise 
a sense of interdependence through multilateralism that continues to this day to be a 
liberal pursuit. The League of Nations was spearheaded by Wilson, as an international 
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body (organisation) to prevent disputes and war between states to ensure a peaceful 
world (Ethridge & Handelman, 2008, p. 536). The League of Nations acted as a forum 
where states could work together and reconcile differences between them. However, 
the refusal of the United States Senate to support the League of Nations dealt a blow 
to this organisation. The League of Nations, although established to bring about 
peace in the world was not able to prevent World War II. 
2.3.4 Neoliberalism and liberal institutionalism 
 
Neoliberal scholars such as Robert Keohane (1988), Joseph Nye (1993) and Robert 
Axelrod (1986), unlike classical liberals place their focus on system level factors. 
Neoliberals investigate the influence international institutions have over shaping 
state perception and behaviour. Here, international institutions provide rules and 
norms central to ordering state to state relations, acting as a source of cooperation 
and governance within an anarchical international system. Instead of institutions 
acting to benefit the greater good, neorealists argue that, institutions safeguard the 
self-interests of dominant states that are responsible for their existence. This section 
will discuss the role of international institutions, their purpose and briefly discuss 
problems associated with them. 
2.3.4.1 Institutions: creating international governance within anarchy 
 
In an anarchical international system cooperation between states may be hard to 
promote, but this does not mean that efforts to create order are futile. The absence 
of a world government does not mean a lack of global governance. Governance can 
be understood as how a particular environment is ordered and administered (Nel, 
2002, p. 9). International institutions and regimes act as forms of governance and 
order relations between states. Stephen D. Krasner, a professor of International 
Relations at Stanford University, provides a useful and inclusive definition of regimes. 
According to Krasner (1982, p. 185), “Regimes can be defined as a set of implicit or 
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explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. Norms and 
principles are standards of behaviour, giving meaning to the regime by prescribing 
how individuals representing the state should respond to an issue. Regimes and 
institutions are constructed to maintain a system of behaviour needed to facilitate 
cooperation, which is an ongoing process (Krasner, 1982, pp. 186-188). 
Keohane notes the confusion around the term international institution and its 
interchangeable use with international organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation, the International Labour Organisation and so forth. Rather, an 
institution “may refer to a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a 
particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized” 
(Keohane, 1988, p. 382). The term institution refers to a pattern of behaviour or a 
system of order, arranging human activity. Institutional patterns and arrangements 
set rules and standards by prescribing human behaviour and shaping expectations 
(Keohane, 1988, p. 382). Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, offer a definition of 
an institution but also separated it from a norm. Norms refer to a single set of 
standards of behaviour whereas institutions refer to a collection of norms that are 
interrelated (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The NPT and its norms of non-
proliferation and disarmament suit this definition of an institution.   
The notion of an international norm will be discussed in more detail in this chapter 
under the heading of constructivism. 
2.3.4.2 Functions of international institutions  
 
Neoliberal scholars, such as Robert Keohane (1988) and Robert Axelrod (1986) are 
interested in the role that international institutions and organisations play in the 
international system, in particular, their influence in shaping state behaviour and 
promoting cooperation among them. Keohane explains that cooperation between 
states is affected by what he terms ‘collective action problems’ (Martin, 2007, p. 111). 
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‘Collective action problems’ infer that cooperation is impeded by the fact that 
bargaining within a multilateral forum between states may not yield tangible results. 
Furthermore, based on the logic of international anarchy trust between states will be 
questionable; states may be weary of each other’s intensions. This will undoubtedly 
affect cooperation between them (Haggard, Levy, Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, 1993, p. 
175). It is expected that member states act in good faith and uphold their obligations 
under agreements. However, the nature and the strength of prohibitions in place 
would determine the strength of an institution and its support from member states. 
Neoliberal scholars are inclined to believe that international institutions and 
organisations hold an important position in international relations due to their 
functions. International organisations serve as forums where member states can 
negotiate issues and resolve conflicts between them. The discussion on international 
institutions can be related to non-proliferation and disarmament. The NPT as a treaty 
and international organisation gives rise to the NPT review conferences (multilateral 
forums). The NPT review conferences are where member states negotiate and 
evaluate the standard of the NPT.  
There are various reasons why states conflict and engage in war with one other. One 
reason may be because states keep secrets from each other. For this reason 
organisations also provide a space for member states to share information and learn 
about the concerns and interests of others and in this way minimise tension between 
them. John Ikenberry, a professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton 
University, makes a crucial point that institutions act as contracts between states, 
setting in place rights and rules that is expected from member states to govern their 
interactions (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 134). The NPT is a legal contract between member 
states, but it is the rules and norms of non-proliferation and disarmament, which 
create consistency as all member states are influenced by this order which shapes 
expectations and behaviour. States can monitor each other’s level of compliance 
towards the institution, in turn promoting transparency and accountability between 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
states that build confidence and counter insecurity inherent in an anarchical system 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 117, 120). 
2.3.4.3 Incentives for cooperation 
 
Neoliberal scholars differ in their perspective from earlier liberal views discussed. 
Neoliberals agree with realists that the state is the most important actor in the 
international system and is also a rational actor.  
The rational actor perspective in International Relations is associated with realism, 
used to explain how foreign policy decisions are made. When leaders are faced with 
a foreign policy decision, they have to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
what gains will be achieved as a result of their decision and what shortcomings may 
result. A ‘rational’ foreign policy decision is thus based on the maximum relative 
gains achieved with minimal cost (Neack, 2003, pp. 44-45; Martin, 2007, pp. 112-113). 
Axelrod and Keohane (1985, p. 226) have argued that world politics is not fixed. At 
particular times in history, war is experienced while at other times cooperation 
occurs. Cooperation in the international system is depended on the nature of an 
issue. However, there is also a material aspect or payoff related to institutions. With 
that said, for Axelrod and Keohane (1985, pp. 232-233) it is easier for states to 
cooperate on economic matters than around security concerns. Economic 
cooperation links states closely together, and they have to assume that their 
relationship will not be fixed to a certain period. Defecting from an agreement or 
institutions will result in future negative economic consequences. An example of 
economic cooperation can be seen in the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
economic system. 
The Bretton Woods economic system emerged in 1944, comprising of the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. It was 
the United States that was tasked with maintaining the capitalistic system through 
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the Bretton Woods economic system central to rebuild Japan and Western European 
after World War II and stabilising international currencies. The United States 
benefited from this system, through access to foreign markets (Leysens & Thompson, 
2002, pp. 77-80). 
After World War II, weaker states may have preferred to belong to an institutional 
order because of perceived gains. The ability to access financial loans through the 
Bretton Woods economic system and the regulation of monetary policy made 
belonging to this order desirable. 
2.3.4.4 Neorealist critique of liberal institutionalism 
 
As earlier discussed, there are areas of agreement between neoliberal and neorealist' 
scholars, but there are also significant differences. For neorealists order in the 
international system is based on a balance of power or hegemony. The concept of 
hegemony refers to a dominant state that exerts its political, economic and cultural 
power over other states. As a result, order is not imposed or created by institutions; 
rather, it is the dominant state(s) that influence institutions. The neorealist' scholar, 
John Mearsheimer, supports this view and argues that institutions have very little or 
no influence over shaping state interests and conduct as dominant powers create 
institutions, which embody their own self-interests (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 7). 
In Mearsheimer’s critique of liberal institutionalism he refers to NATO as an example. 
Mearsheimer indicates that without the threat of the Soviet Union, cooperation 
between NATO and the European community would breakdown. Mearsheimer was 
of the view that the fall of the Soviet Union would reduce the usefulness of NATO, 
and thus the Eastern European states would in turn become suspicious of each other, 
fuelling conflicts and war between them (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 52; Keohane & 
Martin, 2010, p. 63). However, the assumption of Measheimer was flawed as NATO 
continues to survive and expand. Waltz’s answer as to why NATO has not ceased to 
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exist is because the United States wanted NATO to survive and expand (Waltz, 2000, 
p. 25). 
Waltz also argues that Keohane and Martin, although they attempt to disagree and 
criticise realism, are actually in support of it. For Waltz, international institutions are 
constructed to serve the interest of those that brought them into existence (Waltz, 
2000, p. 21). Strong states use institutions to create a favourable environment for 
them that serve their interests. Thus, the strength of an institution depends largely on 
the intensions of those that bring them into existence. This view supports the idea 
that dominant powers have a direct impact on the life and strength of an institution 
(Waltz, 2000, p. 24). Ikenberry elaborates further on this argument. He poses the 
question: why would a hegemonic state limit its own power through the creation of 
an institution? If a hegemonic state calculates that its dominant position will be short 
lived, then there is an incentive to build an institution which will create favourable 
patterns of cooperation with other states that persist even as power balances shift 
(Ikenberry, 2006, p. 136). Neorealist scholars such as Mearsheimer do not explicitly 
articulate that cooperation is impossible. In Mearsheimer’s (1995, p. 9) article entitled, 
The False Promise of International Institutions, he proposed that cooperation may be 
possible, but it cannot undo a realist world of international anarchy where conflicts 
and security competition between states is the order of the day, and which no 
amount of cooperation can overcome. In this way, cooperation is a short lived 
phenomenon. Anarchy does not mean disorder or chaos; rather, it is an 'ordering 
principle’, itself indicating that states are the highest entities in the international 
system due to the lack of a world government (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 10). 
Neorealists assert that cooperation will be hindered by international anarchy, which 
leads states to question the activities, behaviour and capabilities of other states. 
However, when institutions do emerge, this is solely based on the desire of great 
powers or hegemonic states to benefit their self-interests. 
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2.4 Constructivism  
 
The neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought in International Relations were for 
some time regarded as the mainstream accounts of the international system. Despite 
their significance, these theories are not without their shortcomings. E. H. Carr 
explicitly stated in his book entitled, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, the 
centrality of a realist and a liberal view in International Relations to remedy the 
shortcomings of each discipline. According to Carr (1939, p. 10) “...there is a stage 
where realism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in 
other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism. 
Immature thought is predominantly purposive and utopian. Thought which rejects 
purpose altogether is the thought of old age. Mature thought combines purpose 
with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political 
science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where 
both have their place”. Constructivism, it will be argued here, acts as a bridge 
between the realist and liberal theories to reconcile their differences. In this way, a 
more holistic view of the international system can be obtained, indicating which 
other factors have a bearing on state interests and interaction other than 
international anarchy and power. 
2.4.1 The role of ideas in the international system  
 
Unlike realists and liberals who place an emphasis on material factors, such as 
military and economic power, constructivists argue that ideas play a significant role 
in international relations. It should not be inferred that constructivism neglects the 
role of power; rather, ideas influence how states come to define their interests and 
respond to other actors. Alexander Wendt, a central scholar in social constructivism 
argues that, the social world (or ‘reality’) comprises of a set of ideas and beliefs that 
structure and give meaning to relations (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Human beings are 
involved in a process of making sense of the world. This process of meaning-making 
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that human beings impose on the world through their intellect, and ideas are ways to 
order the world, guide their activities, and maintain relations between them (Adler, 
2005, p. 92). A group of people in a particular space of time have in possession 
beliefs and ideas about themselves, the sovereign nations they form part of and their 
historical, religious and cultural aspects, which set them apart from others (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2003, p. 255). 
According to Jackson and Sørensen (2003, p. 254), “The social world is a world of 
human consciousness of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of language 
and discourses, of signals, and understanding among human beings, especially 
groups of human beings, such as states and nations”. The social world and political 
world with their laws, rules and institutions are different from nature as they have 
been invented through human consciousness. For example, nuclear weapons are 
physical entities, which have brought much devastation to the world as seen in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. However, the ideas behind these weapons are also 
particularly dangerous, such as the association of prestige and power to nuclear 
weapons, which may lead others who desire this level of status to believe they can 
only do so by obtaining nuclear weapons. It is the ideas behind the formation of 
physical entities that influence how they are viewed, used and experienced by others 
(Onuf, 1998, pp. 61, 74). 
2.4.2 The role of norms in international relations 
 
Ideas establish and define what is considered to be appropriate forms of behaviour, 
and over time ideas become norms. Simultaneously, norms influence ideas, and for 
that reason constructivists place their focus on the role of norms in international 
relations.  
According to Legro (1997, p. 33), “International relations theorists have in recent 
years shown an interest in international norms and rules not equated since the 
interwar period.” For realists, such as E. H. Carr who assumed the first Woodrow 
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Wilson Chair of International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth in 1936, 
institutions and norms have relatively little influence over shaping the behaviour of 
states in an anarchical international system, because “power ultimately trumps all 
other considerations...” (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 143). This argument is problematic 
and misleading, for it assumes that international anarchy is the only factor capable of 
influencing the interests of states and thus determines how states pursue 
international relations. 
The question emerges, what is a norm and what role do norms play in international 
relations? Florini (1996, p. 364) defines a norm as a standard of behaviour which 
prescribes how members of society ought to conduct themselves. Norms represent 
appropriate forms of behaviour that is not limited to an individual actor but are 
shared among different actors. For example, the non-proliferation norm is not 
related to one state but applies to all states that form part of the NPT, namely 
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 171). Thus, 
the influence of a norm in the international system is dependent on whether it has a 
distinctive character of legitimacy, which is representative of its level of support. 
By prescribing appropriate forms of behaviour, norms are useful to states to bring 
more order to the international system. According to Florini (1996, p. 365) “Norms 
arise because they are “needed” to bring about cooperation in a mixed-motive 
setting or game with multiple equilibria”. Neoliberalists are more optimistic in their 
support of international cooperation and see norms as having a significant impact on 
state to state relations. For neorealists anarchy remains the driving force behind 
change in international relations. However, neorealists support the idea that norms 
have a limited influence on state behaviour as the distribution of power is 
responsible for how states conduct their affairs. 
Neorealist scholars warn that there is always a risk that states may cheat when it 
comes to norm adherence, so those states that abide by norms limit their own 
behaviour, but cannot be sure that other states will also do the same (Jackson & 
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Sørensen, 2007, p. 173; Bradford, 2001, p. 656). However, it can be argued that states 
that seek to maintain economic relations, for example, need to develop and maintain 
common rules between them to reduce conflict, which can negatively affect their 
economic well-being (Buzan, 1993, p. 334). 
A deeper understanding of norms has been put forward by Legro (1997, p. 33) who 
warns that norms often have competing and conflicting commands and 
requirements. The notion of ‘self-help’ as inferred by realists from international 
anarchy is an example of a standard of behaviour which has been put forward by 
realists of how states need to act. Self-help and cooperation are competing 
processes. Hence, the desired end of cooperation may be limited by those that 
advocate self-help. Another significant factor influencing the strength of a norm is its 
durability, which depends on the consensus around the issue and the prohibitions in 
place to deal with those that deviate from the desired forms of behaviour (Legro, 
1997, pp. 33-35). When there is a high level of consensus around a norm, it will 
become institutionalised and established as a law governing an organisation or a 
system (for example, the norm of non-proliferation, which forms part of the non-
proliferation regime) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). 
2.4.3 Challenging self-help views of international anarchy 
 
Constructivism has been greatly influenced by Alexander Wendt. Wendt made a 
significant contribution to constructivism by challenging the assumption that 
international anarchy (as a force) is responsible for conflict and war between states. 
Also, Wendt challenged the neorealist and neoliberal view that states are rational and 
unitary actors. For Wendt, self-help is not necessarily a rational response to 
international anarchy. It is at this point that Wendt proposes to build a bridge 
between the neoliberal and neorealist school of thought (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). 
As previously argued, constructivism places the emphasis on the role of ideas in the 
international system. For realist’ scholars, anarchy is the driving force behind why 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
states act in self-help ways. Wendt critiques this view and argues that, self-help and 
power politics are not basic or necessary responses under anarchy. Anarchy, that is, 
the lack of a world government is a fact, but drawing negative conclusions from 
anarchy is simply an idea that has dominated the international system, and is not 
necessarily a true depiction of reality (Wendt, 1992, pp. 394-395). 
Since the social world is an invention of human intellect and ideas, so too are 
perceptions created of the ‘inevitable’ outcomes of anarchy. Anarchy may affect state 
security, but it does not predetermine the nature of state interaction (that is, whether 
relations will be conflictual or cooperative). From this statement, it can be inferred 
that how states perceive the world determines how they will respond to phenomena 
and to other states. Following this logic, the way states perceive the international 
system and construct their identity will influence state behaviour and interests (Little 
& Smith, 2006 p. 392). 
States that regard themselves as middle powers define their identity and interests by 
this category. Middle powers favour multilateral solutions to international problems 
and work through structures such as the New Agenda Coalition to influence nuclear-
related matters (non-proliferation and disarmament) (Flemes, 2007, p. 8; International 
Business Publications, 2007, p. 135). This middle power role describes the identity of 
states, and influences how they perceive/respond to other states and phenomena. 
There is thus a link between state identity and interests. That is, the way state identity 
is constructed will influence what type of interests states will pursue and the way they 
relate to their environment (Wendt, 1992, pp. 398-399). 
Those that subscribe to the self-help logic are inclined to view security as an 
individual process or responsibility. Wendt argues further that state security can be 
seen as a collective process, this is possible under anarchy. This challenges the realist 
assumption that states will continue to engage in conflict due to anarchy. Self-help is 
a social construction which has over time come to be seen as real or factually based. 
The security dilemma between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis for example was not a natural process; it occurred through 
interaction, internalising the activities of the other, constructing perceptions and then 
acting upon them. Self-help, just like state sovereignty, exists because states 
recognise it and practice it. New ideas can overcome old systems of thinking as the 
social and political world is a social construction and not an unchanging fact (Wendt, 
1992, pp. 407-410, 412-413).    
In chapter six, a constructivist view of the NPT will be explored, namely that the NPT 
is a social construction, created through the ideas and beliefs of states. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a theoretical framework that will guide the study. The three 
dominant paradigms in International Relations have been discussed; namely, realism, 
liberalism and constructivism, offering a different interpretation of the international 
system but also complementing each other. Thus, they indicate which factors 
influence how states perceive and pursue their interests as well as respond to others. 
On closer inspection, the assumptions of these theoretical paradigms can be placed 
into five major categories for the purpose of comparing and contrasting them. The 
five major categories are, the central actor(s) in international relations, the role of 
anarchy, the role of power, the role of morality, and lastly whether change is possible 
in the international system or whether continuity prevails. These are the major issues 
discussed in each theoretical paradigm. Realists argue that the state is the most 
important actor in the international system and within an anarchical system; power is 
the only feature that can influence international outcomes. From this argument, 
anarchy condemns states to conflict and engaging in war and because anarchy is 
permanent, continuity prevails in international politics. For liberal scholars, states are 
not the most important actors, transnational and multinational corporations have an 
influence over the affairs and interests the state projects. Liberals see anarchy as a 
fact but argue that cooperation between states is possible through international 
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institutions and organisations. Power is not the only influential factor in the world; 
morality also guides state decisions, for example the decision to end the slave trade 
and because people are innovative and learn from their mistakes, progress is 
possible in international relations. For constructivists, ideas play a prominent role in 
how states view the world and respond to it. So who the main actors are, the norms 
that determine behaviour and whether change or continuity prevails are a function of 
the interplay between agents and structures that constitute the reality of 
international politics. 
Core concepts and theories of International Relations will be applied to the NPT. The 
researcher proposes to provide a critical analysis of the NPT, its purpose and ability 
to combat insecurity in an anarchical world by interpreting this treaty from a realist 
(chapter four), liberal (chapter five) and constructivist (chapter six) perspective. Such a 
critical analysis will reveal whether the NPT is a realist instrument used by strong 
states to facilitate their self-interests or a liberal instrument working to the benefit of 
the international community at large, or whether its meaning can change as the 
thinking and ideas of states change (as constructivist would hold).  
The next chapter highlights the evolution of the NPT since it was first proposed and 
when it finally entered into force. This chapter offers a descriptive account of the 
NPT, noting key review conferences and critical events preceding these conferences, 
which have impacted on the NPT’s direction and strength.  
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Chapter 3: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Any discussion of the NPT will be incomplete without providing background on the 
introductory process of this treaty. This chapter will proceed by explaining the origin 
of the NPT; that is, when the idea of an international agreement to limit the spread of 
nuclear weapons was first proposed, how the treaty was negotiated and the tensions 
between member states that arose and became embedded in the treaty. Thus, the 
chapter will not only discuss the origin of the NPT, but also shed light on its 
subsequent evolution as measured by the review conferences. In particular, this 
analysis will reveal the areas of disagreement between nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapon states that continue to persist, affecting the integrity and strength of 
this treaty and its goal of promoting a world free from nuclear weapons. 
3.2 The origin of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
The origin of the NPT stems from a proposal made by Frank Aiken, an Irish Minster 
for External Affairs in 1958. In the 13th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
meeting, Frank Aiken proposed a draft resolution calling nuclear weapon states not 
to proliferate nuclear weapons to states not in possession of them (Pande, 1995, p. 3; 
Fischer, 1992, p. 5 and Mozley, 1998, p. 142). Ireland played an influential role in 
shaping non-proliferation discussions by describing the problems surrounding 
nuclear weapons and how to address them (Sinnott, 1995, pp. 59-60). This state 
argued that a universal test ban treaty was not sufficient in preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons, and that it would also be in the self-interests of nuclear weapon 
states to support its proposal of a non-proliferation treaty. In 1957, when the IAEA 
came into existence with the responsibility of inspecting nuclear facilities and power 
plants to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers, it was already clear that 
stronger mechanisms needed to be in effect to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 
In 1953, United States President Dwight Eisenhower championed the idea among 
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other nuclear supplier states that nuclear information and technology for peaceful 
civilian purposes be shared (Firmage, 1969, pp. 714-715). This decision came in the 
form of the Atoms for Peace program. In return for gaining access to nuclear material 
and technology states should forgo the nuclear weapons option (Wastler, 2010, p. 
203). In 1957, the IAEA emerged from the Atoms for Peace program to facilitate the 
peaceful application of atomic energy and prevented the diversion of nuclear 
material (Bunn, 2003, p. 1; Firmage, 1969, p. 715). At this time, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the Soviet Union were the only states in possession of nuclear 
weapons. It was argued that the Atoms for Peace program led to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to states such as India, Israel and Pakistan, because it provided 
access to dual-use technology that was diverted by these countries to their military 
programmes (Kroenig, 2010, pp. 157-159). To prevent this from happening stronger 
verification measures were put in place to ensure that states do not direct civilian 
nuclear technology to weapons programmes. 
In an effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons Ireland made a proposal to the 
UNGA that the UN Disarmament Committee should be created to develop means 
through which nuclear proliferation could be forestalled. More specifically, it 
proposed that the number of nuclear weapon states should be limited through the 
creation of an international treaty. Initially, among those that disagreed with the Irish 
proposal was the United States as it came to the conclusion that other states would 
not reject nuclear weapons while the United States continued to be in possession of 
them (Pande, 1995, p. 4; Emelyanov, 1982, p. 170). 
Discussions on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons continued throughout the 
late 1950s. However, it was only in 1961 that serious and more earnest discussions 
emerged around this issue within the UNGA based on the Irish proposal. In 
December 1961, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1665 (XVI) calling for the nuclear 
weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and in 
turn, non-nuclear weapon states not to produce nor accept nuclear weapons. 
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Resolution 1665 (XVI) was vital to nuclear arms control initiatives as it called for all 
states to make a concerted effort to realise the conclusion of an international 
agreement in support of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (UN, 1961b, pp. 
5-6; Pande, 1995, pp. 3-4). 
Shortly thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union (also known as the Union 
for Soviet Socialist Republics or by the abbreviation, USSR) made a joint statement 
concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament, forwarded it to the UNGA and 
proposed an appropriate body to be convened where these matters could be 
discussed. In 1961, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was formed by the 
UNGA based on Resolution 1722 (XVI) and opened for discussion in 1962 (Neidle, 
1963, pp. 46-47). This Committee was a multilateral forum in which negotiations 
could take place and was tasked with the responsibility to develop a joint statement 
among its members that would lay a foundation of agreed principles for the 
establishment of the NPT (UN, 1961a, p. 7; Pande, 1995, p. 5). The Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee included Western states, such as Britain, Canada, France, 
Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Bloc, including Bulgaria, the former 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. It also included so-called 
NAM states, for example, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the 
United Arab Republic (Zarate, 2007, p. 8). 
The NAM is a group of 118 member states that is mobilised around promoting the 
interests and needs of the developing states. The origin of this movement was based 
on the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference which convened in Bandung, Indonesia and was 
officially launched in 1961. Member states, as a result of common concerns, have 
mobilised around and in support of ending colonialism/neo-colonialism, self-
determination and promoting reform of the global order dominated by the West 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006; The Non-Aligned Movement, 2001). Non-
Alignment can be termed as a position emanating from the period referred to as the 
Cold War. 
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The Cold War period gave rise to a bipolar international system. Bipolarity in the 
international system was accompanied by hostility and rivalry, most notably 
manifesting in the form of a nuclear arms race between the West (United States) and 
the East (Soviet Union) and their respective allies. States were either allies of the 
United States or the Soviet Union, but Non-Aligned states chose not to align 
themselves with any major power bloc. With the end of the Cold War, NAM 
continues to play a role in global affairs, in particular supporting nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament (United States Department of Defense, 2010, pp. vii-
viii, 3). 
Once again, in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union made draft treaties “for 
the General and Complete Disarmament...” of nuclear weapons and presented it to 
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (Pande, 1995, p. 5). However, draft 
treaties submitted by these states placed an emphasis on non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons while not encouraging disarmament of their own nuclear weapons. 
The Soviet Union wanted to get the nuclear weapons of the United States off the 
territory of Central Europe and West Germany. In contrast, the United States and its 
allies wanted to place nuclear weapons in Central Europe to deter and balance 
superior Soviet Union forces (Carranza, 2006, p. 493; Sagan, 1997, p. 78).  
The year 1962 was characterised by the Cuban Missile Crisis, resulting from an 
unstable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two 
superpowers of the Cold War era engaged in a nuclear arms race, with the United 
States holding nuclear superiority by being in possession of more nuclear weapons. 
Fearing an attack by the United States, the Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba 
that became a Soviet ally after the communist revolution under Fidel Castro. Soviet 
missiles stationed in Cuba thus had the potential of carrying nuclear weapons that 
could reach the United States. The then United States President, John F. Kennedy, 
consulted his advisers who proposed a military blockade of Cuba. The tensions of 
war were rising and created a condition where Kennedy and the Soviet Union 
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President, Nikita Khrushchev, saw the importance of developing mechanisms to 
minimise a possible nuclear war (Schlesinger, 1996, pp. 25-26). It could be argued 
that the Cuban Missile Crisis brought home to the leaders of both superpowers the 
danger of nuclear escalation when they pass these weapons on to their allies. This 
realisation laid the foundation for a more earnest discussion by the superpowers on a 
non-proliferation treaty, but also set the stage for the distinction between nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.  
In 1963, the Soviet Union and the United States showed hostility towards measures 
discussed by non-aligned states in the UNGA to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union criticised a plan by Western states and in particular, 
representatives of the United States that wanted to ensure that any non-proliferation 
treaty would not affect NATO from gaining access to nuclear weapons. For the Soviet 
Union, this ran contrary to the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(Pande, 1995, pp. 6-7; Emelyanov, 1982, p. 170). 
3.3 Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Principles and 
obstacles  
 
In a 1964 session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, the United States 
proposed a non-proliferation treaty drawing its origin from the Irish Resolution of 
1958 and in 1965 drafted a full treaty concerning preventing nuclear weapon states 
from proliferating nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring 
them (Ford, 2007, p. 959). Positive strides were also made by non-nuclear weapon 
states towards this end. During discussions at an Organization for African Unity 
(OAU) Summit in Cairo, in July 1964, and the Second Conference of the non-aligned 
states in October 1964, an agreement was reached and supported. Both conferences 
supported a treaty that would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their 
acquisition (Cisse, 1980, pp. 93-94; Ford, 2007, p. 959 and UN, 1965, p. 7). United 
States officials acknowledged the dangers that nuclear weapons posed to all states. 
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However, for many non-nuclear weapon states the concern was not over nuclear 
weapons being used against them by those who were in possession of them but 
rather nuclear weapons proliferating to neighbours in their region (Carranza, 2006, p. 
493). 
According to Mishra (2008, p. 5), there are two dominant perspectives that explain 
the origin of the NPT. The first is a Western view indicating that the origin of the NPT 
stems from a concern by the United States over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The second is a ‘developing nations’ perspective’ and holds that non-nuclear weapon 
states were equally concerned over the spread of nuclear weapons and supported 
nuclear disarmament. For example, India as a non-nuclear weapon state at the time 
was an instrumental agent in supporting non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
(Dougherty, 1966, pp. 19, 21; Mishra, 2008, pp. 5-6). The proposal for preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s came from 
developing states (non-nuclear weapon states) rather than nuclear weapon states 
(Pande, 1995, p. 5). 
The disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States soon changed, 
and their focus on non-proliferation was realigned based on the nuclear explosion by 
China in 1964. This also had an impact on the position of India. India expressed that 
nuclear weapon states should not transfer weapons or technology to non-nuclear 
weapon states, and that nuclear weapons should not be used against non-nuclear 
weapon states (Pande, 1995, p. 6; Zarate, 2007, p. 9). As instructed by the UNGA the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee prioritised non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in an effort to develop an international treaty (UN, 1965, p. 8). It was then 
that Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the UAR (Egypt) all forming 
part of the non-aligned states “...submitted a memorandum to the General Assembly 
setting out their joint views on the non-proliferation question” (Pande, 1995, p. 8). 
This memorandum was instrumental as it paved the way for the NPT by laying down 
its core principles. 
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November 1965 marked a prominent time towards the effort of reaching an 
international treaty on non-proliferation. Based on the memorandum submitted to 
the UNGA by the eight Non-Aligned members, Resolution 2028 (XX) on Non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons was officially adopted (Mishra, 2008, p. 6; UN, 1965, 
pp. 7-8). It stated that five principles would guide the formation of an international 
treaty, namely:   
 The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or 
non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in 
any form; 
 The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities 
and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; 
 The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete 
disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament; 
 There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the 
effectiveness of the treaty; 
 Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States 
to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear 
weapons in their respective territories. 
 
Negotiations progressed and in 1966 India and non-aligned states argued for arms 
limitation and security assurances to be included in the NPT. In spite of this, the 
United States and the Soviet Union did not make any reference or support this 
initiative in their draft treaties. Their reasoning for the lack of support concerning 
reducing nuclear stockpiles and making security assurances was based on the notion 
that these measures may prevent an agreement on the NPT. They deemed these 
demands “unnecessary, imprudent and complicating”, risking a delay of the treaty 
(Pande, 1995, p. 10; Graham, 2008, p. 51). As a result, the draft treaties by the United 
States and the Soviet Union was criticised by India. At this point, India requested a 
more balanced treaty that was non-discriminatory against non-nuclear weapon 
states. From this view, all states and not only non-nuclear weapon states should be 
expected to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. In addition, reductions in 
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nuclear stockpiles must be legally enforced. India’s position was also supported by 
Sweden that proposed a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a treaty 
to be introduced with the goal of ending the production of fissile material which can 
be used to make nuclear weapons (Graham, 2008, pp. 48-49; Pande, 1995, p. 10). 
Tensions between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states were clearly visible and 
influenced the process of negotiations. 
It became apparent to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states would 
not support the introduction of a limitation on nuclear arms in the NPT. Non-aligned 
states and also some Western states, such as Canada and Italy proposed that there 
be a separate article which requires nuclear weapon states to stop the arms race and 
eventually reduce their nuclear stockpile (Graham, 2008, pp. 49-50). It appeared that 
the proposals made by non-aligned states and others had an impact on subsequent 
draft treaties submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, as both 
submitted identical drafts to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (Pande, 
1995, p. 11).   
The draft treaties of the United States and the Soviet Union generated much debate 
and also criticism from many states. It was essential for an international treaty on 
non-proliferation to be established; however, the question of benefits or incentives 
for joining such a treaty needed to materialise. Many non-nuclear weapon states had 
hoped that in return for renouncing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states would 
promote nuclear disarmament, would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against 
them, and would aid the advancement of peaceful nuclear technology. Brazil and 
India noted the discriminatory nature of the NPT and as a concession expected that 
nuclear weapon states should not manufacture any new nuclear weapons, referred to 
as ‘vertical proliferation’ (Goldschmidt, 1980, p. 73). 
Italy and Switzerland did not support a treaty that had an unlimited lifespan; they 
argued that the treaty should have a fixed period. It was decided that the lifespan of 
this treaty would be for 25 years (Johnson, 2010b, pp. 438-439). A treaty with an 
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unlimited duration would affect negotiations on nuclear disarmament by instituting 
the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, relieving 
nuclear weapon states of the pressure to disarm (Pilat, 1995, p. 34). Britain proposed 
a review conference which formed part of the draft treaty. A review conference would 
be convened every five years to monitor the progress the NPT has made and discuss 
its future (Pande, 1995, pp. 13, 15; Sinnott, 1995, p. 65). The United States and the 
Soviet Union once again submitted revised draft treaties on 18 January 1968. The 
new draft included what is known as Article III of the NPT, namely to place all nuclear 
facilities of non-nuclear weapon states under IAEA safeguards. IAEA safeguards refer 
to a system that includes a range of different technical and protective measures to 
verify and determine the nature of states’ nuclear material and activities. This is a key 
mechanism to verify that peaceful nuclear material is not diverted to military 
purposes (IAEA, 2011, n.p.; IAEA, 2002b, p. 13).  
Furthermore, a concession for non-nuclear weapon states for not ‘going nuclear’, 
that is, getting nuclear weapons, was access to nuclear technology used for peaceful 
purposes, inscribed as Article IV in the NPT. There were thus back and forth 
negotiations over the terms of this treaty between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon 
states before its conclusion.   
3.4 The Conclusion of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
The next negotiation session convened on 24 April 1968 in the UNGA. During this 
session, 23 non-nuclear weapon states including Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Cyprus, India, Jordon, Nigeria, South Africa and many others criticised the 
March 1968 draft treaty for its weak arms limitation and disarmament conditions. 
These two mentioned provisions were included to address the discriminatory nature 
of the NPT by requiring nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and 
eventually disarm completely (Pande, 1995, pp. 15-16). An important critique came 
from 18 non-nuclear weapon states, namely Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Dahomey (the 
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African country now known as Benin), El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Jamaica, 
Japan, Peru, Rwanda and South Africa. Article VI was criticised on the grounds that it 
was “vague, subjective, insufficiently compelling and merely an expression of 
intention to undertake negotiations in good faith which, in the previous 20 years, had 
not resulted in significant arms limitation and disarmament agreements” (Pande, 
1995, p. 16). Subsequently, based on a proposal made by Yugoslavia on arms 
limitation and disarmament, an amendment was made to the preamble of the joint 
revised draft treaty of the United States and the Soviet Union to include the wording 
"to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament". This 
amendment was supported by the UNGA and was added to Resolution 2373 (XXII) 
on 12 June 1968 (UN, 1975, p. 2; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, n.p.).  
The outcome of negotiations resulted in 59 states, including the United States and 
the Soviet Union, signing the NPT, open for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into 
force on 5 March 1970 (Clemens, 2004, p. 227; Mishra, 2008, p. 7 and Pande, 1995, p. 
17).  
Though the NPT was put into effect and ratified by many states, there was still a 
sense of uncertainty around its principles, based on the many critiques by non-
nuclear weapon states during its negotiation process. The disputes and 
disagreements discussed should not be seen in a vacuum as they continue to play a 
role in non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations ever since. These differences 
have not been successfully resolved, and disarmament of nuclear weapons remains a 
contested area of international politics. This introductory section of the NPT serves as 
a guide to understand the roots of current debates between nuclear weapon and 
non-nuclear weapon states. The origin of the NPT is also the source of its challenges: 
to realise a world free from nuclear weapons greater commitment is needed by 
nuclear weapon states towards disarmament. From the outset, this commitment has 
been relegated to the realm of the idealistic as opposed to an imaginable goal, 
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bringing one of the key themes that this thesis aims to explore to light: juxtaposing 
an idealist and realist interpretation of the NPT. 
The next section will briefly outline the review conferences that took place since the 
NPT came into effect. The chapter will focus on the first Review Conference that 
convened in 1975, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 2000 and the 
2005 conferences which were regarded by many states as failures, and lastly, the 
2010 Review Conference. An analysis of these five conferences respectively provides 
an understanding of the current status of the NPT as it manifested during the 2010 
Review Conference, a source of data that will be drawn on in subsequent chapters.  
3.5 The first Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
 
Under Article VIII.3 of the NPT, every five years, an NPT review conference will be 
convened and the first of which would be in Geneva, Switzerland. Review conferences 
are useful to interpret the NPT, monitor its strengths and weaknesses and an 
opportunity for member states and civil society organisations to make 
recommendations and amendments to improve the treaty’s status (Rauf, 2000, p. 8). 
The main purpose of the NPT review conferences is to develop a final document 
where member states can agree on the direction of the NPT (Shaker, 2010, p. 3). 
According to Stoiber (2003, p. 127), states perceived the final document of the NPT 
differently. Some may argue that agreements emanating from NPT review 
conferences are legally binding while others regard them as non-binding, and 
therefore, discardable. Nevertheless, Stoiber (2003, p. 127) argues that a final 
document is important because “at least, such language could be taken to express a 
concrete statement of the parties on the interpretation of the treaty, unless and until 
revised or repudiated in a similar consensus document.” 
In May 1975, the membership of the NPT increased to 91 states (Choubey, 2009, p. 
19). In spite of the declaration at this conference that all member states had adhered 
to their NPT obligations, there remained challenges to the treaty (Emelyanov, 1982, 
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p. 172). Non-nuclear weapon states voiced their concern that too much emphasis 
was placed on their obligations under the NPT, while their rights and the obligations 
of nuclear weapon states had not been properly implemented. This discussion 
related to the ‘inalienable right’ of non-nuclear weapon states to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes, and the nuclear weapon states obligation under Article VI and 
the Preamble of the NPT to disarm (Sukovit, 1982, p. 216; Dhanapala & Rydell, 2005, 
pp. 17-18.). 
3.5.1 Unfulfilled promises and commitments by nuclear weapon states 
 
In response to the lack of support by nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon 
states attempted to add protocols to the NPT. The first proposal was in support of a 
‘comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons’. Protocol two was in response to reducing 
the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenals possessed by nuclear weapon states. 
Proposal three involved an assurance by nuclear weapon states not to use or 
threaten non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons (Barkenbus, 1980, p. 38; 
Boutwell, 2010, p. 6).  
The nuclear weapon states largely ignored these proposals and refused to support 
them. The United States and the Soviet Union made mention of the Strategic Arms 
and Limitation (SALT) talks as part of their commitment to the NPT. The SALT talks 
refer to a series of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union 
which occurred between 1969 and lasted until May 1972, with the aim of developing 
agreements to reduce their offensive nuclear weapon stockpiles. The outcome of 
talks resulted in the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the 
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons both on land and in 
submarines (Graham & LaVera, 2003, p. 309; Halloran, 2009, pp. 126-127 and UN, 
1975, p. 7). SALT was regarded by these states as their exclusive area of negotiations 
which non-nuclear weapon states should not interfere with (Epstein, 1975, p. 46). 
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Other agreements signed between the United States and Russia included the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In 1991, START I was signed  to reduce the 
amount of strategic delivery vehicles including intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
heavy bombers and sea-launched ballistic missiles of the United States and Russia to 
1600 (Taylor, 2010, p. 3; United States Department of Defense, 2010, p. 21). However, 
on 5 December 2009, START 1 expired leading to the negotiation of New START, 
signed on 8 April 2010 and entering into force on 5 February 2011 (The Daily 
Maverick, 2010).  
At the 1975 Review Conference, nuclear weapon states were more interested in 
strengthening IAEA security measures of nuclear materials to prevent theft and 
diversion from peaceful uses. A proposal to create ‘multilateral nuclear fuel cycle 
centers’ (as opposed to allowing non-nuclear weapon states mastering the nuclear 
fuel cycle individually) was floated by nuclear weapon states to alleviate the risk that 
nuclear material would be stolen or diverted to military purposes (Epstein, 1975, p. 
47). In Epstein’s elaboration on this matter, it is indicated that non-nuclear weapon 
states would have been willing to accept restrains and controls only if the nuclear 
weapon states were more committed to their obligations under the NPT. This 
initiative did not materialise due to the lack of political will on this issue (Shaker, 
2007, p. 1). 
3.5.2 Vague and conditional commitments 
 
To the disappointment of non-nuclear weapon states, arms control and disarmament 
remained vague and unachieved. Non-nuclear weapon states felt deceived but 
remained committed to the NPT. In particular, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles 
from Mexico criticised the power of the United States and the Soviet Union who 
undermined the role and needs of non-nuclear weapon states and used the NPT to 
serve their own ends, thus placing themselves above other member states. 
Ambassador Robles made three proposals, the first proposal called for nuclear 
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weapon states to negotiate a CTBT, the second included halting nuclear testing on a 
temporary basis, and the third demanded a stop to the further production of nuclear 
weapons (Power, 1986, pp. 481-482). These proposals were blocked by the United 
States. In an effort to develop a consensus and prevent the failure of this conference, 
former Swedish President, Inga Thorsson and chair of the Review Conference, urged 
nuclear weapon states to demonstrate more support towards their treaty obligations. 
A final document was established as a result of the proposals made by Ambassador 
Robles, yet the conference ended without producing any real results (Epstein, 1975, 
pp. 47-48). Nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states despite quarrels “agreed 
late in the meeting to a declaration written in language tilted in favour of the pro-
CTBT forces” (Power, 1986, p. 482).  
At this time, important states, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and 
South Africa remained outside the NPT (Emelyanov, 1982, p. 172). Brazilian and 
Argentinean relations since their independence in the 1800s have been characterised 
by rivalry and competition. In 1825 these states entered armed conflict which 
perpetuated a sense of mistrust and hostility toward each other. This rivalry and 
hostility were visible in the nuclear field concerning technology and development 
and was also the reason for their reluctance to accede to the NPT (Carasales, 1995, 
pp. 39-40). 
Israel's reason for not acceding to the NPT is based on its geographical position and 
its sense of vulnerability within the Middle East. Israeli officials argue that Israel is 
best safeguarded through its military force, which is believed to include nuclear 
weapons (which Israel has never admitted or denied – also referred to as a policy of 
deliberate nuclear ambivalence). This reasoning for remaining outside the NPT was 
also employed by apartheid South Africa. It was the pursuit of nuclear weapons that 
kept these two states outside the NPT (Steinberg, 2000, p. 175). 
India and Pakistan have continued to criticise the NPT for its discriminatory practices 
against non-nuclear weapon states. In particular, they have criticised the fact that 
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disarmament in the NPT is not regarded as an obligation by nuclear weapon states 
and for that reason remain outside this treaty (Fidler & Ganguly 2010, n.p.). A 
fundamental problem was the conduct of nuclear weapon states and support shown 
towards the NPT that was not convincing enough to draw those outside the treaty in 
and may have further entrenched the view of the discriminatory nature of this treaty. 
Returning to the discussion of negative security assurances, that is, the assurance by 
nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states, it was only in 1978 in the UNGA that nuclear weapon states 
such as the United States declared a non-use policy of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states. This declaration came out of the need to protect the security 
interest of non-nuclear weapon states. The non-use policy echoed that “the United 
States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state party to 
the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire 
nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its 
territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such state allied to a nuclear-weapon state 
or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack” 
(Pilat, 2005, p. 160; Bunn, 1997, p. 6). This promise was made under the leadership of 
United States President Jimmy Carter. Although it was considered to be a Negative 
Security Assurance, it included exceptions that non-nuclear weapon states did not 
agree with. This matter finally came to a conclusion before the 1995 NPT Review 
Conference, the topic of the next section.   
3.6 The impact of events preceding the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference 
 
An analysis of the 1995 Review Conference is pivotal, not only to explain what 
changes had been implemented since the first review process in 1975, but also 
because the NPT’s 25 year duration had expired. The end of this period thus marked 
a three-way fork in the NPT’s future:  indefinite extension, another fixed duration or 
re-negotiation of the treaty in another form.  
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For the purposes of the discussion here the following questions can be posed at this 
juncture: Was the NPT any closer to its realisation of a world free from nuclear 
weapons? Has the conflicts between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states 
been bridged or transformed and what impact has this treaty had on non-member 
states? Before these questions are answered, there have been two cases specifically 
where NPT member states were found to be in non-compliance, namely in Iraq and 
North Korea. These cases significantly impacted on the outcome of the 1995 Review 
Conference and thus warrant investigation. 
3.6.1 Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme  
 
Writing ahead of the 1995 Review Conference, Pilat and Pendley (1995, p. 47) argued 
that despite the wide level of support towards the NPT by its 160 member states, the 
treaty remained susceptible to criticism. When the standard of the NPT is reviewed, 
they argued that it would be the political, legal and technological matters occurring 
before the review conference that will take priority during discussions.  
For that reason, Pilat and Pendley (1995, p. 48) noted the many changes since the 
fourth NPT Review Conference in 1990 that would impact on the strength and 
integrity of the treaty.  With this in mind, the first major challenge to the NPT by a 
member state concerns the covert nuclear weapons programme of Iraq. It was 
believed that since the 1980s Iraq had been in non-compliance with its NPT 
obligations. An analysis of Iraq’s history may shed light and provide the context for 
understanding the period leading up to its nuclear ambitions. This will also provide 
an understanding of the Gulf War.  
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This period in history was referred to as the 
Gulf War. There have been many discussions on this matter; however, the reasons for 
the invasion are based on two central points, namely, nationalist and Pan Arab 
elements. Key to note is the artificial creation of the borders of Iraq and Kuwait 
respectively. In 1920, the San Remo conference divided Arab Middle East territories 
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formally part of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France. As a result, in 1921, 
Iraq was officially made up of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra under British influence. A 
British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, in 1922 set the boundaries of Iraq and 
Kuwait, which became the source of conflicts over access to resources such as oil 
(Bennis & Moushabeck, 1991, p. 50).  
Iraq, under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein, was concerned with the 
unfairly distributed wealth that resulted from artificial boundaries created by Western 
powers (Bin, Hill & Jones, 1998, p. 2). “These included: historical and territorial claims 
that Iraq had over Kuwait; Kuwait's refusal to lease two strategic lands to Iraq; Iraq's 
anger over Kuwait's pumping of huge quantities of oil from the Rumaila field which 
lies underneath both countries...” (Bahbah, 1991, p. 50).  
In an attempt to end the invasion and ensure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait a UN 
based coalition force of 34 states including Egypt, United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia 
led by the United States launched an attack on Iraq. Iraq was a former ally of the 
Soviet Union which the United States was hostile towards, but the Soviet Union did 
not oppose a UN coalition. The UN Security Council and the Arab League made 
resolutions calling for an end to the war and Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. An attack 
by the United States followed and was justified in addition to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait by pointing to Iraq’s use of biological and chemical weapons and its 
suspected nuclear weapons programme (Gordon, 2011, n.p.).       
In 1991, after the Gulf War an IAEA inspection exposed Iraq’s enrichment of uranium 
and its nuclear weapons ambitions. It was then that the UN and the IAEA attempted 
to understand how this secret nuclear weapons programme was conducted. It was 
revealed that Iraq drew on the support of Europe, North America and Asian states to 
provide it with infrastructure such as electrical supply and power equipment (Albright 
& Hibbs, 1992, p. 27). Iraq poured billions into its nuclear weapons quest and divided 
equipment orders to mislead export controls and made use of middlemen to 
disguise the destination of imported materials. Iraq was also cautious in assuring its 
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Western suppliers that the materials and products it imported were for peaceful 
civilian purposes. 
The materials or components which Iraq received were not controlled and Iraq used 
this to get around Western export controls. Export controls prevent certain products 
and information from being exported and traded. For example, a government may 
be concerned about the destination of a certain product and for that reason ban its 
trade. For the United States export controls are seen as essential to stop nuclear 
weapons' proliferation and thus to protect national security (Albright & Hibbs, 1992, 
p. 28). 
On 12 January 1992, the IAEA accused Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials of not declaring 
large purchases of materials and components from Germany to supply its gas 
centrifuge program. In a meeting convened at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, 
officials of the centrifuge program in Iraq supplied IAEA officials with information 
concerning their activities. In this report, “The Iraqis acknowledged that they had 
imported German materials and components-and added that they had acquired 100 
tons of margining steel and other raw materials needed to manufacture centrifuge 
components" (Albright & Hibbs, 1992, p. 29). 
In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, “...Iraq shall unconditionally 
agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable 
material or any subsystems or components or any research..." The IAEA and the UN 
Special Commission was tasked with inspecting Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme, 
placing it under exclusive control and destroying it (UN Security Council, 1991, p. 6).  
3.6.2 Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
 
After the Gulf War, UN inspectors in 1991 learned of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear 
weapon programme despite regular inspections conducted by the IAEA. Much 
criticism was directed at the NPT and IAEA safeguards. It can be argued that this 
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development threatened the non-proliferation regime and damaged its credibility 
and currency as an arms control instrument (Pilat & Pendley, 1995, pp. 51-52). An 
inability to detect Iraq’s nuclear weapon ambitions demonstrated the weakness of 
IAEA safeguards and the need to strengthen its ability to detect nuclear material that 
has not been declared and diverted from peaceful to military purposes.  
In 1991, the IAEA proceeded to modify its safeguards system. Thus, in 1993, the 
Board of Governors called for the Director General to develop proposals for 
strengthening safeguards. The secretariat of the agency was tasked with developing 
a safeguard program. In 1995, the Board of Governors supported measures to 
strengthen the IAEA and the Director General could then put these measures into 
effect. Certain measures required legal authority, and a special committee of the 
Board of Governors were tasked with developing a model to gain authority (IAEA, 
2005, pp. 4-5). The outcome of discussions resulted in the formation of a Model 
Additional Protocol to the NPT, approved on 15 May 1997 and published as 
INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). 
“Under an Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 (corr.)), which is the key to the 
strengthened safeguards system, a State is required to provide the IAEA with broader 
information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, including 
research and development, uranium mining and nuclear waste. States must also 
grant the Agency broader access rights and enable it to use the most advanced 
verification technologies” (IAEA, 2002a, n.p.). States forming part of Comprehensive 
Safeguards with the IAEA are expected to subject themselves to short-notice 
inspections and all sectors of nuclear sites are to be accessible to inspectors (IAEA, 
2002a, n.p.; Behrens, 2006, p. 4). In addition, the manufacturing and export of 
nuclear-related technologies will be monitored, and inspectors could then also 
collect environmental samples from all nuclear-related sites to verify that nuclear 
material have not been diverted to military purposes. 
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The Iraq clandestine nuclear weapons programme was successfully stopped and 
destroyed. However, the same could not be said for North Korea. The second case of 
non-compliance to the NPT was North Korea. North Korea pursued a nuclear 
weapons option, and in 2003 become the first state to withdraw from the NPT, 
largely an unresolved issue. 
3.6.3 North Korea’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme and treaty 
withdrawal 
 
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union aided North Korea in the production of a nuclear 
research reactor and later in 1973 supplied fuel for this reactor. A Soviet IRT-2m 
research reactor was built and in 1974 Korean specialist modified this reactor, which 
operated similar to that of the Soviet Union. The reactor had a capacity to produce 
eight megawatt and a fuel enrichment of 80 percent. In 1986, United States satellites 
revealed a new power plant in North Korea which separated plutonium from spent 
fuel in the nuclear reactor. In addition to this development, a 50 megawatts nuclear 
reactor in Yongbyon and a 200 megawatts reactor at Taechon were built. This 
increased concerns around the nuclear programme of North Korea (Nikitin, 2009, pp. 
1-2; Arms Control Association, 2010). 
In 1988 a significant development occurred in the UNGA where the South Korean 
President, Roh Tae Woo, called for discussions between South and North Korea on 
security matters (Kim, 1997, p. 261). The division of Korea stems from the 1945 allied 
victory by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union over Japan that was 
the former colonial power of Korea. In an attempt to end the war with Japan the 
United States and Britain requested that the Soviet Union attack Japanese forces. 
When the United States invaded Korea, it occupied the South while the Soviet Union 
occupied the North. These two territories become two separate republics and the 
boundary that separated them was referred to as the 38th parallel (Millett, 1998, pp. 
299-300).  
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A Trusteeship plan was set up to enable the United States and the Soviet to control 
each territory respectively for a temporary period. The superpowers were supposed 
to coordinate their activities and aid Korea in its political, economic and social 
stability and ultimately realise a unified Korea (Matraym, 2004, p. 60). Problems 
emerged when rivalry between the superpowers affected the negotiation and 
cooperation process which led the Soviet Union in the North to create a communist 
government under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, who headed the cabinet as a 
premier and the ruling authority of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which 
was formed in 1948. On the other hand, the United States was involved in the 
creation of a democratic government with a capitalist market framework in the South 
where Syngman Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea. The United 
States and the Soviet Union were the cause of the division of Korea into South and 
North Korea respectively (Matraym, 2004, p. 58). 
Korea was thus divided into two territories each with its own political and economic 
ideology. Each side voiced that they represented all Koreans and wanted control over 
the entire Korean peninsula (Matraym, 2004, p. 60). This tension resulted in the 
escalation of armed conflict and war between North and South Korea, referred to as 
the Korean War, which started in 1950 (Matraym, 2004, pp. 76, 79-81; Perry, 2006,  
pp. 78-81). Technically, the Korean War did not end, what took place was a ceasefire 
among warring groups. On 27 July 1953, China, North Korea, South Korea and the 
United States signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement issuing a ceasefire where 
no group was required to surrender. Based on the Armistice Agreement a new 
border (demilitarised zone) was marked between North and South Korea and how to 
handle political prisoners were discussed (Stueck, 1995, pp. 211-212).   
In September 1990, the dialogue between North and South Korea that the South 
requested occurred. The talks produced a positive outcome in the form of two 
agreements, namely the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, 
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and Cooperation and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula (Niksch, 2005, p. 10).  
The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed in 
1991 and brought into effect on 19 February 1992. The Joint Declaration agreement 
between North and South Korea prohibited each state from possessing nuclear 
weapons or nuclear facilities capable of reprocessing plutonium and enriching 
uranium. A nuclear inspection system also had to come into effect to monitor this 
process. As a result, North Korea, on 30 January 1992, signed an IAEA safeguard 
agreement required under the NPT when it acceded to the treaty in 1985 (Niksch, 
2005, p. 10; Manyin, 2003, p. 3). The call for an inspection regime to monitor the 
denuclearization process came in the form of a Joint Nuclear Control Commission 
mandated with the task of developing the inspection regime. 
On 4 May 1992, North Korea submitted its nuclear material report to the IAEA. Upon 
inspection of the report, the IAEA noted discrepancies in this initial report submitted 
by North Korea in September 1992 and asked for clarification on the amount of 
reprocessed plutonium. In a nuclear reactor spent fuel can be separated to make 
plutonium. The danger is that plutonium can be used to supply fuel for a nuclear 
reactor but can also be used to make nuclear weapons if further enriched. As a result 
of discrepancies the IAEA requested a special inspection in February 1993, however, 
was denied entry to North Korea’s nuclear sites. The IAEA announced that it was 
unable to verify whether nuclear technology was being used for peaceful purposes or 
diverted to making nuclear weapons. It was also widely believed by IAEA inspectors 
that two nuclear facilities in North Korea were storing nuclear waste, which they were 
refused entry to (Larkin, 2008, pp. 35-36; Niksch, 2003, p. 3). 
To the surprise of the international community, on 12 March 1993, North Korea 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT (Larkin, 2008, p. 31). According to Article X of 
the NPT, member states have the right to withdraw from the NPT “...if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized 
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the supreme interest of its country” (Kerr, 2010, p. 26). The withdrawal announcement 
led to talks between the United States and North Korea in June 1993. In a Joint 
Statement, North Korea and the United States agreed on a Korean peninsula free 
from nuclear weapons, not to threaten the other with nuclear weapons and that 
North Korea would subject itself to IAEA safeguards. On 19 May 1994, the IAEA 
announced North Korea's removal of spent fuel from its five-megawatt nuclear 
reactor. Concerns arose from the fact that spent fuel can be reprocessed for making 
nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2010; Niksch, 2005, pp. 11-19). Shortly 
after this, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA which led to another 
round of talks between North Korea and the United States. 
In an attempt to contain the nuclear issue of North Korea, the so-called Agreed 
Framework between the United States and North Korea was proposed on 14 October 
1994. The Agreed Framework had the aim of replacing graphic moderated reactors 
and facilities with a light-water reactor power plant in North Korea. The United States 
envisioned an international consortium for sponsoring and supplying the light-water 
reactor project. In return, North Korea would have had to freeze its graphic 
moderated reactors and facilities and eventually dismantle them (Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization, 2009, pp. 1-2; Larkin, 2008, p. 32). North Korea’s 
treaty withdrawal sparked bilateral negotiations between itself and the United States. 
This led North Korea to retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 
(Chaffee, 2003, n.p.).  
Both the Iraq and the North Korean cases highlight an inherent structural weakness 
within the NPT, namely that non-nuclear weapon states may use their entitlement to 
civilian nuclear technology to pursue military programmes and then withdraw from 
the NPT. Although the NPT provided verification measures to prevent this diversion, 
they clearly were not sufficient in the two cases discussed above. 
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3.7 End of the Cold War 
 
Despite the Iraq and North Korean cases, the NPT may be said to have gained more 
currency from the end of the Cold War (1991) that preceded the 1995 Review 
Conference.  
According to Thomas (1995, p. 93), the end of the Cold War halted the vertical 
proliferation of nuclear weapons (not pursuing increased nuclear stockpiles) between 
the United States and Russia (formally part of the Soviet Union). The Cold War ended 
in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union due to its economic stagnation, which 
led to the independence of 15 states formally part of the Soviet Union. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union ended the hostile bipolar order that characterised the Cold War 
while signalling and entrenching the military dominance of the United States 
(Thomas, 1995, pp. 91-94). 
Linked to South Africa’s transition from apartheid (which was in turn linked to the 
end of the Cold War), South Africa dismantled its nuclear arsenal and joined the NPT 
in 1991. Since the 1980s the apartheid regime had been on the brink of collapse 
based on domestic and international pressure. Economic sanctions and export 
controls were also placed on nuclear-related trade by the United States (Pabian, 
1995, p. 10). In 1990, South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons programme which 
was also influenced by dialogue between itself and three existing nuclear weapon 
states (the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) (Pabian, 1995, p. 
9).  
South Africa's nuclear weapons and security position was largely influenced by its 
international isolation which in turn related to its policy of apartheid. The nuclear 
weapons of South Africa were envisioned to protect its sovereignty from external 
invasion by major powers, such as the Soviet Union and maintain domestic order. 
South Africa used the threat of the Soviet Union to justify its banning of political 
parties such as the African National Congress and the South African Communist 
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Party. As soon as regional and international tension diminished so did the need for 
possessing nuclear weapons, making it harder for nuclear weapon advocates to 
justify nuclear weapons (UN, 1991, pp. 5, 14, 36-37). 
Furthermore, at this time, the former Soviet Union states, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the 
Ukraine, gave up their nuclear weapons (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 6; Harvey, 
2010, p. 1). Argentina and Brazil shortly after entered a bilateral agreement to put 
their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and in 1993 Argentina ratified the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco and joined the NPT in 1995. The Treaty of Tlatelolco established a 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America and in the Caribbean. As a result, in 
1994 Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and eventually joined the NPT in 1998 
(Gwertzman, 2010, n.p.; Clemens, 2004, p. 227). There were visible strides achieved by 
the NPT manifesting in several states now accepting non-proliferation as the norm, 
signalling in turn the start of realising the NPT’s universal nature.      
3.7.1 Voices against indefinite extension 
 
The 1995 Review Conference was a critical time when member states had to decide 
whether this treaty should be extended indefinitely or be granted another fixed 
period (Simpson, 1994, pp. 30-31). The United States directed a great deal of 
resources towards the indefinite extension of the NPT and prioritised this as a foreign 
policy goal. However, many non-nuclear weapon states, such as Egypt, Indonesia and 
Mexico did not support this decision. Thus, there was much controversy around this 
issue, which affected the outcome of this conference (Steinberg, 1996, p. 20).  
During the review process, various proposals were put forward, including a deadline 
to disarm nuclear weapons, universality of this treaty, security assurances to non-
nuclear weapon states, the need to resolve the matter of North Korea and Iraq 
clandestine programmes and Israel’s accession to the NPT. Discussion on the 
indefinite extension of the NPT was affected and influenced by Israel’s non-
membership to this treaty. For this reason, it is necessary to reflect on the events 
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leading to Egypt’s stance towards Israel and its lack of support towards the indefinite 
extension of the NPT.   
In 1991, a significant development occurred at the Madrid conference to begin the 
Middle East peace process, which included government officials from Cairo, 
Jerusalem and Washington. This conference led to the formation of the Arms Control 
and Regional Security Multilateral Framework designed with the purpose of 
addressing regional issues between Israel and the Arab world, extending to North 
Africa, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. It was suspected that Israel was in possession 
of nuclear weapons and did not subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection 
(Ziabari, 2010, n.p.). In 1990, Egypt proposed a Middle East Zone Free from Weapons 
of Mass Destruction. Egypt put pressure on Israel to place its nuclear policy on the 
agenda. However, Israel did not want to discuss its nuclear policies despite Egypt’s 
insistence that it was necessary and was linked to the establishment of regional 
peace and stability (Steinberg, 1996, p. 18). 
Upon visiting Israel in August 1994, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa 
urged Israel to sign the NPT. Moussa noted that the nuclear capability of Israel was 
threatening to Egypt. By the time of the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 
the position of Egypt towards Israel remained unchanged (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 18-
19; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, pp. 3-4).  
3.7.2 The 1995 Review and Extension Conference 
 
On 19 April 1995, the Review and Extension Conference opened in New York and was 
attended by 175 member states. Nuclear weapon states such as Britain, France and 
the United States supported the indefinite extension of the NPT without any 
limitations or conditions. However, this outcome for the NPT was not widely 
supported, especially not by non-aligned states.  
During deliberations at the review process of the NPT a group of 14 non-aligned 
states directed by Indonesia did not support a treaty with an unlimited lifespan. 
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Indonesia proposed a rolling fixed period of 25 years. This would provide the 
opportunity to monitor the NPT and act as a source of pressure on nuclear weapon 
states to disarm. Extending the NPT indefinitely would affect the leverage that non-
nuclear weapon states had over nuclear weapon states. From this argument, the 
distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states would be 
institutionalised and thus keeping the discriminatory nature of this treaty intact 
(Epstein, 1995, p. 27; Leith & Pretorius, 2009, p. 350; Steinberg, 1996, pp. 20-21 and 
Kerr, 2010, pp. 4-5). Non-aligned states supported a CTBT, legal security assurances, 
disarmament of nuclear weapons and bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into the 
NPT. 
The inability to resolve the matter around Israel’s nuclear capability resulted in Egypt 
not supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT along with Arab states, such as 
Syria (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 20-21). Egypt proposed that the conference should be 
suspended until this matter was resolved, which was also supported by Syria. The 
extension of the NPT was thus linked to Israel’s accession to this treaty as a non-
nuclear weapon state.  
During discussions, member states made draft proposals in support of the indefinite 
extension of the NPT. South Africa drafted its own principles in support of the 
indefinite extension of the NPT and gained the support of some non-aligned states, 
weakening the proposal made by Egypt to link the extension to Israel (Rauf & 
Johnson, 1995, pp. 29, 31). 
The United States did not want a split vote and saw the importance of arriving at a 
consensus in support of the indefinite extension of the NPT. It became necessary for 
the United States to make a compromise with Egypt so as not to isolate Israel during 
discussions. However, this compromise failed to materialise (Steinberg, 1996, p. 23). 
Matters were further complicated by Egypt’s desire to have Israel accede to the NPT 
before the treaty could be indefinitely extended. 
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There were a number of non-aligned states who criticised South Africa for its support 
of the indefinite extension of the NPT. South Africa proposed principles of nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament, which lay the foundation for a successful NPT 
Review Conference. The South African proposal included: strengthening the review 
process of the NPT, access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a fissile 
material cut-off treaty, the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones and 
so forth. The ‘consensus package’ put forward by South Africa gained the support of 
non-aligned states not without criticism, but also gained support from nuclear 
weapon states such as the United States. Non-Aligned states voiced concern over the 
lack of support for nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states, and thus 
influencing their decision not to support the NPT’s indefinite extension (Shelton, 
2000, pp. 20-21). Israel was not explicitly linked to the Middle East Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone, but the Middle East Resolution was a step toward establishing peace in 
this region (Steinberg, 1996, p. 24). 
3.7.3 The outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference 
 
After the NPT was extended indefinitely a document was adopted by the conference 
on strengthening the review process of this treaty, and it developed principles and 
objectives that would pave the way for non-proliferation and disarmament. This 
document was divided into three decisions, entitled: "Decision 1: Strengthening the 
Review Process for the Treaty, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament, Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (Rauf, 2000a, p. 6). 
Based on these three decisions member states agreed that in 1997 a Preparatory 
Committee would conduct meetings once a year every three years prior to the review 
process. Preparatory Committees provide ways and consider principles and 
objectives that will enable the NPT to be fully implemented. The Preparatory 
Committee would also be tasked with providing recommendations to the Review 
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Conference – they thus have an important agenda-setting role (Harvey, 2010, p. 37; 
Rauf, 2000b, pp. 147-148). 
Based on Decision 2, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament, all states that are outside the NPT were called to sign and ratify it. The 
importance of signing international safeguard agreements with the IAEA was noted. 
With regards to non-proliferation, all efforts needed to be directed at preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by extension to prevent nuclear war. This 
should be achieved without affecting the inalienable right of NPT members to use 
nuclear technology peacefully. Nuclear weapon states at this conference reaffirmed 
their commitment to Article VI “to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective 
measures relating to nuclear disarmament” (UN, 1995, p. 2). Two of these measures 
were preventing nuclear weapon testing and stopping the production of more fissile 
material. 
It was the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament to complete the CTBT 
“no later than 1996” and to conclude an agreement on a treaty that would ban the 
production of fissile nuclear material used to make nuclear weapons. The CTBT 
requires all states that sign not to conduct test explosions of nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water (Feldman, 1997, p. 163). 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones marked an important area of agreement at this Review 
Conference. It was stated that the development of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
should take priority in regions experiencing tensions, with specific reference to the 
Middle East. This resolution was in response to the conflict, tension and civil wars 
that plague the Middle East. Creating a Middle East free from nuclear weapons would 
contribute to regional peace and security (Rauf, 2000b, p. 149).  
In accordance with Article X paragraph 2 of the NPT, a majority of member states 
had to decide whether this treaty would be extended indefinitely or granted a fixed 
period. Though all demands by member states were not achieved the outcome of 
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the conference was deemed successful as the NPT was indefinitely extended (Rauf, 
2000b, p. 148). Nuclear weapon states received their desired outcome and to some 
extent, so did the non-aligned states through the efforts of South Africa, who drafted 
a proposal for the indefinite extension of the NPT that called for the review process 
to be strengthened, the conclusion of the CTBT by 1996, as well as noted the need 
for commitment by nuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament. South 
Africa’s proposal was accepted and created a point where states could find common 
ground and agree on the way forward for the NPT (Leith & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 350-
351). 
3.8 The 2000 Review Conference 
 
In April 2000, the sixth NPT Review Conference was convened with a low sense of 
expectation by member states. Based on the problems and tensions encountered 
before the Review Conference, including the nuclear test explosions conducted by 
India and Pakistan in 1998, the United States Senate’s refusal to ratify the CTBT and 
Washington’s intended missile-defence plans that would have been in breach of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, left the NPT in a weakened state with not much hope for 
the Review Conference (Gillis, 2009, pp. 29-30).  
The desire of India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapon states has largely been 
influenced by their rival history, territorial disputes and regional tensions in South 
Asia. 
In 1947, after India received its independence its former colonial power Britain 
divided India into two separate states. The two states were divided along religious 
and ethnic lines. India comprised mainly of a Hindu population while Pakistan was 
predominantly Muslim. Since independence these two states have been in conflict as 
a result of their ethnic and religious differences. The roots of conflict are based in 
territorial claims over boundaries as a result of the 1947 partition of India. In 
particular, Jammu and Kashmir was a contested area resulting in armed conflicts, for 
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example, the first Kashmir crisis of 1947 (Sprecher & Park, 2003, p. 160). Each state 
desired to expand their territory and engaged in military conflict to realise their 
objective.  In order to ensure that no state gains the advantage both India and 
Pakistan developed conventional and nuclear weapons capability (Sprecher & Park, 
2003, pp. 158-159). 
In May 1998, India and Pakistan respectively conducted a nuclear test, both of which 
were condemned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1172. UN Security Council 
Resolution 1172 states: "that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (UN Security Council, 1998, 
p. 1). This document reaffirms that the nuclear test by India and Pakistan threatened 
the non-proliferation regime (non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and also 
increased the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. In accordance with Resolution 
1172 India and Pakistan were called upon to cease all nuclear tests and enter 
dialogue to find solutions to the long-standing tensions between them (UN Security 
Council, 1998, pp. 1-2).  
These two cases posed a challenge to the NPT, highlighting that some states still 
remained outside this treaty and needed to be brought within its scope. Moreover, 
their tests exposed a structural difficulty in the NPT’s binary treatment of states as 
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states based on whether states had tested 
by 1967. India and Pakistan were now clearly de facto nuclear weapon states, but 
according to the NPT's classification system, they remained de jure non-nuclear 
weapon states. Even though India and Pakistan remain outside the NPT their nuclear 
tests thus impacted on the NPT and influenced discussions at the 2000 Review 
Conference. 
Abdallah Baali from Algeria was elected as the President of this Review Conference 
and proposed that the conference should include two subsidiary bodies (Rauf, 2000a, 
p. 4). In this way, a Main Committee 1 would discuss disarmament and security 
assurances while the Main Committee 2 focused on regional issues. General debates 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
in this conference revolved around issues such as the lack of commitment towards 
the NPT by Iraq and North Korea, the threat that Israel's nuclear weapons 
programme posed to regional peace in the Middle East, and the unwillingness of the 
United States to ratify the CTBT (Kurosawa, 2000, pp. 1, 9-10).  
In Main Committee 1, the five recognised nuclear weapon states issued a joint 
statement where they supported the indefinite extension of the NPT and officially 
agreed and indicated that they are committed to the results and the decisions that 
came out of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Another issue brought 
before Main Committee 1 concerned the 'modernisation of nuclear weapon systems’, 
as nuclear weapon states continued to test and improve nuclear systems, which 
Switzerland described as being in opposition to the CTBT. South Africa made the 
nuclear weapon states aware of their commitments to the CTBT as discussed in the 
Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear weapon states expected more praise for 
their support of Article VI while non-aligned states made reference to the 1996 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and its declaration of the 
inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. The endorsement of this declaration would 
significantly contribute to nuclear disarmament. However, this proposal was blocked 
by nuclear weapon states (Johnson, 2000, n.p; Rauf, 2000c, n.p.). 
3.8.1 Security Assurances 
 
Calls from non-nuclear weapon states for nuclear weapon states to commit towards 
negative security assurances were made in Main Committee 1. The non-aligned 
states, in particular, Indonesia, argued that a legal treaty specifying negative security 
assurances be integrated into the NPT. China also urged fellow nuclear weapon 
states to commit to negative security assurances without any conditions attached. 
This initiative was also echoed by Switzerland, and in its proposal articulated that 
negative security assurances should not be linked to chemical or biological weapons 
as was previously done by the United States. A legally binding treaty would represent 
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an important measure in support of Article VI by nuclear weapon states. Other 
discussions included the Middle East Resolution, safeguards and nuclear energy 
(Johnson, 2000, n.p.; Dhanapala & Rydell, 2005, p. 123). 
3.8.2 The efforts of the New Agenda Coalition in support of disarmament 
 
The Review Conference ended on 20 May with a sense of relief as a final document 
was achieved. It was a long fought battle to reach a positive outcome for the NPT, 
considering the difficult time this conference was held at. This conference 
successfully developed a final document with nuclear weapon states showing more 
support towards disarmament than what was seen in previous years. Through the 
efforts of the so-called New Agenda Coalition nuclear weapon states had to specify 
their intensions towards the NPT as their compliance was called into question.  
The New Agenda Coalition was established in Dublin in 1998 by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden (Duarte, 2008, p. 1). The 
New Agenda Coalition continues to play a role in multilateral forums in the arena of 
non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear disarmament has been a particular focal 
point of the New Agenda Coalition where they have emphasised that non-nuclear 
weapon states remain committed to the NPT while nuclear weapon states have not 
been fully committed towards their disarmament obligation, this argument was 
expressed in the 1999 Preparatory Committee. The New Agenda Coalition affirmed 
that nuclear weapon states need to be transparent about their nuclear weapons and 
committed to nuclear disarmament (Joyner, 2011, p. 73). In this way, the reduction of 
nuclear weapons can instil confidence in the non-nuclear weapon states that a 
nuclear weapons-free world is an aspiring ideal. The New Agenda Coalition thus 
serves as a bridge between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. 
Concerning the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, the New Agenda Coalition 
has been particularly influential in persuading nuclear weapon states in making a 
joint statement (Kerr, 2010, p. 5). The nuclear five, namely China, France, Russia, the 
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United Kingdom and the United States have made a joint statement indicating that 
they will uphold their obligations to the NPT. In addition, the New Agenda Coalition 
was successful in having the 13 steps integrated into the final document of the NPT 
(Bunn, 1999, p. 4; Murphy, 2004, pp. 214-215). 
3.8.3 The 13 steps in support of nuclear disarmament 
 
Based on the concerns that the obligations of the nuclear weapon states to the NPT 
were vague, the 13 steps provided clarity and detailed their commitment. The 13 
steps along with the CTBT represent practical steps agreed between member states 
of the NPT to set in motion nuclear disarmament under Article VI.  It may be argued 
that the 13 steps are useful to place pressure on nuclear weapon states to seriously 
consider nuclear disarmament (Larkin, 2008, pp. 220-221; Müller, 2005a, p. 35).  
The 13 steps were negotiated between the five nuclear weapon states and the New 
Agenda Coalition and form part of a consensus final document of the 2000 Review 
Conference (Estabrooks & Regehr, 2003, p. 5). The 13 steps urgently call for the 
signature and ratification of the CTBT (1), an agreed delay on nuclear test explosions 
(2), reaching the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (3).  In some cases 
plutonium or highly enriched uranium has been recycled from dismantled nuclear 
weapons to improve or build new nuclear weapons (Johnson, 2000, n.p.; Buongiorno 
& Godsberg, 2010, n.p.). To avoid the occurrence of nuclear weapons being 
manufactured in this way, once fissile materials are no longer used for military 
purposes they should be placed under inspection of the IAEA or another 
international verification body.  
Step 4 calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body within the UN Conference on 
Disarmament to deal specifically with nuclear disarmament. The principle of 
irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament (5), nuclear weapon states should 
be explicit about their commitment to total nuclear disarmament (6). The entry into 
force of START II and START III (7), establish a Trilateral Initiative between the United 
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States, Russia and the IAEA (8), support the unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons, 
transparency of nuclear arsenals and reducing the role nuclear weapons feature in 
security policy (9). Place fissile material no longer used for military purposes under 
IAEA verification (10), reaffirm the general and complete disarmament of nuclear 
weapons remain a vital objective (11), nuclear weapon states should submit regular 
reports on their implementation of the NPT (12), and lastly, additional verification 
capabilities need to be established to ensure compliance toward nuclear 
disarmament agreements (13) (Middle Power Initiative, 2003, pp. 4-19). 
This positive outcome was short lived as in the upcoming 2005 Review Conference 
this consensus regarding the NPT and its future were to be severely challenged by 
nuclear weapon states. 
3.9 The 2005 Review Conference 
 
In May 2005, member states convened for the seventh NPT Review Conference. This 
was indeed a troubling time as the United States announced it would no longer be 
bound to the proceedings and decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review processes. In 
addition, in the run-up to this conference, the Preparatory Committee of the NPT, 
tasked with the responsibility of developing an agenda for the conference, could not 
realise its task. Declining support towards disarmament by any one of the important 
states acting as leaders of the non-proliferation regime may affect the NPT and 
hinder discussions (Zanders, 2010, pp. 2-3; Harvey, 2010, p. 37). 
On 11 September 2001, an attack was launched against the United States sparking its 
so-called “War on Terror” campaign directed at terrorist organisations, such as Al 
Qaeda and rogue states believed to have sponsored them, such as Iraq. Four 
commercial passenger jet planes were believed to have been hijacked by Al Qaeda, 
two of which were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New 
York, killing thousands of people. A third plane crashed into the Pentagon, and a 
fourth plane initially targeted at Washington DC crashed in Pennsylvania (Purpura, 
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2007, p. 359). The September 11 attack on the United States soil increased its 
insecurity and gave birth to its pre-emptive war doctrine under the Bush 
administration (Mockli, 2010, p. 73). 
In September 2002, the pre-emptive war doctrine formed part of the National 
Security Strategy document of the United States. The United States thus linked pre-
emption and prevention together. Pre-emption refers to when a possible adversary’s 
use of weapons of mass destruction is impending, thus requiring the use of military 
action in self-defence. Prevention includes a range of strategies to stop a state from 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Litwak, 2003, p. 17). There was an 
international consensus around using military might to overcome terrorist 
organisations but not in relation to states breaking international laws. Iraq had been 
in non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions since the end of the Gulf 
War (Litwak, 2003, p. 16). The pre-emption doctrine linked terrorism and non-
proliferation in that rogue states may aid terrorist organisations in the acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 31). Thus, the Bush 
administration made a direct (albeit it tenuous) link between nuclear weapons, Al-
Qaeda and Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. 
In 2003, the United States-led war against Iraq was based on non-proliferation 
objectives. Iraq was accused of being in possession of weapons of mass destruction. 
The pre-emptive doctrine gained much criticism as the IAEA official tasked with 
proving that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons programme, Hans Blix, could not 
confirm it. Despite Blix’s conclusions, the United States-led invasion of Iraq occurred 
without UN Security Council backing (Blix, 2008, pp. 199, 201, 204). Although the 
United States was supported by some allies, for example, the United Kingdom, it was 
still seen as a unilateral decision to go to war with Iraq, which had implications for 
the 2005 Review Conference. It suggested a disregard of the NPT by the United 
States. The Review Conference is a multilateral forum that requires the cooperation 
of states to function. However, under the Bush administration, the United States had 
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placed itself above the treaty which it had originally spearheaded (Malone & Khong, 
2003, pp. 5-6). This set the tone for the 2005 Review Conference and was to a great 
extent responsible for its failure. 
Müller (2005a, p. 35) refers to the 2005 Review Conference as ‘disastrous’ and as 
having a deteriorated mood where member states could not even decide on the 
agenda for discussion. An international treaty is only as strong as the level of support 
showed by its member states. Since compliance to the treaty was in question a 
review process regarded as disastrous might have a grave effect on the NPT. Non-
nuclear weapon states voiced their concern that too much emphasis had been placed 
on their obligations. However, the activities or expectations of the nuclear weapon 
states under the NPT were vague, which had already been said in previous Review 
Conferences (Müller, 2005a, p. 35). Since the 1995 Review Conference, momentum 
had increased towards disarmament in the form of the CTBT and in 2000 more 
support was shown towards this end through the 13 steps. With this in mind, further 
positive strides made towards Article VI of the NPT could have created a more 
balanced and equal treaty (Boutwell, 2010, p. 2). 
3.9.1 The breakdown and failure of the 2005 Review Conference 
 
Non-compliance towards the NPT during its 2005 review process came from the 
United States’ unwillingness to support the proceedings that emerged during the 
2000 review process. Tension between NPT member states revolved around whether 
the 2000 Review Conference results should act as a standard to judge NPT 
compliance.  The term ‘manoeuvring’ is useful to understand the conduct of nuclear 
weapon states and their attempt to undermine Article VI during this time. During 
negotiations, states, such as the United States and France, were guilty of trying to 
prevent a discussion on the results of the 2000 Review Conference (Boutwell, 2010, p. 
10). Nuclear weapon states’ lack of commitment towards Article VI reached a low 
point. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was welcomed at the 2000 Review 
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Conference as an important instrument for building international stability, was 
disregarded by the United States’ pursuit of missile-defence (Müller, 2005a, p. 39).   
Before explaining what the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty entailed a definition of a 
missile needs to be provided. "A missile is a self-propelled, guided or unguided 
projectile designed to deliver a weapon or other payloads" (Gillis, 2009, p. 43). 
Missiles are powered by jet engines but differ in range distance. There are short-
range missiles such as tactical ballistic missiles and long-range missiles such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles can be launched from the ground, 
from a ship and underwater (Gillis, 2009, p. 43). The danger surrounding missiles is 
that they have the potential to carry nuclear weapons over long distances. States that 
build missile-defence systems (also called an anti-ballistic missile system)  such as the 
United States, Russia and China argue that this is to combat missiles capable of 
carrying weapons of mass destruction referring, in particular, to rogue states such as 
Iran and North Korea in the case of the United States (Gillis, 2009, pp. 44-45, 47). 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a bilateral agreement signed between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on 26 May 1972 and entered into effect on 3 October 
1972. This was an attempt to reduce the anti-ballistic sites and missile systems of 
each state respectively (Arbatov, 2008, pp. 106-107). An anti-ballistic missile system is 
a missile-defence system that has the ability to intercept, stop and destroy any 
incoming ballistic missile.  Regardless of the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty as a symbol of arms control and reduction the United States under the 
leadership of George W. Bush in 2001 officially withdrew from this treaty. George W. 
Bush argued that this treaty hinders the United States from protecting and defending 
itself against the ballistic missile attacks of rogue states and terrorists (Doyle, 2009, p. 
142; Arms Control Association, 2003). In addition, the Bush administration 
announced that it would no longer support the CTBT, nor ratify it. In 1995 when the 
NPT was indefinitely extended, part of the package included the CTBT. Taken off the 
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agenda were negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty which the United 
States refused to support as well. 
States without nuclear weapons came to the harsh realisation during these 
negotiations that those with nuclear weapons may not be willing to give them up. 
This point is further strengthened by Müller (2005a, p. 40), “In 2005, it became clear 
that NWS are set on keeping their nuclear weapons and regard them as legitimate 
elements of their military postures”. Under the Bush administration, the United States 
made it clear that it would deploy its nuclear weapons against rogue states and 
against biological and chemical weapons. The fact that nuclear weapons have been 
officially part of the military posture of the nuclear weapon states is proof that their 
military officials and politicians regard nuclear weapons as legitimate. 
3.10 The build-up to the 2010 Review Conference  
 
After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, there were fears and concerns 
that the NPT was losing its legitimacy among member states and therefore its ability 
to contribute to trust among these states in this area that is so key to international 
security. As a result, great expectations and importance were placed on the 
successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference. 
The period preceding the Review Conference were influenced by the trade in 
nuclear-related technology between the United States and India. On 1 October 2008, 
Washington formally approved a peaceful nuclear-cooperation deal between the 
United States and India (Bajori 2010, n.p). The problem with this agreement is that 
India is in possession of nuclear weapons; however, it is not a member of the NPT 
and has not subjected its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. The United States-India 
deal was thus in direct violation of the NPT; risking watering down the security 
regime and affecting the goal of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
(Zanders, 2010, p. 8). This agreement also revealed the preferential treatment to India 
unlike in the cases of Iran or Iraq. 
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Review Conferences are impacted by the events preceding them but the recurring 
problems that were not successfully resolved at previous conferences also influence 
discussions and proceedings. They include the 1995 resolution of the Middle East 
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. India, Pakistan and Israel have still not joined the NPT, 
and North Korea withdrew from the NPT and tested nuclear weapons (Hubert, 
Broodryk & Stott, 2010, pp. 1-2). An inability to resolve these matters threaten the 
non-proliferation norm and thus the future of the NPT.  Despite the challenges to the 
NPT, there was an optimistic view in the air at the eighth NPT Review Conference.   
Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, 
argued that 2010 marked a period in which the “international environment” was 
more favourable to deal with nuclear-related issues (Johnson, 2010a, p. 8). This 
favourable environment could be attributed to the initiatives and work done by the 
Obama administration. On 5 April 2009, United States President Barack Obama 
delivered his now famous speech in Prague. The significance of this speech lay in the 
support the United States expressed towards disarmament and the realisation of a 
world free from nuclear weapons (Smith, 2010, p. 71). Obama added in his speech, 
“So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the 
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. First, the United States will 
take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold 
War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy, and urge others to do the same” (Obama, 2009). This served to revitalise the 
commitment of the United States towards the NPT and hope for a successful Review 
Conference. Under the leadership of Obama, the nuclear posture of the United States 
changed, indicating that it will no longer retaliate with its nuclear weapons against 
biological, chemical or conventional attacks (Sanger & Baker, 2010, n.p.). New START 
was signed between the United States and Russia signalling their renewed support 
towards nuclear disarmament (Johnson, 2010a, p. 2). These initiatives were geared 
towards making the May 2010 NPT Review Conference a success after the failure of 
the previous conference in 2005 to produce a final document. A successful NPT 
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Review Conference provides hope and a sense of confidence in the NPT and its 
ability to realise a nuclear weapons-free world. 
3.10.1 The 2010 Review Conference 
 
In May 2010, the eighth NPT Review Conference was hosted at the UN in New York. 
Negotiations at the Review Conference began with member states making general 
statements and commenting on the NPT. For the purpose of delegating work, Main 
Committee 1 and Subsidiary Body 1 were tasked with discussing nuclear 
disarmament. Main Committee 2 focused on non-proliferation measures and 
Subsidiary Body 2 worked on regional issues with reference to the Middle East. Main 
Committee 3’s area of focus was peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and Subsidiary 
Body 3 focused on improving the review process and the issue of treaty withdrawal 
(Müller, 2010, p. 8). The problem was that none of these bodies could develop a 
consensus report.  
At that point, the Review Conference president, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of 
the Philippines, used documents supplied by committee chairs and requested that 
member states discuss this in open consultation, which then formed part of a 
conference draft report. Another group of approximately 15 delegates deliberated on 
recommendations to the NPT.  
Member states agreed "to a forward-looking action plan covering nuclear 
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear energy, as well as the 1995 
resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the 
Middle East" (Acheson, 2010, n.p.). Iran attempted to block this consensus on an 
'action plan' forming part of the 2010 NPT final document. However, Iran did not 
obtain the support of fellow non-aligned states, and on the final day of negotiations, 
a final document was obtained consensually (Müller, 2010, p. 8). Since 2002, Iran has 
been in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards under the NPT. Iran has not been 
transparent about its nuclear activities, which created the perception that it may be 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme. Iran has been suspected of the 
enrichment of uranium, which is “closer to levels needed for making weapons-grade 
material -- uranium refined to 90 percent purity” (Hafezi, 2010, n.p.). In May 2010, 
Brazil and Turkey concluded a nuclear fuel agreement with Iran to overcome the view 
by Western states that Iran was developing the ability to enrich uranium to weapons’ 
grade. Brazil and Turkey’s intervention did not stop the UN Security Council from 
launching a fourth round of sanctions on Iran for punishment of its alleged nuclear 
programme (Mac Farquhar, 2010, n.p.).  
3.10.2 Concluding the 2010 Review Conference  
 
The final document included the proceedings of the Review Conference, the views of 
the president on deliberation among member states and recommendations put 
forward (Albright & Stricker, 2010, p. 1). The nuclear weapon states have reaffirmed 
their commitment towards total nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference. The conference concluded where nuclear weapon states have appeared 
to make some concessions to show that they remain committed to this treaty. A 
conference has been proposed for 2014 to discuss practical steps to realise 
disarmament. In 2012, the UN Secretary-General and others will convene a regional 
conference for the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (UN, 
2010, pp. 21, 29-30; Krieger, 2010, n.p). The UN Secretary-General, along with Britain, 
Russia and the United States were tasked with appointing a host government to 
facilitate preparations towards this conference (Johnson, 2010a, p. 5). In the area of 
disarmament and nuclear safeguards not much has been achieved besides 
reaffirming what had been put forward in the 2000 review process such as the 
importance of ratifying the CTBT. Disarmament proposals and reducing the 
importance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines came from groups such as the 
non-aligned states. 
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The usefulness of nuclear deterrence and the modernisation of nuclear weapons 
were criticised by the non-aligned states (Johnson, 2010a, p. 6). Iran criticised nuclear 
weapon states, in particular, the United States and France, for blocking disarmament 
steps and a time-bound framework to realize nuclear disarmament (Johnson, 2010a, 
p. 5). These states did not want to be bound by a legal time frame for complete 
disarmament (Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 2010, n.p). Other critiques came 
from states such as Switzerland over the tactical nuclear weapons installed in Europe 
through NATO. It was argued that these weapons are no longer useful in Europe. 
Initially, they existed to strengthen the United States and European military ties and 
relations during the Cold War to deter and counter the threat of the Soviet Union 
(Müller, 2010, p. 9; Arms Control Association, 2006, n.p.). In the final document of the 
NPT, the nuclear weapon states are only encouraged to provide negative security 
assurances to non-nuclear weapon states implicitly (Müller, 2010, p. 10).  
The United States-India deal did not feature explicitly, although, the final document 
states that for nuclear export to occur states must have "full scope safeguards" 
(Müller, 2010, p. 10). As was noted above, the Additional Protocol of the IAEA gives 
the IAEA more rights and enables it to use more advance technology to verify states’ 
nuclear activities. The conference mentioned the Additional Protocol as a 
recommendation but did not explicitly indicate that it will be the standard for all 
nuclear exports (Johnson, 2010a, p. 7; Albright & Stricker, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, 
Western states wanted to strengthen export controls so that states could coordinate 
policies under the guidelines of the NSG. However, NAM argued that export control 
steps prevented them from accessing advanced technology and would also affect 
their sovereignty (Müller, 2010, pp. 7, 16). With India exempted from the rules of the 
NSG many member states question the fairness of this decision. The lack of support 
towards the time frame for nuclear disarmament also played a role in hindering the 
negotiation process and thus caused conflict between member states (Kerr, 2010, p. 
13). Disagreement between nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states 
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prevented the realisation of valuable and key steps that would have strengthen the 
pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation and disarmament.  
The 2010 NPT Review Conference can be deemed a success as a final document was 
obtained and cooperation among member states were achieved despite the damage 
done to the treaty by the 2005 Review Conference. However, more political will is 
required from nuclear weapon states regarding nuclear disarmament; this will lead to 
further cooperation among member states. Visible achievements toward nuclear 
disarmament may be met with increased support by the non-aligned states toward 
non-proliferation initiatives such as the Additional Protocol. A strengthened and 
durable NPT can only result once members make tangible accomplishments to show 
their commitment to this treaty.  
3.11 Conclusion 
 
The NPT can be considered as a bargain between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states. This bargain has benefits such as the right and the provision to access 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes granted to NPT members and in particular, 
non-nuclear weapon states. In turn, non-nuclear weapon states should be committed 
to non-proliferation. On the other hand, nuclear weapon states should not aid non-
nuclear weapon states in the production/development of nuclear weapons and in 
turn have an obligation under Article VI to disarm their own nuclear weapons. In this 
way, a bargain such as the one encompassed by the NPT has in place obligations and 
rules acting to influence the behaviour of member states. The breakdown of this 
bargain occurred during the 2005 Review Conference. 
Disagreement and conflict between member states of the NPT led to a deadlock in 
negotiations. To the dismay of many member states, the 2005 Review Conference 
was a complete failure, unable to produce a final document which also affected the 
standard and the quality of the NPT and the faith of member states in this treaty 
(Boutwell, 2010, p. 10). One conclusion to be drawn from the outcomes of these 
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review conferences is that nuclear weapon states are not committed to their end of 
the bargain as written up in Article VI of this treaty and that non-nuclear weapon 
states were duped when they signed onto the NPT. Another way to interpret the 
review conferences suggests the intense awareness by member states that nuclear 
weapons breed insecurity and a world free from them is in the interest of all states, 
hence the need to ensure a successful outcome of the review conferences.  
Despite the major concerns that the NPT has faced, there still seems to be a sense 
that states cannot fathom an international order without the NPT (or an equivalent). 
The notion that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are important norms to 
be pursued, and the gains made during the 2010 NPT Review Conference contradict 
the realist notion of self-help in international relations. How treaties function to 
condition and restrain state perceptions and behaviour, especially in the area of 
nuclear weapons, remains an important topic of study. 
The next chapter will provide a realist view of the NPT as an instrument that serves 
the interests of nuclear weapon states by creating an order that is favourable to them 
by preventing others from becoming future nuclear weapon states.   
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Chapter 4: A realist perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves to provide a realist view of the NPT. In International Relations, 
there are debates over the role treaties play in the international system and whether 
norms and standards of behaviour echoed in regimes and institutions influence the 
behaviour of states. As was noted in chapter two both realist and liberal scholars 
make convincing arguments. It thus becomes necessary to delve into the positions of 
respective states (as represented by their officials) on this issue. For example, Indian 
officials often argue that the NPT is an instrument used by the strong to maintain the 
nuclear order in their favour. India’s position with respect to the NPT can be 
explained in the context of its officials’ realist worldview. Deconstructing views which 
may hinder the success of this treaty, especially by delving into the role that 
respective states’ leaders and officials see treaties, institutions and regimes play in 
the international system becomes a significant task that sheds light on the problems 
the NPT has experienced. 
In this chapter, the realist theoretical paradigm will be used as a lens to analyse the 
views of states to the NPT. Review conferences discussed in chapter three, namely 
those held in 1975, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be used as practical cases to 
examine the realist notion that treaties forming part of institutions and regimes do 
not have much influence over the behaviour of states, and that they only serve the 
interests of the powerful, in this instance, nuclear weapon states, as opposed to the 
weak, or in this case, non-nuclear weapon states.    
4.2 The utility of nuclear weapons 
 
Since the NPT was formulated complete nuclear disarmament remains an ideal but 
not a practice. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union spent 
huge amounts of money on building nuclear weapons, but was this rational 
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behaviour? Despite concerted efforts by the international community nuclear 
weapons remain in existence, and the NPT even makes a distinction between nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, and since the treaty was extended 
indefinitely this distinction has been institutionalised. The NPT has thus fixed the 
Cold War position of the nuclear powers and created an order that serves their 
interests. How can these matters be understood? Key to a realist understanding of 
the NPT is the role and function that nuclear weapons are perceived to serve in the 
international system. 
4.2.1 Nuclear weapons protect national security  
 
The huge amounts of money that was spent on building nuclear weapons and 
increased stockpiles during the Cold War could have been spent on social 
development projects in the United States and in the Soviet Union. In a 1995 issue of 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on Nuclear Weapons entitled “The Real Cost”, it 
is stated that during 1946, the United States spent 25 billion in dollars on 
infrastructure alone, including reactors, uranium-enrichment plants, chemical 
separator facilities and laboratories (Schwartz, 1995, p. 34). On the question of 
whether this is rational behaviour, realist scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz 
argue that states are in fact rational actors. From this view, states are rational agents 
acting in a selfish and self-help way only to maximise their own interests, hence, 
states are “sensible and calculative” (Nel, 2002, p. 27). For the United States, nuclear 
weapons have served a host of functions. Not only have nuclear weapons been 
explicitly linked to protecting its security from conventional and nuclear attacks but 
also protects its allies through its nuclear umbrella referred to as extended 
deterrence. President Obama stated the importance of reducing the role nuclear 
weapons play in its national security strategy (Jackson, 2010, n.p.). Under the Bush 
administration, nuclear weapons were envisioned to be used against rogue states 
and terrorist organisations.   
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In an anarchical world, states cannot trust each other and have to assume the worst 
about the intentions of others. For classical realist scholars, such as Machiavelli, state 
survival is of utmost importance, because if leaders are not wise, they will surely lose 
their state. It is impossible to escape the condition of insecurity, and this leads state 
leaders to pursue military power (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 75; Walt, 1998, pp. 35, 
37). Even though states are considered equal because of sovereignty, states are 
distinguishable according to their power capabilities. Neack (2003, p. 128) provides a 
useful understanding of power as measured by a state’s level of industrialisation and 
economic strength, accompanied by a well trained and large military. A strong 
military force is pertinent to the survival of a state and hence serves its national 
interests. States have to be ready to dispel an adversary to protect its interests. 
Nuclear weapons, as a result of their massively destructive power, have been viewed 
as the ultimate weapon to safeguard national security.  
Realists hold that a balance of power is a way to combat international anarchy. 
Balance of power can be defined as “a system in which no single actor is dominant” 
(D’Anieri, 2011, p. 30). In this system, no individual state can dominate the 
international system as groups and units of states will combine their efforts and align 
their policy to prevent the emergence of a hegemon (Sheehan, 1996, p. 76). An 
example of a balance of power is the emergence of the Anglo-American-Soviet 
alliance to prevent the rise and domination of Nazi Germany over Europe (van Uhm 
& Schoenmaker, 2012, p. 322). According to Waltz (2000, p. 38) “Balancing is a 
strategy for survival, a way of attempting to maintain a state's autonomous way of 
life". However, realists recognise that the pursuit of security through balancing power 
may well result in the so-called security dilemma and arms races that actually create 
more insecurity. In the nuclear weapons realm, this leads to the prediction that if 
state A decides to build a nuclear arsenal as an ultimate weapon to guard their 
security, its rival (say, State B) will feel insecure and respond by trying to balance 
State A’s power by also acquiring nuclear weapons. State B’s nuclear weapons may in 
turn threaten State C or introduce suspicion into a region where tension exists, 
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leading to a chain of nuclear proliferation. In fact, realists predicted in the 1950s that 
there would be proliferation to the nth degree - this was referred to as the nth country 
problem. For example, the United States President, John F. Kennedy warned that by 
1975 the number of nuclear weapon states may increase to 15 to 20 (new nuclear 
proliferators) (Yudin, 2009, p. 4). 
It is not difficult to see how security concerns led to a chain of proliferation in the 
past. The Manhattan research project began in 1939 at the height of World War II. It 
led to the development of the first atomic bomb in the United States after Germany 
was suspected of developing an atomic bomb. Later, the United States used these 
bombs to get Japan to surrender unconditionally (Hackel, 1992, p. 70). After the 
atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, the Soviet 
Union invested more funds and energy in its own nuclear weapons programme. The 
use of the atomic bomb by the United States raised the concern in the Soviet Union 
about a possible United States attack given the two states’ ideological rivalry. In the 
case of the United Kingdom and France, the decision to go nuclear was based on the 
increasing threat of the Soviet Union. Also, the United Kingdom and France no 
longer felt secured under the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States through 
NATO, and pursued their own nuclear weapon capability (Sagan, 1997, p. 58). China’s 
decision to go nuclear was influenced by concerns over a possible nuclear attack by 
the United States after the Korean War, as well as diverging Sino-Soviet relations that 
resulted in China denouncing the Soviet version of Marxism in 1961. The Chinese 
nuclear weapons programme in turn had an impact on India’s decision to conduct a 
nuclear weapons test in 1974. In 1914, the British integrated the Arunachal Pradesh 
region into India, which China regarded as part of its territory. In 1962, as a result of 
this territorial dispute, India and China went to war (Guo, 2007, pp. 51-52). India’s 
long-standing rival, Pakistan, built close ties with China. In 1998 India tested nuclear 
weapons again. Shortly after India’s nuclear test, Pakistan followed suit to balance 
India’s power and to deter India (Sagan, 1997, p. 59). This is the nature and effect of 
the balance of power logic, with the outcome of an arms race and nuclear 
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proliferation as seen in the domino effect of states obtaining nuclear weapons to 
achieve security vis-à-vis their rivals.   
4.2.2 Nuclear weapons as a deterrent mechanism 
 
According to Kacowicz et al (2000, p. 14), the long-standing peace between the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be attributed to nuclear 
weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy each 
other, but did not. Policy makers in the United States and in the Soviet Union as well 
as realist scholars inferred that the value of nuclear weapons does not lie in its 
physical use but in its ability to deter and threaten an adversary. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union realised that if either used nuclear weapons, the other 
will retaliate in the same manner (Kennedy, 1969, pp. 86-88). The use of nuclear 
weapons will ensure the destruction of each state respectively. It would be a rational 
decision for leaders to avoid any action that will escalate tension between itself and 
another nuclear weapon state. This rule or principle that maintains nuclear stability is 
referred to as mutually assured destruction. The logic of mutually assured destruction 
is that there is no way any state can win a nuclear war, as each state would receive 
damage equal to the other. This recognition deters a nuclear attack by any state on 
another. More specially, any benefit perceived to be achieved through the use of 
nuclear weapons will be superseded by its cost (Neack, 2003, pp. 51-52). It could be 
argued that this logic also characterised the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a short period in history, which began on 16 October 
1962 when the United States learned of the Soviet Union missiles in Cuba. It ended 
on 28 October 1962 when the Soviet Union agreed to the withdrawal of its missiles 
(Weldes, 1999, p. 38). The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba relates to the Bay of 
Pigs incident in 1961 under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the revolutionary, that 
overthrew the Fulgencio Batista government. Under the Castro government Cuba 
became a socialist one-party state. The Bay of Pigs translated from the Spanish name 
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Bahia de Cochinos, the area wherein the invasion of Cuba took place. The United 
States, under the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, supported Cuban exiles 
who were in opposition to Castro. However, after the Bay of Pigs incident, the United 
States was embarrassed as the Cuban exiles were captured by Castro’s army 
(Hammond, 1969, pp. 157-158). This increased Castro’s fears of another United 
States attack on Cuba. Stationing missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union was thus in 
response to an increasing United States threat to Cuba’s socialist regime and the 
need to counter Western domination (Weldes, 1999, p. 39; Belkin & Blight, 1991, p. 
732).  
During the Cuban Missile Crisis nuclear weapons were not intended for physical use, 
but were useful to threaten the United States and prevent it from invading Cuba. This 
point is supported by a statement by Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet 
Union at the time, when he said: “My comrades in the leadership and I realized that 
our friend Fidel totally failed to understand our purpose. We had installed the 
missiles not for the purpose of attacking the U.S. but to keep the U.S. from attacking 
Cuba” (Khrushchev, 1990, n.p). Realists argue that nuclear deterrence prevented the 
use of nuclear weapons during this time, and it is for that reason that Waltz 
encouraged the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He maintained that these weapons 
played a positive role during the Cold War in preventing the superpowers from going 
to war (Waltz, 2008, pp. 384-385, 392, 396).  
It was the dangers associated with a nuclear war and the logic of mutually assured 
destruction, which facilitated cooperation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its nuclear 
weapons in Cuba with the condition that the United States removed its missiles from 
Turkey (Allison, 1971, p. 136; Kennedy, 1969, p. 89). The dangers of a nuclear war led 
the United States and the Soviet Union to reconsider the nuclear arms race. Relations 
between these states began to improve, leading to the signing of the Limited 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which prevents nuclear testing on land and 
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underwater (Belkin & Blight, 1991, p. 733). Miscalculation and time constraints could 
have had grave consequences for the United States and the Soviet Union. On 26 
October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev sent a message to President Kennedy informing 
him Soviet missiles would be removed from Cuba on condition that the United States 
does not attack Cuba. It took Kennedy 12 hours to decode Khrushchev’s message. 
This delay in response by the United States could have been interpreted as an 
indication of war on Cuba. Establishing a direct line of communication between these 
two leaders could significantly overcome miscalculation between them. In June 1963, 
the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding the Establishment of a Direct line of Communication. As a result, a 
teletype device was installed between Washington and Moscow to send and receive 
printed messages between them (Sterling, 2008, p. 221).  
Nuclear weapons under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction formed an 
important dimension of the bipolar nature of the international system during the 
Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union could balance power with the 
other, creating a sense of stability. Here, a bipolar system is preferred by realists, such 
as Waltz, who argue that, fewer wars result in such a system as opposed to a system 
wherein one state dominates and dictates the affairs of other states. The two 
superpowers were able to restrain their allies and manage crises so as to prevent 
disputes between them from escalating and risking an unwinnable nuclear war (Nel, 
2002, p. 30). 
4.2.3 Nuclear weapons: Symbol of power and status 
 
Although the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are well documented from 
the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and nuclear tests, on closer inspection, their 
utility is not just related to their physically destructive ability. Nuclear weapons have 
meaning and value that extend beyond their physical use. This section will refer to 
the nuclear ambitions of France, and the role that nuclear weapons play in the 
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interest of this state. Associating value and prestige to nuclear weapons influence 
ideas and perceptions of the role these weapons should play in the international 
system.  
An historical background of France represents an interesting case to understand the 
meaning and value associated with nuclear weapons. France’s quest for nuclear 
weapons is partly based on its history of being invaded by Germany on three 
different occasions. Germany invaded France in 1870, 1914 and in 1940. The cost of 
the war effort and the increasing need to build a military force had great ramification 
on the wealth of France (Finer, 1960, p. 205). The 1940 German invasion by Hitler left 
France humiliated and disproved the belief that France had a powerful military in 
Europe.  
In France, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle the Fourth Republic was founded 
in 1958 and in 1959 de Gaulle served as its president. For de Gaulle, the invasion of 
France created the need to protect its sovereignty and independence. France during 
this time formed part of NATO and was thus protected by the nuclear guarantee of 
the United States. However, de Gaulle was not convinced by this nuclear guarantee. 
This view was influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union were in possession of 
ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Further, the United States did 
not aid France in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and in the Suez crisis, in 1956. 
These events led de Gaulle to question the commitment of the United States in 
protecting the security interests of France (Tertrais, 2004, pp. 56-58).   
After World War II, European states were beginning to rebuild and recover their 
economies. The United States leadership was no longer necessary and deteriorated 
over time. This was attributed to the fact that once the Soviet Union gained the 
atomic bomb the United States’ monopoly on nuclear weapons began to fade, thus 
affecting its nuclear guarantee. For de Gaulle France was forced to protect its own 
national security, which was best served through the development and possession of 
nuclear weapons. “For him, the bomb was an instrument of self-determination, a 
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means to exist by ourselves and, in case of drama, to choose our direction by 
ourselves” (Tertrais, 2004, p. 58). France was determined to protect its national 
security, through nuclear deterrence and regain its major power status in the 
international system. This was to be achieved through the possession of nuclear 
weapons and guided its nuclear policy starting in the 1950s (Tertrais, 2004, p. 56). 
It was argued that nuclear weapons would be of great benefit to France for its 
scientific, technological and industrial development reasons. Atomic power was used 
for civilian purposes and was a marker of modernity and prestige. France considered 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as great powers and 
desired to return to its status that had deteriorated after World War II. Nuclear 
weapons were perceived as a political tool for France to be involved in great power 
deliberations. Being in possession of nuclear weapons was associated with prestige, 
and France assumed that through these weapons, it could exercise real institutional 
power, especially since France was not at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The 
Yalta conference was a wartime meeting which began in February 1945 between 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (United States), Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
(United Kingdom) and General Secretary Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union). The purpose of 
this conference was to discuss the recovery of Europe after World War II. The 
Potsdam conference followed in July 1945 (Van Dijk, 2008, pp. 968-969). These views 
are still prevalent today and influence the way states (non-nuclear and nuclear) 
perceive nuclear weapons. 
India is another state that has associated prestige and power with nuclear weapons. 
India’s decision to conduct a nuclear weapons test was largely viewed as a response 
to regional tensions, more especially China and Pakistan. On closer inspection, India’s 
possession of nuclear weapons is closely associated with its desire to be classified as 
a great power. In 1993, a Bharatiya Janata Party spokesman said, "Nuclear weapons 
will give us prestige, power, standing” (Perkovich, 1998, p. 16). By being in possession 
of nuclear weapons, India believed this would prove to the international community 
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that it deserves the status of a great power and should be taken seriously on the 
international stage. This is evident in India’s bid to become a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council (Dillon, 2007, p. 15; Deshingkar, 1996, p. 41). The link 
between possessing nuclear weapons and exercising great international influence is 
not surprising. India is aware of the fact that the five nuclear weapon states of the 
NPT are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. India’s bid to 
gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council was also endorsed by the United 
States President Obama. President Obama voiced, “I look forward to a reformed UN 
Security Council that includes India as a permanent member” (BBC News, 2010). India 
will use this permanent seat to promote peace and stability beyond its region to deal 
with security concerns in Afghanistan and its rival Pakistan (The Express Tribune, 
2010). 
Perceptions rightly or wrongly associated with nuclear weapons as the ultimate 
source of security, markers of modernity, and status and prestige make nuclear 
weapons attractive to other states and in turn became a threat to non-proliferation, 
fuelling the nuclear ambitions of states.   
4.2.4 Challenging the “nuclear taboo” norm 
 
At the time when nuclear weapons were used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki to 
end World War II it was viewed as a legitimate weapon of war. Shortly after its use its 
development and usefulness were criticised. This came in the form of the UN and its 
distinction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The UN defined 
nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction based on its destructive, 
indiscriminate and disproportional power but also the radiation effects it caused to 
the Japanese population and the fear and disgust that were associated with its use. 
This led to the formation of the so-called “nuclear taboo”, an international norm 
holding that nuclear weapons should not be used again in any war situation. This 
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norm became essential to delegitimize nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear 
disarmament (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 362-363). 
Realists are critical of the role of norms in the international system and question 
whether norms even exist. From this view, norms have no impact on influencing the 
behaviour of states because power ultimately influences what states can or cannot 
do. Thus, norms “are simply a function of power and interest and thus produce no 
independent analytical leverage” (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 4). Realists account for the 
non-use of nuclear weapons by arguing that it is rational decision making (Allison, 
1971, pp. 12-13). Decision makers of the state conduct a cost-benefit analysis when 
faced with a demand, and since the use of nuclear weapons lacks any material 
benefit its use would not be rational (Ogilvie-White, 1996, pp. 44-45). Norms are only 
stating what decision makers already know, namely that the use of nuclear weapons 
have no material benefits. “In this view- a hyperrealist argument- norms, if there are 
any, are simply frosting on the cake” (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 39). Hence, norms 
prohibit behaviour that states did not want to pursue in the first place and for this 
reason are relatively weak. 
4.3 Promoting non-proliferation and not disarmament 
 
The introduction of the NPT was significant for nuclear arms control and 
disarmament. A closer look at the events surrounding its introduction suggests that 
the NPT was to a great extent a product of great powers pursuing their interests in 
this realm. 
In 1956-1957, the United States and the Soviet Union both shared the concern of 
nuclear proliferation to states that they were allied to. The United States feared that 
states such as Germany, Italy and Japan would become nuclear based on the threat 
of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union feared the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to China, on the one hand, and to Germany through NATO on the 
other. The spread of nuclear weapons diminished the control of superpowers over 
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their allies and risked the escalation of tension between them, a point that the Cuban 
Missile Crisis brought home (Tertrais, 2005, p. 1). At this time the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the only nuclear powers and preventing 
others from gaining these weapons was seen to be in their interest.   
On 28 October 1962, in a statement made by the United States President, Kennedy 
declared, in response to a letter received from Khrushchev, that the missile crisis was 
over. At this time, Kennedy pointed out the need for the United States and the Soviet 
Union to work together to make progress on nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation (Kennedy, 1969, pp. 183-184). This view supports the notion that nuclear 
weapons facilitated cooperation between the dominant powers of the Cold War due 
to the logic of mutually assured destruction. The risk that not all states would abide 
by this logic if they had nuclear weapons and actually use them, led the superpowers 
to cooperate to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to states other than themselves, 
which in turn, explain the drive of the major powers to negotiate and universalise the 
NPT. 
This drive was also motivated by the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. In 1963, after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States 
agreed on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, 
under water and in outer space (Johnson, 2009, p. 2). This treaty was only honoured 
for a year, and later member states did not want to remain committed to it. The 
Chinese test brought home the realisation that more states may find a way to 
develop nuclear weapons and thus contributed to the alignment of the focus of the 
United States and the Soviet Union to find a way to halt the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In the light of this, the NPT would address the concerns of the superpowers 
and create an order that would facilitate their interests. 
Although realists argue that international anarchy is the only factor capable of 
influencing state behaviour an international treaty can emerge but only when 
superpowers (great powers) desire to establish it (Carranza, 2007, p. 493). In 1966, 
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the non-aligned states argued for arms limitation and security assurances to be 
included in the NPT. However, the United States and the Soviet Union refused to 
support these proposals, arguing that they would prevent agreement on the NPT 
and delay its implementation (Pande, 1995, p. 10). Already at this time, nuclear 
weapon states were clearly not in favour of nuclear disarmament. The draft treaties 
submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by the United States, and 
the Soviet Union lacked a disarmament clause, which many non-nuclear weapon 
states had hoped for in return for their commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons.  
With this background in mind the NPT should be seen as an agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. These states came close to engaging in nuclear 
warfare but did not. It should be understood that alliances between states, as well as 
treaties can serve to the benefit of states by limiting the actions and behaviour of 
other states (Sonalp, 2009, p. 15). The signing and ratification of the NPT by the 
United States and the Soviet Union created an assurance that the other would not 
proliferate by aiding non-nuclear weapon states in the production of nuclear 
weapons. The support for non-proliferation was in the interest of the superpowers as 
it prevented others from gaining the bomb while the superpowers could maintain 
their monopoly over these weapons. After all, nuclear weapons served a deterrent 
function during the Cold War so why would the superpowers decide to abandon or 
dismantle them. The dismantling of nuclear weapon does not represent rational 
thinking (Allison, 1971, p. 12; Tagma, 2010, p. 165).  
In a 1995 Preparatory Committee meeting, the United States Ambassador, Graham 
Thomas, said, "While the NPT reflects the reality that five nuclear-weapon states 
existed in 1968, it does not legitimize the permanent possession of nuclear weapons” 
(Graham, 1994, n.p.). The NPT recognised that five nuclear weapon states existed 
before 1967, but the treaty did not legitimise their status or act as a justification for 
developing new nuclear weapons. In 1995, the indefinite extension of the NPT was 
linked to the 'principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and 
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disarmament' where nuclear weapon states are called to reduce and disarm their 
nuclear weapons; this legal requirement is enshrined in Article VI of the NPT 
(Graham, 1998, p. 25). The NPT, firstly, acts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and secondly calls nuclear weapon states to 
stop a nuclear arms race and to disarm their nuclear arsenals. The NPT bestows rights 
and obligation on both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states (Albright & 
O'Neill, 1995, p. 25). However, it is this distinction in the NPT which leads nuclear 
weapon states to assume the treaty legitimises their status as a nuclear weapon state 
and in turn support their possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely (Athanasopulos, 
2000, p. 47). Nuclear weapon states such as the United Kingdom have argued that 
the NPT legitimises their status as nuclear weapon states and allows them to hold 
onto nuclear weapons. The inability to link nuclear disarmament to non-proliferation 
significantly hampers the strength of the NPT. In fact, nuclear weapon states such as 
the United States and China view nuclear weapons as an essential component to 
protect their security interests by deterring possible attacks (Brooks, 2008, p. 73; 
Guoliang, 2008, pp. 174, 184).   
When non-nuclear weapon states signed and ratified the NPT, the category of 
nuclear weapon states was not seen as a permanent arrangement. Article VI of the 
NPT was a measure to make the treaty more equal and eventually the distinction 
between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states would be removed (Miller, 
2007, pp. 50-51). The dispute over nuclear disarmament and its slow pace by nuclear 
weapon states has been linked to the wording of Article VI of the NPT. “In fact, while 
Article VI is often invoked, it may be that it is rarely read, because the text of the 
treaty is far more vague and conditional than the common understanding of it. As 
written, the text of the treaty requires not nuclear disarmament but the pursuit of 
negotiation, not disarmament but 'effective measures relating to...nuclear 
disarmament" (Miller, 2007, p. 51). 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
4.4 The created ‘order’ of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the evolution of the NPT evident in review conferences 
highlight the areas of disagreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states relating to their commitments and rights and the increasing need to 
integrate non-members into this treaty. The NPT has created a system of order 
surrounding nuclear-related matters by attempting to influence state behaviour 
through its rules, standards and norms. At this juncture, two questions emerge. That 
is, what impact or effect did the order created by the NPT have on the behaviour of 
member states, and does the order created by the NPT benefit some states more 
than others and if so how? Closely linked to these two questions is the manner in 
which dominant states interpret and relate to the NPT, in particular, how their 
activities and actions benefit certain states.   
4.4.1 Japan, Germany and South Korea’s accession to the NPT 
 
During the Cold War, the United States placed its nuclear weapons in Europe and in 
Asia. The United States thus extended a nuclear deterrent to its allies and partners 
against states in their region with nuclear weapons, or who may be pursuing nuclear 
weapons (United States Department of Defense, 2010, pp. 31-32). According to the 
International Security Advisory Board (2007, p. 23) "There is clear evidence in 
diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, 
and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn 
nuclear weapons".  
In Japan, talks over the ratification of the NPT took place in the National Diet of 
Japan, that is, Japan’s bicameral legislature (comprising of the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors). From 17 December 1974 until 24 May 
1976, NPT ratification talks convened (Endicott, 1977, p. 275). Japan’s ratification of 
the NPT gained much criticism. Geneda Minoru, an elected member of the House of 
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Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party, voiced concern over placing Japan’s 
security interests in the hands of the United States. In this way, the concern was 
raised, if Japan’s nuclear weapon option should be closed or remain open. Japan 
delayed ratification of the NPT as it was assumed this treaty gave the United States 
the right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely. Another concern was Japan’s fear 
that the NPT may prevent it from developing peaceful nuclear technology (Endicott, 
1977, pp. 275-277; Hughes, 2004, p. 199). In response to these concerns, Foreign 
Minister Miyazawa Kiichi said, “...if the U.S.-Japan security arrangement were to lose 
its validity, then the entire question of Japan's security would have to be restudied in 
the light of changed circumstance” (Endicott, 1977, p. 281).   
In August 1975, in a joint announcement, the United States President, Gerald Ford 
and Prime Minister Miki Takeo agreed that the nuclear deterrence offered by the 
United States contributed greatly to Japan's security. Furthermore, President Gerald 
Ford reassured Prime Minister Miki Takeo of the United States’ pledge under the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to protect Japan against nuclear and 
conventional attacks (Watanabe, 1997, p. 353). Japan’s decision to ratify the NPT was 
largely influenced by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. The non-nuclear 
stance of Japan may not necessarily be attributed to the NPT; as Japan would remain 
non-nuclear as long as the extended nuclear deterrence was credible. It can be 
argued that the NPT alone did not instil enough confidence in Japan that its security 
could be protected without nuclear weapons. As Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi 
expressed, the credibility of the United States’ nuclear umbrella will determine 
whether Japan should reconsider its security situation. Commitment to the NPT could 
be described as weak and conditional as long as Japan’s security was safeguarded by 
the United States which this treaty could not ensure (Endicott, 1977, pp. 282, 292).    
In Germany, ratification of the NPT was a controversial issue and for that reason this 
process was delayed. In 1958, the Free Democrats proposed a nuclear weapons-free 
Germany, but this view was not widely supported. On the other hand, the Christian 
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Social Union of Bavaria and some members of the Christian Democrats opposed the 
NPT. In 1966, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Christian Social Union of 
Bavaria and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany formed a coalition 
government (Grand Coalition). As a result of their distinct views of the NPT, reaching 
an agreement was hard. It was only in 1969, when Chancellor Willy Brandt of West 
Germany under the Brandt government signed the NPT. Under the Brandt 
government it was indicated that, the NPT should not affect its access and right to 
develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Also, it was expected that 
Germany would continue to enjoy security protection under the nuclear umbrella of 
the United States (Hofhansel, 1996, pp. 129-130; Mackby & Slocombe, 2004, pp. 199-
200). In 1955, the United States stationed nuclear weapons in Germany under 
NATO's nuclear sharing policy (Maettig, 2008, n.p.). 
On 2 May 1975, Germany finally ratified the NPT and included a declaration detailing 
their expectations of this treaty. Germany "reaffirmed its expectation that the treaty 
would be a milestone on the way toward disarmament and international detente and 
that nuclear weapon states would intensify their efforts to comply with article 6 of 
the treaty (on nuclear disarmament); -underlined that the security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany continued to be ensured by NATO..." (Mackby & Slocombe, 
2004, pp. 200-201). According to Müller (2003, p. 14), the United States had to place 
considerable pressure on Germany to ratify the NPT, and reaffirmed its ‘nuclear 
security guarantee’ through NATO to ensure Germany remained non-nuclear. Being 
a member of the NPT enabled Germany to gain access to the right to research and 
develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes and even though Germany 
technically forswore nuclear weapons, their security interests were protected by 
NATO. This raises a concern, as non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT should not 
be in possession of nuclear weapons on their territory. However, in recent years, 
discussion over NATO’s deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany has been 
critically examined. In Germany, both citizens and politicians are calling for the 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
removal of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, as these weapons are no 
longer relevant (Snyder & van der Zeijden, 2011, pp. 4-13).   
South Korea is another state protected under the nuclear umbrella of the United 
States. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in South 
Korea was not made public. The stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in South 
Korea compensated for the reduction of the United States’ forces that assisted and 
supported South Korean soldiers during the Korean War and after the signing of the 
Armistice agreement. In the 1950s, as a result of the Korean War, the United States 
suffered a financial deficit. The United States had to reduce its forces and financial 
aid to South Korea to resolve its financial deficit. However, the reduction in aid and 
military assistance was not supported by the South Korean President Syngman Rhee. 
President Syngman Rhee was committed to the reunification of Korea and would use 
force to realise this end (Heo & Roehrig, 2010, p. 159). Fear over the possibility that 
South Korea might provoke North Korea could have influenced the United States’ 
decision to station its nuclear weapons in South Korea (Jae-Bong, 2009, n.p.). For the 
United States, its nuclear weapons in South Korea served to deter a North Korean 
attack (Nam, 2009, p. 163). In 1975, Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger 
publically announced that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in South 
Korea “and would use them if it was faced with serious aggression likely to result in 
defeat in any area of very great importance to the US in Asia...including Korea” (Nam, 
2009, p. 88).  
South Korea signed the NPT in 1968 but only ratified the treaty in 1975. The late 
ratification by South Korea may be based on North Korea and China’s refusal to sign 
the NPT and Japan’s delayed ratification (Solingen, 2007, p. 85). Yet again, the 
nuclear guarantee offered by the United States to a large extent influenced its 
decision to ratify the NPT after seven years. "Indeed, South Korea's statement 
accompanying ratification clarified that NPT membership would be contingent on 
robust U.S. security commitments. Park's statements merely two months after 
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ratification reiterated that South Korea would need its own deterrent if U.S. 
guarantees were removed" (Solingen, 2007, p. 85). Park Chung-hee was the President 
of South Korea from 1961 up until 1979. In 1991, the United States President, George 
H. W. Bush began the process of removing its nuclear weapons from South Korea. 
The United States hoped the removal of nuclear weapons would lead North Korea to 
discard its nuclear ambitions, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that Russian 
President Mikhail Gorbachev would also initiate nuclear disarmament (Heo & 
Roehrig, 2010, p. 164) 
In recent years, discussions have emerged in South Korea over the possibility of 
pursuing its own nuclear weapon capability. Conservative politicians and the media 
argue that South Korea should reconsider its non-nuclear status. The economic 
hardships in the United States and its declining global influence sparked discussion 
in South Korea about the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory or 
whether it should pursue its own nuclear deterrent (Weitz, 2011, n.p.). North Korea 
continues to make gestures in support of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula but lack 
commitment towards realising this end (Dae-joong, 2011, n.p.). According to Dae-
joong (2011, n.p.), it is only through South Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons that 
negotiations between North and South Korea will produce results. These comments 
should not lead to the assumption of an emerging nuclear South Korea, rather that 
the nuclear guarantee of the United States may no longer be sufficient, intensifying a 
sense of insecurity and concern over the realisation of a nuclear weapons-free Korea. 
The mentioned cases of Japan, Germany and South Korea are examples of states that 
are covered under the nuclear guarantee of the United States. The only difference is 
Japan, and South Korea no longer have tactical nuclear weapons of the United States 
on their territory. On the other hand, Germany no longer wants tactical nuclear 
weapons on its territory. It has been assumed and argued that the increasing 
normative strength of the NPT was responsible for the decision of states to forgo 
nuclear weapons (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78). According to Kutchesfahani 
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(2010, p. 10), it was rather the nuclear guarantee of the United States that played a 
significant role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Realist scholars point to 
the limited role institutions play in shaping state behaviour, this argument is well 
applicable to the NPT. In this context, remaining a non-nuclear weapon state were 
not influenced by the NPT directly. Commitment towards the norm of non-
proliferation was based on the benefits that some states enjoyed; that is, the 
protection of the nuclear guarantee of the United States (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 12). 
This so-called benefit and privilege were not extended to all non-nuclear weapon 
states of the NPT. For Japan, Germany and South Korea, belonging to the NPT was a 
convenient arrangement; they gained access to nuclear technology but also are 
protected under the United State’s pledge to protect them from conventional and 
nuclear weapon attacks. Preventing nuclear proliferation to Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Germany, Turkey and other European states was the desired outcome, but 
the method employed to change this behaviour and in turn shape and change their 
sense of insecurity was not achieved through the NPT. “Without this guarantee, and 
without subsequent ratification of the NPT, this norm against nuclear weapons 
proliferation might not have been as strong as it is today” (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 
10). This point brings into question the strength of the NPT and the reason why 
states have ratified it. Without the nuclear guarantee, non-nuclear weapon states 
may reconsider their non-nuclear status (Taylor, 2010, p. 6).  
Sovereignty infers that all states are equal; however, realists argue that states differ in 
their capability and power. Under the NPT not all states are equal as some benefited 
more from this order, and this inherent inequality may be responsible for distrust 
among them. In a 1993 statement, Japanese Foreign Minister, Kabun Muto said that 
"if North Korea develops nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, first 
there is the nuclear umbrella of the United States upon which we can rely. But if it 
comes down to a crunch, possessing the will that ‘we can do it ourselves’ is 
important" (Schoff, 2009, p. 2). This quote highlights the fact that despite having 
ratified the NPT in 1976, Japan considered keeping its option to develop nuclear 
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weapons open. What is evident is that being under the NPT does not necessarily 
mean states will forgo their quest for nuclear weapons. Rather, if regional disputes 
intensify, for example in the case of North Korea, or if confidence in the nuclear 
guarantee of the United States decline this may create sufficient conditions for Japan 
and other states to withdraw from the NPT, pursue a nuclear weapons programme 
and obtain nuclear weapons. The NPT may not be sufficient to influence state’s 
decision to forgo nuclear weapons or even disarm; as regional tensions, perceived 
external threats and a changing international system may drive states to produce 
nuclear weapons to ensure the safety of their security interests (Kurosawa, 1997, pp. 
9, 11-12). 
It is not only certain non-nuclear weapon states as mentioned previously that 
benefited from the order of the NPT fashioned by dominant states. Non-members of 
this treaty also benefited from this order, for example, India and Israel. 
4.4.2 The nuclear trade between the United States and India: undermining 
Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
 
The NSG was established in 1975 and comprises of 46 nuclear supplier states.1 The 
nuclear supplier states have coordinated their export controls to regulate the trade in 
nuclear-related materials and technology to non-nuclear weapon states. The NSG is 
another key component of the non-proliferation regime and in its ‘guidelines’ 
describe the rules for nuclear trade (Arms Control Association, 2006). The NSG 
guidelines administer and manage trade of nuclear material and technology to 
                                                          
1 NSG members includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,  Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Nuclear Suppliers Group, see: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-member.htm 
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prevent misuse and the development of nuclear weapons. For example, the NSG 
imposes restrictions on the trade of nuclear technology with states that do not 
adhere to the NPT or have not signed IAEA safeguards (Wastler, 2010, pp. 201, 205).   
On 6 September 2008, the NSG formally approved an exemption to its rule that only 
allows nuclear trade to non-nuclear weapon states if they have signed a 
comprehensive IAEA safeguard agreement with the IAEA. This was done under 
pressure from the United States that announced its intentions to normalise trade 
with India in 2005. India is not a member of the NPT and has a nuclear weapons 
programme. However, under the NPT India is classified as a non-nuclear weapon 
state and the United States would thus not have been allowed to engage in nuclear 
trade with India unless the NSG exempted India from the need for comprehensive 
safeguards.  
Under the Atoms for Peace program, India misused nuclear technology and in 1974 
conducted a nuclear test explosion. In 1975, the NSG was formed based on India’s 
nuclear test and through its guidelines prevented states such as Israel and Pakistan 
from gaining access to the benefits of nuclear trade (Schaffer, 2009, pp. 91-92). The 
problem with the nuclear agreement between the United States and India is that it 
lifted a 30-year-old ban by the NSG on transferring nuclear material to India (Wastler, 
2010, p. 202). NSG member states could have blocked the nuclear cooperation deal 
with India but chose not to. On the one hand, states such as Australia, Ireland and 
New Zealand initially disagreed with the decision to exempt India from NSG rules. On 
the other hand, France and Russia had a vested economic interest in exempting India 
from the NSG rule (Wastler, 2010, p. 205). Proponents of the nuclear agreement 
argued that it served to bring India closer to the non-proliferation regime and 
strengthened United States and Indian relations. Under the nuclear agreement, India 
was required to formally pledge to suspend nuclear testing and to subject its civilian 
nuclear facilities and non-military facilities to IAEA inspection (Wastler, 2010, p. 210).   
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The United States and India nuclear agreement gives American companies the ability 
to sell nuclear fuel, technology and reactors to India (CNN, 2008). France has also 
commenced a similar agreement to provide India with the world’s largest nuclear 
reactor of 1,650 megawatt (BBC, 2008). Other states outside the NPT may also appeal 
for this type of cooperation and states within the NPT may question their 
membership. Through the nuclear deal with the United States, India enjoys the 
benefits of being a nuclear power while also receiving benefits associated with 
member states of the NPT (Srivastava, 2007, n.p.). 
However, for many non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT, this agreement 
represented a violation to their interest. According to Article IV of the NPT, non-
nuclear weapon member states to this treaty have the inalienable right to access 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. India was afforded this benefit or right 
even though it remains outside the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT have 
forgone the option of going nuclear and in this way gained access to nuclear 
technology; this forms part of the grand bargain between member states of the NPT 
(Scott, 2010, p. 3). Access to peaceful nuclear technology is the exclusive right of 
non-nuclear weapon states (Wastler, 2010, p. 209).  
The George W. Bush administration saw building closer links with India as having a 
strategic purpose to counterbalance China as a rising power (Sevastopulo, 2008, 
n.p.). The United States and Chinese relations have been filled with inconsistency and 
uncertainty.  
After China denounced the Soviet Union in the 1960s the United States under 
President Richard Nixon moved from a relationship of confrontation with China to 
peace and reconciliation (Goh, 2005, p. 112). In recent years, relations between China 
and the United States have been characterised by hostility and tension. The 
economic rise of China has been viewed with suspicion and fear, especially from the 
United States. In 2010 China had an economic grown rate of 9.7% (BBC, 2011). China 
is a communist state with a rising economy and a real contender for the role of 
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superpower. There have been fears in the United States that China may challenge the 
position of the United States as a global leader. China may use its power and 
position to reshape international institutions in its favour; mostly, it is the distinct 
culture and ideology of China, which is threatening to the United States (Hsiao & Lin, 
2009, p. 42; Xia, 2008, n.p.). China also has the world's largest army, but it is the 
United States’ trade deficit with China that prevents it from pushing for reforms in 
China. The United States has a trade deficit with China of $133, 412.6 billion in goods 
and services based on 2011 foreign trade statistics (United States Census Bureau, 
2011, n.p.). These factors make the United States unsure on how to deal with China; 
that is, whether to embrace China or regard it as a foe (De Vore, 2011, n.p.). 
The nuclear trade with India shows a disregard for rules and the watering down of 
the NPT. Balancing power and economic benefits gained through nuclear 
cooperation trumps non-proliferation efforts as national interests take precedence 
(Cohen, 2006, p. 93). Here double standards are evident in the case of India where it 
receives benefits for being allied to the United States while states such as Iran or 
North Korea that are not allies of the United States, experience more pressure for 
their nuclear activities (Bajoria, 2010, n.p.).   
The Indian case points to the concern by non-aligned states that export controls are 
used as a foreign policy tool by industrialised countries to punish their rivals and 
repay their allies, rather than being implemented to ensure the principle of non-
proliferation (Müller, 2010, p. 7). 
4.5 Historic links between the United States and Israel 
 
The United States has supported Israel since its formation in 1948 after World War II 
and the holocaust. During World War II, Nazi Germany under the leadership of Adolf 
Hitler was responsible for the mass murder and genocide of approximately six million 
European Jews. On 29 November 1947, the UNGA agreed to partition Palestine to 
form an independent Israeli state. An independent Israel set its state boundaries and 
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reclaimed more land than what was initially agreed under the UNGA Partition Plan. 
Israel thus encroached on Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip occupied by Egypt, 
and the West Bank occupied by Jordan. Egypt, Syria and Iraq proceeded to attack 
Israel on the same day as its independence. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war of 
independence, thousands of Palestinians fled their homes or was expelled and took 
refuge in neighbouring regions such as Jordan and Syria. The encroachment of 
Palestinians’ rights was a central issue influencing Israeli and Arab relations. In order 
to house the Jewish immigrant population Israel exploited water from the river that 
separates Israel and Jordan without gaining agreement from Arabs which angered 
the Arab world (Gat, 2005, p. 613; Grey, 1994, p. 220).   
The Six Day War of 1967 intensified relations between the United States and Israel. 
On 5 June 1967, Israel used its air force to launch a surprise attack on Egypt and 
Syria. In a decisive victory for Israel, it claimed control over the Gaza Strip and Sinai 
Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan 
Heights from Syria. Before the Six Day War President Nasser of Egypt lashed out 
against Israel for its abuse of Palestinian rights. Nasser also employed rhetoric calling 
for the destruction of the Israeli state (Gat, 2005, p. 608). Nasser did not want to go 
to war with Israel. Instead, he lashed out against Israel as proof that he was 
committed towards Pan-Arab elements desiring the freedom of Palestine (Gat, 2005, 
p. 609). The involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was evident, and it 
feared Israel would attack its ally Syria. As a precautionary measure the Soviet Union 
warned Egypt of this development. Israel was not planning on attacking Syria 
though. The Soviet Union wanted Nasser to deter Israel from attacking Syria but did 
not expect Nasser to provoke a war (Tal, 2000, pp. 136-137).  
The increasing presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East led the United States 
under President Richard Nixon to support Israel and balance power through 
strengthening its military influence and position to deter Arabs from conducting a 
war that would escalate in war between the superpowers (Stephens, 2006, p. 27). For 
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the United States, Israel represented an ally to the fight against communism in the 
Middle East during the Cold War.  
During the 1980s relations between the United States and Israel were labelled by 
President Ronald Reagan as a security partnership, but in actual fact many argue that 
Israel dictates the foreign policy of the United States on the Middle East, which may 
have negative implications. President Ronald Reagan argued that ongoing United 
States support for Israel was a moral obligation in support of the pledge of the 
Jewish people and in accordance with the national interests of the United States 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 56). 
Israel finds itself in a hostile region with emanating threats from states, such as 
Egypt, Syria, Iran and so forth. However, security threats to Israel also came in the 
form of terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Since 1985, the United 
States provided Israel with $3 billion per annum in economic and military aid, which 
has increased since (Mark, 2004, p. 2). A former Senator of the United States, J. 
William Fulbright, cautioned in 1974 that the Jewish lobby “can just about tell the 
president what to do when it comes to Israel. Its influence in Congress is pervasive 
and, I think profoundly harmful – to us and ultimately to Israel itself” (Thomas, 2007, 
p. 51).  Israel perceives itself as in a precarious and hostile position within the Middle 
East and as a result requires security assurances and protection, which largely come 
from the United States.  
4.5.1 Jewish lobby in the United States 
 
The Jewish lobby in the United States comprises of Christian Americans, Jewish 
Americans, religious organisations, such as the John Hagee Ministries, and groups, 
such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The Jewish lobby has a 
pro-Israeli stance, seeking to influence American foreign and public policy in support 
of Israel. AIPAC has a 100 000 membership base and works with both Democrats and 
Republican political leaders to strengthen relations between the United States and 
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Israel. AIPAC was successful in a number of areas, for example, in obtaining foreign 
aid for Israel from America, passing legislation that places tougher sanctions on Iran 
for its nuclear programme and acquiring security assistance to maintain and 
strengthen Israeli military position to overcome its adversaries (United States, 2011, 
pp. 26-27). There are roughly six million Jews in America that occupy key electoral 
college states, leading presidential candidates to support and promote the agenda of 
Israel. The Jewish lobby seeks to influence public opinion, academics and business 
groups. Media outlets and various Jewish lobbies link Israeli security concerns to 
American interests. Here American policy and activity in the Middle East, for example, 
deploying military troops to limit the influence of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah 
is not necessarily in the interest of America. The boundary of where Israeli security 
concerns begin and where American interest’s end is yet to be clearly specified. 
Often, it is perceived the interest of Israel and that of the United States are identical, 
but on closer inspection they are not (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, n.p.).      
This favourable treatment towards Israel and long standing support has ramifications 
in the nuclear realm and ongoing efforts to bring nuclear Israel into the NPT and 
conduct its nuclear activities in a transparent manner.  
 4.5.2 Ignoring Israel’s nuclear status and non-NPT membership 
 
Calls for Israel to join the NPT have occurred since the treaty came into force. Arab 
states, in particular Egypt, demanded Israel to end its nuclear ambiguity as Israel 
does not deny nor admit that it is in possession of nuclear weapons. On 29 July 2004, 
the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon said, “Israel faces existential threat, and it 
must be able to defend itself by preserving its deterrent capability” (Larkin, 2008, p. 
23).  
In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician who worked at the Dimona power 
plant in Israel obtained evidence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and presented it to the 
Sunday Times in London where upon it was published. The Sunday Times published 
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that Israel was in possession of approximately 150 to 200 nuclear weapons produced 
in its underground plutonium separation facility (Diehl & Moltz, 2008, p. 203). Upon 
Vanunu’s stay in Rome, he was kidnapped and brought to trial in Israel and 
imprisoned for revealing the truth of Israel’s nuclear power and its possession of 
nuclear weapons (Larkin, 2008, p. 24). This shows the extent to which Israel was 
willing to conceal its nuclear activities and prevent leakage of critical information.  
Arab states have for many years requested IAEA inspection of Israel’s nuclear 
facilities, but Western States have been more interested in addressing Iran’s nuclear 
programme. On 28 May 2003, Arab states met in Vienna to attend the Arab League 
Office. The meeting at Vienna produced a memo and letter that were sent to the 
IAEA. Arab states requested IAEA inspections in Israel, but the request has been 
blocked by the United States. It is the influence of the United States on the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA blocking Arab demands that the IAEA criticise Israel’s nuclear 
arsenal (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, n.p.; Perelman, 2003, n.p.).  
At the 1995 Review Conference, Egypt voiced the urgency for Israel to join the NPT 
as Israel’s nuclear status poses a threat to Egypt’s interest and a threat to the rest of 
the Middle East. For this reason, Egypt and other Arab states attempted to link 
Israel's accession to the NPT with the NPT’s indefinite extension, but failed to achieve 
this outcome (Steinberg, 1996, p, 21). All states of the Middle East have signed and 
ratified the NPT, except Israel. The 1995 Resolution of the Middle East calling for a 
nuclear weapons-free zone in this region is directly linked to Israel’s nuclear 
weapons. Ignoring a nuclear Israel is a risk to regional and international peace and 
security. In the 47th regular session of the IAEA it warned Israel’s possession of 
nuclear weapons could spark a nuclear arms race (IAEA, 2003, p. 2). Since 1970, 
President Richard Nixon stopped inspection of Israel's nuclear facilities, and this 
perpetuated Israel’s nuclear ambiguity. In the 1960s, Israel formally pledged that it 
would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East and 
Nixon was advised not to force Israel the issue further (Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 24). 
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Richard Nixon was of the view that as long as Israel protected its nuclear weapons 
and did not test it, in other words, keeping it a secret, the United States could live 
with a nuclear Israel. This point is strengthened by the fact that in 1970 inspections of 
Israel’s nuclear facility, Dimona, was stopped and in a 1975 congressional hearing, 
the State Department refused to accept Central Intelligence Agency information that 
Israel had the bomb (Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 29). 
States such as Iran that are regarded as possible nuclear proliferators are subjected 
to sanctions and international criticism while India, Israel and Pakistan are allies of 
the United States, more recently with reference to its war on terror, but their nuclear 
arsenals are not met in the United States with the same discomfort as in the case of 
Iran (Johnson, 2004, p. 11). These double standards have implications for the integrity 
of the NPT, especially how the treaty is perceived by those outside it and member 
states that remain committed to its rules and practices.  
With the above discussion in mind, non-nuclear weapon states use the NPT to 
highlight double standards conducted by member states relating to how this treaty is 
interpreted (Haq, 2006, p. 26). Israel remains outside the NPT and is also in 
possession of nuclear weapons while Iran is a member state without nuclear 
weapons, but more pressure is directed at Iran. Egypt and Turkey have highlighted 
this discrepancy and in such a way call nuclear weapon states to account for their 
actions and reservations for certain states (Landau, 2010, p. 44). By publically voicing 
double standards, non-nuclear weapon states place pressure on nuclear weapon 
states to be impartial and consistent in their application of the NPT.  
Favourable treatment for some under the NPT waters down the value of this treaty 
leading to the assumption that dominant powers that have crafted the NPT and 
established its rules have the ability to directly influence how it is interpreted and 
practiced. This position highlights the neorealist view, namely that dominant powers 
construct institutions to serve their self-interests and will deviate from its rules and 
regulations when it no longer serves its interests. With reference to Susan Strange on 
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the Bretton Woods economic system, the NPT is thus inconsistent by its inability to 
promote order and combat international anarchy.  
4.6 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: A practical 
illustration of the realist view 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the review conferences of the NPT present 
opportunities to re-examine the strengths and the shortcomings of this treaty. In this 
way, the level of commitment of member states toward this treaty can also be 
revealed and understood. The actions of member states preceding and during the 
NPT review conferences serve as practical illustrations of their support or rejection of 
its grand bargain. The interpretation that the NPT is a realist instrument used by 
dominant powers to obtain their interests can be tested by critically revisiting what 
transpired before and during review conferences. This section will focus on the 
actions, conduct and behaviour of the five nuclear weapon states during the NPT 
review processes with reference to non-proliferation, the right to access nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes and nuclear disarmament.    
4.6.1 The 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
 
The 2005 NPT Review Conference stands out as a prime example illustrating the 
realist nature of this treaty. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference resulted in 
the CTBT and the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament agreed 
between the New Agenda Coalition and the nuclear weapon states introduce a 
measure to make the treaty more balanced. However, the failure of the 2005 Review 
Conference to even establish an agenda, let alone progress on the controversial 
matters surrounding the treaty, reversed the gains made in 1995. The blame for this 
failure should be shared between the United States and Egypt. The United States 
under the Bush administration reversed its commitment to the 13 steps and returned 
to an interpretation of the NPT that assumes the five nuclear weapon states has the 
right to have nuclear weapons. Egypt, on the other hand, did not want to lose the 
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momentum achieved based on the 1995 and 2000 results and thus pressed to move 
forward from these agreements. Egypt was frustrated by the Bush administration and 
its lack of support towards the disarmament measures (Müller, 2005b, p. 13).  
Müller attributes one reason for the stalemate at the 2005 conference to national 
interests (Müller, 2005b, p. 4). In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had its 
roots in the terrorist’s attack of the United States on 11 September 2001. To justify 
the withdrawal, the then Press Secretary of the White House, Lawrence Fleischer 
argued that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prevents the United States from 
safeguarding its security against a ballistic missile attack (Fitzmaurice & Elias, 2005, p. 
186) Also, when considering the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the 2005 
Review Conference was headed for failure as the major player of the non-
proliferation regime, namely the United States undermined the value of the NPT to 
pursue its own national interests.  
During the 2005 Review Conference, the Bush administration was explicit in its lack of 
support towards disarmament, gaining criticism largely from the non-aligned states. 
France hid behind the United States during proceeding and effectively blocked 
discussion of the consensus emerged from the 1995 and 2000 (13 practical steps on 
disarmament) review conference (Müller, 2005b, p. 10). To add further insult to injury, 
former United States President, George W. Bush commented that the results of the 
1995 and 2000 Review Conferences represented political statements but was not 
legally binding (Larkin, 2008, pp. 217-218). On the other hand, the United Kingdom, 
being a close ally of the United States did not criticise or openly challenge the United 
States’ response to the NPT and was careful not to isolate the United States 
(Johnson, 2005, p. 24). In a statement made by Ambassador John Freeman of the 
United Kingdom, the NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and the 
United Kingdom is fully committed to its non-proliferation and disarmament 
obligations. However, John Freeman further stated, “let me say at the outset: we 
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recognize the need for balanced implementation of the Treaty and we support 
progress in all its areas, as our record demonstrates. However, we believe that 
progress in non-proliferation is important in its own right" (Joyner, 2011, p. 43). 
Taken in this manner, it seems as if the central pillar of the NPT is non-proliferation 
and disarmament appears to be less important. Interpreting the NPT in a narrow 
manner is a constant concern highlighted by non-nuclear weapon states, as this 
disproportionate emphasis removes the binding link between non-proliferation and 
disarmament. 
The five nuclear weapon states argue that the NPT is central to maintaining 
international security but their activity and behaviour disprove this claim. By 
attempting to almost delink non-proliferation from disarmament nuclear weapon 
states are in fact proving that dominant states have great influence over institutions, 
and can deviate from its rules. Dominant states, through their position and narrow 
interpretation of the NPT have safeguarded their own nuclear weapons by arguing 
that nuclear proliferation to others, such as rogue states is more pertinent than 
nuclear disarmament. In this way, the NPT is viewed as legitimising nuclear weapons 
for some, as nuclear weapon states would argue that they are rational and 
responsible nuclear states while others cannot be trusted (Daley, 2010, pp. 19-20). In 
turn, nuclear weapon states place themselves above the NPT based on their 
behaviour and actions, for example using non-proliferation to further and justify their 
national interests (United States-led invasion of Iraq). Moreover, as the United 
Kingdom argued, the NPT gives them the right to have nuclear weapons. These 
actions and behaviour explicitly state that the rules of the NPT do not apply to the 
five nuclear weapon states, that is, “do as we say, not as we do” (Burroughs, 2007, p. 
37).  
 
 
 
 
122 
 
4.6.2 The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
 
Based on the dismal outcome of the 2005 Review Conference greater resources, 
effort and political will were directed at ensuring a successful Review Conference in 
2010. Both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states saw the urgency of 
developing a positive outcome. At this Review Conference, a final document was 
established and concessions by both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states 
were achieved, but stronger language could have been used concerning non-
proliferation and disarmament, for example nuclear weapon states were merely 
encouraged to establish negative security assurances while the Additional Protocol of 
the IAEA did not serve as a verification standard for all states (Johnson, 2010a, p. 7). 
States participated in the conference in their individual capacity as well as within 
certain groupings, such as the European Union or NAM. The European Union’s 
position at the Review Conference was delivered by its foreign minister, Catherine 
Ashton. The European Union brought key proposals forward and placed it on the 
negotiation table to form part of Committee reports and in the final declaration. 
Under the European Union, the following proposals were put forward: the Middle 
East Resolution, treaty withdrawal, IAEA verification and the CTBT. However, the 
efforts of the European Union were weakened by two nuclear weapon states, namely 
France and the United Kingdom – the two European states that have nuclear 
weapons (Müller, 2010, p. 11).          
The delegation of France and the United Kingdom were not willing to reduce the role 
nuclear weapons played in their military doctrines. Germany, Norway and Switzerland 
were in support of addressing sub-strategic nuclear weapons. It was argued that sub-
strategic or tactical nuclear weapons under NATO placed on European territory 
should be removed. It was mainly Poland preferring to keep these nuclear weapons 
as they acted as a deterrent against Russia.  
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NAM criticised nuclear weapon states for planning to modernise their nuclear 
weapons, and thus failing to honour their NPT obligations (Johnson, 2010a, p. 4). 
Both France and the United Kingdom favour the right to modernise their nuclear 
arsenals, which are ageing. However, modernisation of nuclear weapons suggested 
that these states were not going to disarm any time soon, but are instead re-
investing money in nuclear weapons, which they continue to see as central to their 
national security strategies. This makes a mockery of the disarmament clause of the 
NPT. In 2006, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair suggested the 
renewal of trident nuclear weapons. Trident is a submarine based missile system 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This is in direct violation of the NPT (vertical 
proliferation), instead of reducing nuclear weapons; the United Kingdom plans to 
modernise and increase the trident based nuclear weapons and maintain its nuclear 
deterrence. "Mr Blair said it would be "unwise and dangerous" for Britain to 
unilaterally give up its nuclear deterrent" (Tempest, 2006, n.p.). This comment points 
to the centrality of nuclear weapons. According to Tertrais (2007, p. 252), in 2006, 
French President, Jacques Chirac stated, "In light of the concerns of the present and 
the uncertainties of the future, nuclear deterrence remains the fundamental 
guarantee of our security...” 
China, as in the case of France, did not welcome or support any disarmament 
measures. China has an explicit no-first-use nuclear weapons policy which is in stark 
contrast from other nuclear weapon states. However, China blocked stronger 
language on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (Müller, 2010, p. 13). In an April 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States issued it would begin the 
negotiation process of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; this would strengthen and 
reinforce the non-proliferation regime. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was endorsed 
by the Conference on Disarmament and President Barack Obama supported such a 
treaty with verification measures (United States Department of Defense, 2010, p. 13). 
China's decision to block stronger language on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is 
linked to its position among the rest of the five nuclear states and its future security 
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interests. China fears that it may be at a disadvantage if it supported a moratorium 
on the production of fissile material for weapons’ purposes, as the United States and 
Russia have large stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium (fissile 
material) for weapons’ purposes. China is also concerned over the United States and 
Russian missile-defence systems and may modernise its own nuclear weapons to 
maintain a balance of power among the five nuclear states (Kurosawa, 2005, p. 25; 
Hibbs, 2011, n.p.). "In response, China recently issued a strong public objection, 
saying that such defenses could render China's small arsenal of strategic missiles 
"completely ineffective" and leave China open to blackmail" (Gronlund, Liu & Wright, 
1995, n.p.). By supporting a moratorium on the production of fissile material for 
weapons’ purposes China may risk its security and be at a disadvantage as other 
nuclear weapon states can use existing fissile material to increase their nuclear 
weapons. 
It seems though that nuclear weapon states prefer not to be put under the 
microscope when it comes to their obligations under the NPT and instead choose to 
focus on the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear weapon states. Although 
Cold War thinking around nuclear weapons persists, now the threat of rogue states 
and terrorist organisations are also used to justify the existence of nuclear weapons. 
This only serves to negate the nuclear weapon states’ commitment under the NPT, in 
particular, towards nuclear disarmament (Larkin, 2008, p. 218). 
The NPT as an institution has a limited impact on shaping and influencing the 
behaviour of member states through its norms and standards. The limited influence 
of the NPT is not only evident in the behaviour of member states, but also in the 
reason why some states have decided to forgo the nuclear weapon option. North 
Korea used the treaty to conduct a clandestine nuclear programme and developed 
nuclear weapons. Iran, another member state is suspected of being a possible 
nuclear proliferator by the further enrichment of uranium. Member states thus use 
the treaty to pursue their nuclear weapon ambitions. In the same breath, the five 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
nuclear weapon states use the NPT to serve their self-interests. This is evident in their 
activities to direct attention away from disarmament, using the threat of non-
proliferation to hold onto nuclear weapons indefinitely, condemning foes while 
shielding allies from criticism such as Israel, and bending its rules as in the case of 
India for an economic benefit.  
A further point that Jo and Gartzke (2007, p. 179) make is that those states without 
nuclear weapons that join the NPT do so because they have planned not to obtain 
nuclear weapons. Following this line of argument, the NPT as an institution does not 
change or influence state behaviour. For example, in the case of South Africa, once its 
security was guaranteed after the collapse of the Soviet Union it joined the NPT. The 
NPT did not change South Africa’s behaviour or thinking around nuclear weapons. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a major threat to South Africa, and the 
improvement of regional conflicts between Namibia, controlled by South Africa and 
Angola, the process of nuclear disarmament became possible. Domestically, the 
threat of a communist-led overthrow of the apartheid regime supported by the 
Soviet Union had diminished. However, some argue that the apartheid government 
feared what a South Africa led by the African National Congress may do with the 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capability. This fear of nuclear weapons falling 
into the hands of the African National Congress once South Africa made its regime 
transition was widely supported by the United States (Levite, 2004, p. 103; Purkitt, 
Burgess & Liberman, 2002, p. 187). "...the United States, which feared the 
consequences of South Africa's long-range ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons 
falling into the hands of the new South African government led by the African 
National Congress (and by extension possibly the communist regimes with which it 
was allied, such as Cuba) or nationalist white extremist groups" (Levite, 2004, p. 103-
104). 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an interpretation of the NPT through a realist lens. As such it 
argued that the formation of the NPT reflects the interests of its main architects, 
namely the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its indefinite extension, the 
NPT protects the nuclear weapons and legitimises their possession by China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. This treaty was designed for 
combating non-proliferation and not disarmament, while allies of the five nuclear 
states, such as India enjoy NPT benefits. On the other hand, Israel and Pakistan, both 
Western allies are not harassed and pressured over their possession of nuclear 
weapons, such as Iran and North Korea. The rules of the treaty have been bent or 
overlooked in support of national interests and increasing efforts are directed at 
clinging onto nuclear weapons for an indefinite period. The introductory process of 
the treaty, the guiding intention behind its formation by its main architects, the 
conduct of the five nuclear states preceding and during the NPT Review Conferences 
affirm the realist view of this treaty. 
The next chapter will provide a liberal perspective of the NPT that institutions and 
regimes promote order and cooperation in an anarchical world and have the ability 
to influence the behaviour and interests of states, concerning nuclear weapons and 
disarmament.    
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Chapter 5: A Liberal perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves to provide a liberal view of the NPT. Liberal scholars are inclined 
to offer a more optimistic account of the international system and the position of 
states therein. In spite of this, the liberal and realist assumptions are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Liberal scholars concur with realist regarding international 
anarchy; nevertheless, they affirm that institutions and regimes act as a form of 
governance, reducing insecurity found in an anarchical world.    
The question can be posed: in a world where nuclear weapons are a central 
component of the military doctrines of powerful states, can the NPT change this 
reality by delegitimizing and stigmatising nuclear weapons? The liberal and 
neoliberal theoretical paradigm will be applied to the NPT. Utilising the liberal 
paradigm to understand the NPT reveals its normative strength, its increasing 
currency and ability to influence positively and shape the views of states regarding 
security, nuclear weapons and disarmament through norms and standards. Regimes 
and institutions are not the problem; rather, it is how nuclear weapon states have 
viewed, interpreted and practiced the rules and principles of this treaty.  
5.2 Challenging the rationality of nuclear weapons  
 
For long it has been argued that the usefulness of nuclear weapons lay in their ability 
to deter a nuclear war. Based on the logic of mutually assured destruction the use of 
nuclear weapons would ensure the destruction of each state respectively. This point 
was put forward to explain why nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War 
and more particularly during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, scholars such as 
Tannenwald (2007, p. i) emphasise the non-use of nuclear weapons did not relate to 
their deterrent utility as realists advocate. 
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The extent of resources which industrialised states such as the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the Soviet Union have invested to produce nuclear weapons is not 
clear. These weapons require considerable funds and resources, infrastructure, 
production facilities, raw materials as well as a skilled labour force of scientists, 
technicians, engineers and so forth. Directing financial resources toward making a 
nuclear device or warhead represents only one element of a nuclear weapons 
programme. Significant amounts of capital are spent on delivery vehicles and 
systems capable of transporting nuclear weapons such as bomber aircrafts as well as 
missile systems, including tactical ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. According to Olson (2010, p. 12), it is estimated that the United States 
spends $20 billion per annum to maintain and operate its strategic and tactical 
nuclear delivery vehicles. Furthermore, in the financial year of 2008, the United States 
spent nearly $9.2 billion on its missile-defence system (national missile-defence, 
theatre missile-defence and national and theatre missile-defence) (Schwartz & 
Choubey, 2009, p. 27). For this reason, the option to go nuclear is not necessarily a 
rational decision based on the great economic expenditure required. In this way, 
nuclear weapon-related cost may act as an economic barrier preventing states from 
going nuclear. Besides the economic cost, nuclear weapons cannot be used based on 
their mutually destructive capability, which realist scholars are aware of, however 
states continue to allocate huge amounts of money in their defence budgets for 
nuclear weapon-related programmes.  
The centrality of nuclear weapons is not shared by many non-nuclear weapon states, 
as their security is protected without nuclear weapons. States such as Germany, 
Japan and Switzerland viewed the access to nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes initially implemented through the 1953 Atoms for Peace program and then 
formally guaranteed by the NPT as a valuable package, in exchange forgoing the 
nuclear weapons option (Hackel, 1992, pp. 58-59). Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa 
and the Ukraine have willingly removed nuclear weapons from their territory while 
Argentina and Brazil among many others have forgone the nuclear weapons option. 
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This should prove nuclear weapons are not necessarily the only or most rational 
means available to safeguard national interests. Realists assume nuclear weapons 
best serve the protection of national interests when, in fact, security can be protected 
and guaranteed without them. The fact that non-nuclear weapon states’ security is 
protected without the possession of nuclear weapons should attest to this fact. The 
establishment of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, which will be discussed below in 
relation to the NPT, works on the principle of mutually assured abstinence from 
nuclear weapons as opposed to mutually assured destruction to secure their member 
states. The nuclear arms race during the Cold War brought the world close to a 
nuclear war. It can be argued that nuclear weapons, in fact, heighten insecurity, for 
example Israel worries that Iran may become nuclear and threaten its security 
interests, while Iran may well be engaging in a nuclear weapons programme because 
of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Perceived gains of being in possession of nuclear 
weapons are limited by their security cost, namely the escalation of nuclear weapons 
regionally and in turn more insecurity experienced by that state which first 
introduced them, and the potential danger of their use (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 
79).  
5.3 The nuclear taboo 
 
Warfare raises significant ethical questions, but it is the massively destructive nature 
of nuclear weapons, and their lethal effect on human life and the environment that 
serves as a compelling argument in support of nuclear disarmament (Smith, 1996, p. 
85). Since August 1945, when nuclear weapons were first used against Japan, nuclear 
weapons generated debates about their overkill potential and destructive nature; 
they breach two established laws of war, namely the proportionate and discriminate 
application of organised violence against the enemy. Over time a nuclear taboo 
emerged to challenge and oppose the use of nuclear weapons, and in that way to 
delegitimized these weapons. For the neoliberal scholar, Keohane, norms are 
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standards of behaviour “defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Keohane, 1984, 
p. 57). Another definition of norms distinguishes it from rules and principles. Norms 
are then not only standards of behaviour but are also morally binding. The nuclear 
taboo originated from the destruction inflicted on human beings due to nuclear 
weapons, making their use a moral issue.  
Prior to a discussion on the nuclear taboo as such, it needs to be defined what 
precisely is meant by the notion of a taboo as a taboo and a norm share similar 
attributes. According to Tannenwald (2007, p. 10), “A taboo typically refers to ritual 
avoidance, something that is not done, not said, or not touched”. Viewed in this 
fashion, a taboo places a ban on certain forms of behaviour, refers to danger and to 
violate it would result in undesirable consequences. The term taboo usually invokes 
religious connotations and imagery of what is considered sacred or profane. A taboo 
raises questions of morality and prescribes appropriate forms of behaviour just as 
norms do. It is argued that, when the idea of a taboo is invoked it has a unique level 
of influence over participants on how they perceive and respond to the world. A 
taboo is noted as a specific type of norm, which becomes more robust and linked to 
notions of “unthinkable” and “taken-for-granted” (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 11, 13).  
Since 1945, there has been a shift in attitudes regarding nuclear weapons in 
diplomatic statements made in the UN and echoed in the UNGA resolutions. The 
purpose of the nuclear taboo has been to counteract the value, and the sense of 
prestige associated with nuclear weapons as the ultimate weapon and to 
delegitimize its use. Explicitly, the nuclear taboo opposes the first-use of nuclear 
weapons. It is largely through the moral disapproval that the use of nuclear weapons 
has been prevented (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 8-9). This view is in direct contrast to the 
realist claim of the deterrent role nuclear weapons facilitated during the Cold War. 
Realists affirm the non-use norm simply supports what states already knew, that is, 
nuclear weapons should not be used, because their use will trigger an assured 
nuclear response (the power gained from these weapons is thus balanced). In the 
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case of the nuclear taboo, it did not simply emerge as a rational decision to prevent 
mutual annihilation, but took time to develop and had a moral element to it. Nuclear 
weapons were not always viewed with disapproval or sparked criticism. It was only 
after World War II, as the nuclear arms race took shape and the effects of nuclear 
testing became known that these ideas emerged and were promoted by social and 
activist groups for the abolition of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 21).  
The next section will investigate the impact of international norms and rules on the 
international system, in particular, how states relate to and use them. 
5.4 A moral case in support of non-proliferation and disarmament of 
nuclear weapons 
 
Liberal scholars are inclined to believe that states can cooperate in an anarchical 
system and will do this not just because it is in their interest to do so, but because of 
the moral value of cooperation. From a liberal point of view, treaties, such as the 
NPT, are an expression of states’ pursuit of the common good. Through the NPT, the 
international community is thus instituting commonly agreed upon rules for the 
collective security of humanity given the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. For 
liberals, treaties, integrated into regimes, represent a form of global governance (as 
the UN does and its predecessor, the League of Nations, did). 
The NPT has both moral and legal implications that contribute to what Hedley Bull 
(1977) referred to as the “anarchical society”, that is, a sense of order amidst 
international anarchy. Carr (1939, p. 147) discussed the idea of an international 
community which is bound by a sense of moral obligation towards each other. 
International treaties are useful in that they may maintain relations between states 
and bring order to the international system. However, what gives an international 
treaty, such as the NPT its moral nature is the fact that member states agree to 
protect humankind from the dangers and effects of a nuclear war (Doyle, 2009, p. 
137). A treaty should not be upheld simply because it is in the self-interests of states 
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to do so, but rather because it represents appropriate forms of behaviour, morally 
binding states to pursue the common good (Carr, 1939, pp. 169-172). 
On 27 August 2010, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) made a 
statement at the 19th World Congress International Physicians for the Prevention of 
Nuclear War where it outlined why nuclear weapons should be illegal. The ICRC is a 
humanitarian organisation primarily geared towards the prevention of human 
suffering from armed conflict. It was argued that nuclear war brings much 
devastation to the world and continues to affect human beings and the environment 
through long term radiation effects (Beerli, 2010, p. 1). This argument corresponds 
with the view of the International Court of Justice in a 1996 statement that the 
principles of international humanitarian law are applicable to nuclear weapons. This 
point indicates that nuclear weapons are in violation of the concept of international 
humanitarian law and for that reason is illegal (Beerli, 2010, pp. 2-3). International 
humanitarian law refers to appropriate and inappropriate conduct when engaging in 
a war and conflict situation (rules of war), and is usually divided into two sets of law, 
namely the Geneva and Hague law. For example, the Hague law is based on the 
Hague Peace Conference of 1899, which specifies that weapons that cause 
unnecessary suffering should not be used (Mackintosh, 2000, p. 4). Nuclear weapons 
fall into this category.  
Activist scholars such as Rebecca Johnson (2010c, n.p.) advocate for the 
stigmatisation of nuclear weapons as inhuman, which is for liberal scholars, a 
necessary condition and a step in the right direction to ban their use and existence.   
Liberals point to the moral value of the NPT, and the arguments presented by the 
ICRC and the International Court of Justice are essentially supporting evidence of 
why nuclear weapons should not be used and why disarmament is necessary. From 
what has been discussed thus far it should not be interpreted that liberals argue the 
NPT is not an instrument to pursue the self-interests of states. A liberal view not only 
holds that the NPT comes from a moral imperative to protect humanity, but also that 
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states can realise their security interests by adhering to the treaty. Nuclear weapons 
threaten state security (a central national interest of all states) and the NPT is a way 
to decrease insecurity through global governance. 
5.5 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: order and global governance 
 
Before the NPT came into effect in 1970 the non-proliferation norm did not have a 
significant platform on which to stand. The NPT activated the non-proliferation norm, 
bestowing it with strength and influence in the international system (Rublee, 2009, p. 
48). The NPT is a significant international instrument and arms control mechanism 
needed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament (Harvey, 
2010, p. 21). Both realist and liberal scholars acknowledge the dangers of an 
anarchical international system as a reality, except for liberals this does not mean that 
states cannot cooperate and reach mutual gains. With that said, there is a lack of 
global government but not a lack of global governance. 
Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 3) invoke the term “community” where states share 
common norms, values and symbols, which provide a social identity. From this view, 
states governed by a particular order form a community at the international level and 
for those operating within this framework, it produces a measure of stability and 
peace (for example the NPT). For some the end of the Cold War brought much 
uncertainty to the world as it represented a shift from a stable order (bipolarity) for 
realist scholars. Since then policy makers have been grappling to develop a more 
ordered world (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 4). The functionality of this community 
requires international governance; that is, the maintenance and regulation of state 
policy and activities. Governance draws on global, regional and national actors to 
combine their efforts for the management of a certain area, in this case nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament. It is the political and security activity which demands 
maintenance; and states forming part of this framework can be referred to as a 
security community (Wilkinson, 2002, p. 2).   
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The term security community was coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957 (Mearsheimer, 
2005, p. 145). A security community is a phenomenon wherein states abide by norms 
and institutions reflecting collective security. Within the security community, states 
renounce the use of military force. It is envisioned when states can identify positively 
with others the “...security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all” 
(Mearsheimer, 1998, p. 370). The danger of this is that it may lead to utopian thinking 
and thus straying from reality. According to Wilkinson (2002, p. 1), “Global 
governance is variously treated as fad, an oxymoron, or it is dismissed out of hand”. 
Realist’ scholars are primarily interested in states as central actors attributing little 
influence on the part of non-state actors and institutions in impacting world politics. 
Rather, Wilkinson (2002, p. 2), insists that global governance exists albeit as an 
incomplete process and an emerging phenomenon.   
The notion of security communities (like that of norms) is cited and further 
developed by constructivist scholars but the term governance and the assumption of 
state cooperation within an anarchical international system fits the liberal paradigm. 
This serves to connect the liberal and constructivist paradigm. Based on the earlier 
discussion on governance and community, the NPT represents a form of governance 
to order and stabilise relations between states within this community and ultimately 
contributing to collective security. Norms are necessary to regulate and constrain the 
behaviour of states and therefore key to promoting cooperation among them, but 
also necessary to establish order within an anarchical international system generally. 
Gouldner (1960, p. 161) argues that norms encompass an element of reciprocity or 
duty from those that practice it. Here, nuclear weapon states have the responsibility 
not to proliferate nuclear weapons or deploy them on the battlefield and also to 
promote their disarmament. By the same token, non-nuclear weapon states agree 
not to acquire nuclear weapons nor become nuclear themselves and in turn can 
access the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes. This 
represents the grand bargain of the NPT, bestowing states with rights but also 
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responsibilities or duties in a reciprocal system; and in this way, bringing order to the 
nuclear realm. 
However, governance in the international system can only result if member states are 
willing to cooperate, to share information, and be transparent about nuclear activities 
as well as distribute benefits equally under the NPT.  
For member states of the NPT belonging to this treaty it is useful to promote the 
common good, but also safeguards their self-interests (security). In a world where a 
global government is lacking the NPT needs to promote cooperation among states. 
For this to occur the thinking that nuclear weapons are of value to bestow prestige 
ought to be deconstructed and ultimately reinterpreted; in this manner, the NPT 
facilitates the creation of a new order conducive to non-proliferation and 
disarmament (Karp, 1992, p. 6). Nevertheless, the order of the NPT clashes with the 
strategic value of nuclear weapons. The strategic value of nuclear weapons as a 
source of state security has dominated the thinking of policy makers and academics 
in the international system. According to Booth and Wheeler (1992, p. 24), “Nuclear 
weapons had been irrevocably invented, and they created their own reality”. Thus, it 
appears as if the world had to accommodate nuclear weapons and learn to live with 
them. Realist scholars would then affirm that, anarchy justified the existence of these 
weapons which could not be altered (Karp, 1992, p. 19). Is it then possible for the 
NPT to deconstruct assumptions surrounding nuclear weapons, which have 
dominated the international system since its inception?  
Karp affirms the significance of developing alternative thinking on how state security 
can be safeguarded. Nuclear deterrence represents but one way of countering 
anarchy or protecting state security. However, Karp warns “...the task of thinking 
about security without nuclear weapons-let alone exploring how it could be 
achieved-is far from simple” (Karp, 1992, pp. 5-6).      
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The challenge of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is to combat the inherent 
system of self-help dominating how states perceive and respond to the international 
system, in particular, influencing views on non-proliferation and disarmament. For 
liberal thinkers, the presence and dangers of nuclear weapons are a reality and hence 
cannot be disinvested. Consequently, these weapons must be physically eliminated 
and plans for integrating them into military strategies must be rebuffed (Booth & 
Wheeler, 1992, p. 28). The NPT thus challenged the strategic role of nuclear weapons, 
which dominated thinking in the international system. To subvert realists’ notions 
that nuclear deterrence present security, the NPT had to replace the logic of mutual 
assured destruction with its own order and measure of stability.  
The following sections will investigate the normative force of the NPT and the impact 
this treaty had on the international system, in particular, how it shaped state 
behaviour and interests in the nuclear realm.  
5.5.1 The normative force and the achievements of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty 
 
Realist scholars question the relevance of norms and even whether they exist. 
According to Persbo (2012, p. 2), the non-proliferation norm of the NPT played a key 
role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation norm 
along with the nuclear taboo is a barrier against nuclear proliferation by condemning 
the spread, production and use of nuclear weapons. The NPT is an arms control 
instrument, tasked with limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, realise nuclear 
disarmament and finally to arrive at a nuclear weapon-free world. The NPT and the 
non-proliferation norm should not be underestimated as a factor explaining why 
states decide to remain non-nuclear. Evans and Kawaguchi (2009, p. 78) argue that 
states may support the NPT because it is the ‘right thing to do’. Acting in good faith 
toward the NPT should not be underestimated as the NPT enjoys strong normative 
force, because its member states acknowledge “...nuclear weapons are simply wrong: 
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their acquisition is forbidden, their use taboo, and their indefinite continued 
possession unacceptable” (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78). Endorsing and practicing 
non-proliferation is what it means to be a good global citizen within the international 
system (Persbo, 2012, p. 3; Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 9). Since South Africa dismantled 
its nuclear weapons it became a responsible member of the non-proliferation 
regime. Non-proliferation is thus responsible state behaviour, and, in a world where 
nuclear weapons are a threat to regional and international peace and security, 
forswearing nuclear weapons is a commitment to being a “good international nuclear 
citizen” (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 79). The strong normative force of the NPT is 
manifested in its large membership of 189 states, visible proof of its ongoing 
strength and support. 
The NPT with its almost universal nature is distinct from other arms control and 
disarmament agreements (Zanders, 2010, p. 5). As more states accede to the NPT, it 
made it harder for those outside to justify their inability to join and ratify this treaty. 
Furthermore, the non-proliferation norm and the nuclear taboo exert additional 
pressure for those outside the NPT. In 1992, France and China, states that had tested 
nuclear weapons before 1967, acceded to the NPT. Argentina and Brazil, states with 
nuclear weapon capability ratified the NPT in 1995 and 1998 respectively. South 
Africa, the first state that willingly disarmed its nuclear weapons and acceded to the 
NPT in 1991, set an example for other states, in particular, nuclear weapon states, 
demonstrating that the possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily protect 
and enhance state security. After the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
programme was detected and dismantled. The achievements of the NPT and its 
strong normative force increase its currency within the international system as an 
arms control instrument (Grand, 2010, p. 14).    
The NPT rewards states for their non-nuclear commitment. Article IV of the NPT 
encourages the peaceful application of nuclear technology and, through the IAEA, 
nuclear cooperation in the form of the transfer of nuclear knowledge and technology 
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for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states can take place. Nuclear 
technology and material have many significant uses other than producing nuclear 
weapons. In particular, developing states have benefited from its peaceful 
application, in the energy sector (nuclear power), agricultural sector (improving crop 
production and killing bacteria) and in the health sector (treating cancer through 
radiation therapy) (UN, 2010, pp. 7-8; Hubert, Broodryk & Stott, 2010, p. 9). 
The NPT welcomes the formation of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Under Article VII, 
the NPT encourages the formation of regional treaties to ensure and commit states 
to remain non-nuclear. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones enhance the protection of 
regional and international peace and security, and also strengthen the non-
proliferation regime (UN, 2010, p. 15). There has been many treaties that have 
emerged, which use the NPT as a base in the formation of Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zones, for example the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), Treaty 
of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa) and so forth (Harvey, 2010, 
p. 28). In July 1964, at an OAU Summit, a declaration was adopted calling for the 
Denuclearization of Africa. In 1995, the final text in preparation of an African Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone was completed. In 1996 the Pelindaba Treaty was opened for 
signature and entered into force in July 2009. The name Pelindaba was taken from 
South Africa’s main nuclear research centre and the area where its nuclear weapons 
were produced (Stott, 2009, n.p.). The Pelindaba Treaty, sometimes applying the 
exact language of the NPT, bans the production, testing and stationing of nuclear 
weapons on the Africa continent. It prohibits nuclear research with the goal of 
developing nuclear weapons and requires nuclear weapon states to make negative 
security assurances to members of this treaty. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones is a useful 
step in realising a world free from nuclear weapons, and visible proof of the currency 
of the NPT among its member states and the centrality of this treaty in the 
international system.  
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Under the NPT, cooperation is facilitated between member states in the nuclear 
realm as they are bound, shaped and socialised by the same norms, rules and 
institutions. Being exposed to norms of non-proliferation and disarmament, and 
understanding the moral imperative of this treaty creates a system of familiarity and 
continuity among member states. This system of order created by the NPT also 
serves as a negotiating forum where member states can negotiate and resolve 
tensions between them, evident in NPT review conferences. The rules and rights 
under this treaty govern state interaction and introduce a measure of stability 
(Ikenberry, 2006, p. 134). When member states act in good faith towards their NPT 
obligations this creates continuity in the system, and creates a condition where states 
do not necessarily have to be suspicious of the intentions of others. The NPT may not 
necessarily completely overcome the anarchical nature of the international system 
but this should not lead to the perception that it cannot minimise insecurity 
produced by international anarchy. 
5.6 The impact of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on outsiders 
With its membership of 189 states, the NPT gained a unique level of normative 
strength as an international instrument of arms control. However, this was not always 
the case. When the NPT was opened for signature, its members were few and its 
influence was not sufficiently felt at the time. The question can thus be posed 
whether the NPT impacted on the decisions of states that initially chose to remain 
outside the NPT, but later joined the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Here the 
cases of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa shed light on how this treaty impacted on 
the domestic affairs of some states to either forgo the nuclear option or as in the 
case of South Africa to dismantle its own nuclear weapons voluntarily. In addition, for 
states still outside the NPT, such as India and Israel, it will be shown how this treaty 
has impacted on their behaviour, and how states relate to their nuclear weapons and 
to the international system. Such an analysis is useful to illustrate three liberal 
viewpoints about the NPT, namely, firstly, that nuclear weapons are not the rational 
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pursuit that realists hold and that state security can be protected without them. 
Secondly, that the NPT has set norms for state behaviour generally in this area, even 
if they are outside the NPT. And, thirdly, that domestic factors and sub-national 
actors’ impact on a state’s nuclear position and should thus be included in an 
analysis of nuclear policy. Unlike neorealism holds, states are not unitary actors, and 
their nuclear status is not just a function of the system level. 
In particular, the democratic peace theory model, a prominent theme discussed 
among liberal scholars, will illustrate how a democratic culture, with its diverse 
domestic actors (interest groups, opposition parties and citizens) impact on how 
democracies conduct their domestic and foreign policy.  
5.6.1 Argentina and Brazil’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty 
 
Based on chapter four and the current chapter five of the thesis, realist and liberal 
scholars respectively provided different reasons why states join the NPT and remain 
compliant to it. The liberal perspective of the NPT brings a broader understanding to 
factors influencing the nuclear decisions of states by opening the “black box” of 
policy-making. Unlike neorealists that negate domestic factors because their focus is 
on the system level of analysis, liberal scholars include sub-national actors in their 
multi-centric model of international relations. In this section, the nuclear decision 
making process will be explored with reference to Argentina and Brazil to gain 
greater insight as to why they acceded to the NPT and act in compliance. 
 
In the 1980s the political climate in Brazil changed as it began its democratic 
transition, paving the way for a transformation in its nuclear posture of transparency 
and forgoing the nuclear option. Public opinion at this time was in support of non-
proliferation, a view that was also supported by the decision makers of the state. In 
the early 1990s, the Argentinean President, Carlos Menem and the Brazilian 
President, Fernando Collor de Mello cooperated through a series of agreements to 
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resolve their nuclear rivalry. In 1988, the Brazilian Congress formally banned all non-
peaceful nuclear activities and in 1991 Argentina and Brazil entered an agreement 
(Common System of Accounting and Control) to use nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes only. In July 1991, the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials were created to monitor and inspect nuclear sites and 
materials (Morrison, 2006, n.p.; Carasales, 1995, p. 42). In the same year, both states 
signed IAEA safeguard agreements.   
 
Argentina and Brazil experienced a nuclear rivalry in the past which could have led to 
the development of nuclear weapons among them. Both Argentina and Brazil had 
uranium-enrichment capability. In 1994 it was Argentina that took the first step to 
accede to the NPT and Brazil followed in 1998 (Carasales, 1995, p. 44).  
 
This change regarding nuclear weapons was attributed to the return to civilian 
leadership in Argentina and Brazil. There are a number of reasons why these states 
joined the NPT. The NPT has its own level of influence over states’ decision to 
forswear nuclear weapons and/or remain non-nuclear. However, Argentina and 
Brazil’s decision to ratify the NPT and forswear the nuclear option has its roots in 
their democratic culture (as proposed by democratic peace theorists). Immanuel 
Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, discusses how lasting peace can occur in 
the world, in his essay entitled, Perpetual Peace: A Philosphical Sketch (1795). Kant 
proposes that all states should be ruled by a Republican constitution, where the 
rights of citizenship are respected. In a state ruled by a Republican constitution, 
citizens would refrain from supporting war, due to the violence it incurs, and in such 
a way lasting peace would result (Kant, 1917, pp. 119-120). Kant’s philosophy of 
perpetual peace foreshadowed modern ideas that would form part of the democratic 
peace theory in Political Science, by scholars, such as Michael Doyle (2009), a 
prominent theorist of democratic peace, Bruce Russett (1994) and Spencer Weart 
(1993).  
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For democratic peace theorists, democracies do not go to war with other 
democracies. This premise is guided by the idea that democracies share common 
institutions and norms, which encourage the resolution of disputes peacefully instead 
of waging war with each other (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 26). The political elites are 
socialised according to democratic values of freedom of speech, tolerance of cultural 
diversity (cosmopolitan), transparency and accountability in political affairs, respect 
for the rule of law (separation of power of the executive, legislature and the judiciary) 
to avoid the abuse of power and the infringement of human rights (Rosato, 2003, p. 
586). Thus, a democratic culture domestically is projected internationally, and when 
decision makers of the state encounter tensions with other democracies they will 
search for solutions equally accepted by both (D'Anieri, 2011, p. 121; Rosato, 2003, p. 
587). Democratization in Argentina and Brazil may have led decision makers to 
embark on a path of cooperation instead of hostility and conflict, which could have 
escalated. This common democratic culture among them instilled trust and 
consistency in their relations, minimising insecurity and mistrust, and opening the 
way for negotiation. The Common System of Accounting and Control agreement, 
signing of IAEA safeguards and the ratification of the NPT further strengthened and 
encouraged trust and confidence in the other, all facilitated by their common 
democratic culture. Argentina and Brazil projected their democratic culture onto their 
foreign policy which in turn influenced their decisions to sign and ratify the NPT. 
Under the NPT, these states were committed to using nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes only, and committed to remaining non-nuclear. Argentina and 
Brazil’s NPT ratification highlight the favouring of negotiation over the use of force to 
deter or threaten the other (through nuclear weapons) to resolve tension between 
them. From a liberal perspective, the democratic peace theory provides an 
explanation why Argentina and Brazil joined the NPT and also why they remain non-
nuclear. Taken in this way, the NPT is a liberal instrument to encourage cooperation, 
peace, multilateralism and stability among states.  
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By the same token, the NPT may have influenced the perceptions of these states 
regarding nuclear weapons based on their cost. Argentina and Brazil were aware of 
the dangers of military nuclear competition. If either state was committed to a 
nuclear weapons programme this may have sparked regional tensions and conflict in 
Latin America as a whole (Redick, Carasales & Wrobel, 1995, p. 385). The NPT 
challenged the utility of nuclear weapons and in such a way increased its cost by 
making it a foreign policy issue. Thus, decision makers had to consider the 
international ramification of their nuclear weapons’ pursuit (Walsh, 2005, p. 43). 
Through the ratification of the NPT Argentina and Brazil were formally linked to the 
non-proliferation regime creating further confidence in each other’s commitment 
towards non-proliferation. In this fashion, the NPT consolidated the bilateral 
agreement between Argentina and Brazil creating confidence in each other and by 
the international community as a dedicated member of the non-proliferation regime. 
Argentina and Brazil also desired to display support toward non-proliferation proving 
to the international community they were dedicated members of the non-
proliferation regime. For Udum (2007, p. 59) being a non-nuclear weapon state has 
become an accepted norm in the international community, a token of “good 
international citizenship”. In this way, Argentina and Brazil aspired to gain the 
confidence of the international community regarding their new image and ongoing 
support for non-proliferation and disarmament (Goldschmidt, 2009, p. 2; Feldman, 
2011, n.p.). In turn, international confidence in Argentina and Brazil as well as in the 
NPT increased, moving it one step closer towards universality. 
 
Both Argentina and Brazil joined the NPT because they desired to play an active role 
in international peace and security. Brazil and Argentina have worked together and 
cooperated in the nuclear field, promoting trust and openness, thus serving as a 
model for other states. Acceding to the NPT reveals structures of transparency are 
capable and have the ability to curb suspicions between rivals creating a condition 
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where they viewed the other as good neighbours. Argentina and Brazil also ratified 
the treaty of Tlatelolco and the CTBT (Albright & Lampreia, 1998, n.p.).  
 
5.6.2 South Africa’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
South Africa, before it acceded to the NPT was isolated internationally for its 
apartheid policies and governance but also due to its possession of nuclear weapons. 
South Africa practiced apartheid, which was a legal system of rule that divided 
people according to a racial category affecting social, political and economic life. As a 
result, South Africa was sanctioned (trade sanctions and arms embargoes) to bring 
an end to apartheid and dismantle its nuclear weapons (Solingen, 1994, p. 13). Trade 
sanctions against South Africa made it harder to finance its nuclear program. The UN 
proposed South Africa’s international status could improve once it acceded to the 
NPT and allow IAEA safeguards (UN, 1991, p. 14). 
 
International concern around South Africa's apartheid policies and its nuclear 
weapons programme were growing. In 1977, South Africa's seat on the IAEA Board of 
Governors was removed, effectively preventing it from participating in IAEA 
deliberations. In 1980, the United States terminated nuclear commerce with South 
Africa. In addition, in 1986 France refused to authorise a new nuclear agreement with 
South Africa (UN, 1991, pp. 8-9). International pressure steadily increased against 
South Africa, which played a role in its decision to disarm its nuclear weapons.  
 
When President F. W. De Klerk was elected in 1989 as South Africa’s new President, 
he began to introduce political reforms paving the way for a democratic transition. 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme posed an obstacle to it rejoining the 
international community. On 10 July 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT and since 
then showed an ongoing support towards nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament (Albright, 1994b, p. 46). South Africa was one of the few states to 
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remain outside the NPT despite the significance placed on non-proliferation by 
member states. It is possible to argue that the NPT gained more currency before 
South Africa’s accession. States such as, Mozambique (1990), Tanzania (1991) and 
Zambia (1991) ratified the NPT before South Africa, and after the Gulf War, Iraq’s 
clandestine nuclear weapons programme was detected and dismantled. The 
increasing members to the NPT and detection of Iraq’s treaty violation strengthened 
the non-proliferation regime, and together with the increasing currency and strong 
normative force of the NPT (nuclear taboo) among member states it may have made 
it harder for South Africa to justify its exclusion, and in this way contributed to its 
NPT accession. 
  
When South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons, this was the first step toward the 
process of democratisation. As part of its democratisation process, South Africa 
unbanned the African National Congress on 2 February 1990. South Africa was 
willing to compromise and reach a resolution peacefully and to improve its 
international status, through disarming its nuclear weapons and joining the NPT. De 
Klerk noted the retention of nuclear weapons made South Africa look suspicious. 
Disarming its nuclear weapons and beginning the process of democratisation was 
key to changing South Africa’s international image to that of a trust worthy and 
responsible state. South Africa’s behaviour revealed an awareness of international 
expectations (for example non-proliferation) and democratic norms, such as 
transparency in affairs and favouring the resolution of disputes peacefully. During the 
Cold War, South Africa used its nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to persuade 
the United States to defend its security interests (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 27). 
However, under the leadership of De Klerk, disarmament of nuclear weapons and 
joining the NPT would ensure its reintegration into the international community. 
South Africa viewed itself as a Western ally, and in order to be integrated into the 
Western community (that represents liberal democracies) it had to denuclearise and 
remain non-nuclear (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 36).  
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For De Klerk, South Africa’s possession of nuclear weapons would affect his goal of 
negotiating a democratic constitution based on non-racialism. In his personal 
capacity, De Klerk was not enthusiastic about a nuclear South Africa. In fact, De Klerk 
disliked and held views of discomfort for nuclear weapons (Heald, 2010, p. 267). 
Here, De Klerk’s non-nuclear stance may have been influenced by the nuclear taboo, 
forbidding its acquisition and prohibiting its use, a key norm linked to the NPT. In 
1989, De Klerk appointed a working group of the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa and the Atomic Energy Commission officials to develop a timetable for 
dismantling its nuclear weapons programme, and when South Africa could join the 
NPT and sign IAEA safeguards (de Villiers, Jardine & Reiss, 1993, p. 103). According 
to Heald (2010, p. 267), De Klerk was committed to the process of democratisation. 
For De Klerk, states should remain committed to their agreements and act in good 
faith. In his personal capacity and as the national leader of the state, De Klerk was a 
central agent in the nuclear disarmament process based on his anti-nuclear stance 
(Kaper, 2008, p. 135). 
 
The nuclear question in South Africa was framed around creating a positive image of 
South Africa to the international community. Relinquishing nuclear weapons was 
linked to a sense of obligation to the international community. A moral value was 
attached to why South Africa joined the NPT; this may also be linked to De Klerk’s 
personal dislike for nuclear weapons (Heald, 2010, pp. 195, 266-268). However, 
realists question the so-called moral reason for South Africa’s decision to give up its 
nuclear weapons; as South Africa was pressured by the United States (Albright, 
1994a, n.p.). As discussed in chapter four, the United States feared that nuclear 
weapons would fall into the hands of the African National Congress and its transfer 
to Western enemies, such as Cuba, Libya and Iran (Pabian, 1995, p. 10). These fears 
were unfounded as the African National Congress could have reversed De Klerk’s 
nuclear disarmament decision, but did not.  
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In 1994, when the African National Congress won South Africa’s first democratic 
election, there were also concerns regarding its ongoing support towards non-
proliferation. The African National Congress long supported non-proliferation and 
disarmament as it represented an essential component of its identity. South Africa’s 
post-1994 support for non-proliferation and disarmament can be traced to the 1950s 
as it forged relationships with the World Peace Council, and as a result the African 
National Congress was influenced by its peace and disarmament agenda (Purkitt & 
Burgess, 2005, p. 183). The World Peace Council is a non-governmental organisation 
with the objective of peace, disarmament and global security (World Peace Council, 
2010, n.p.). The African National Congress along with NAM in the 1960s called for a 
nuclear weapons-free zone in places such as Europe and Latin America.  
 
South Africa enjoys a unique position in the international community, and its 
recognition in the disarmament community paved the way for both its terms filling a 
non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This illustration sheds light on South 
African’s on-going support towards the NPT and its use of international mechanisms 
to champion non-proliferation in groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda 
Coalition. In this fashion, South Africa and other non-nuclear weapon states can 
realise greater gains because of its nuclear position and status. 
 
It is clear from the analysis that as liberal scholars predict, South Africa’s nuclear 
position is influenced by a normative stance towards the immorality of nuclear 
weapons, as well as a belief in international institutions (multilateralism) as vehicles 
for international cooperation and governance in an anarchical international order. 
Again, this is not to say that South Africa’s national interest did not benefit from its 
position. 
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5.6.3 India, Pakistan and Israel: Remaining outsiders 
 
India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside of the NPT. Although these states remain 
outside the treaty, the NPT has a measure of influence over their behaviour and how 
they relate to nuclear weapons and the international community. Pakistan lacks a 
clean non-proliferation record. Abdul Quadeer Khan, the nuclear scientist who is 
regarded as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, aided Iran in the 
development of nuclear facilities capable of enriching uranium through gas 
centrifuges (Zarif, 2009, n.p.). In 2004, it was revealed that sensitive nuclear 
information was given to Libya, Iran and North Korea also through Khan’s network 
(Ahmed, 2010, n.p.). Israel also has a tainted proliferation record for cooperating with 
South Africa in nuclear and military matters (de Villiers, Jardine & Reiss, 1993, p. 103). 
At this time, it is not possible to do a detailed analysis on each state listed above due 
to the word limitation of this thesis and for that reason focus will only be placed on 
India and Israel. 
Arab states have demanded that Israel accede to the NPT and place its nuclear 
facilities and material under international safeguards (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 17-18). 
What Israel and Arab states have in common is the formation of a Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone in the Middle East. However, they differ on how this goal is to be realised. 
For Arab states, Israel is the only state in the Middle East that remains outside the 
NPT (Charnysh, 2009, p. 3). The security interests of Arab states are linked to Israel’s 
accession to the NPT and the goal of a nuclear weapons-free zone. Israel, on the 
other hand, argues that the establishment of the nuclear weapons-free zone can only 
be realised once there is peace in the Middle East (Levite, 2010, p. 160). Israel’s 
Middle Eastern neighbours have been hostile to Israel since its formation as a state. 
Iran directly threatens the security of Israel where it calls for the elimination and 
destruction of Israel and states, such as Lebanon, is accused of supporting 
organisations responsible for terrorist acts in Israel, such as Hezbollah (Yoong, 2006, 
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n.p.). This sentiment serves as a justification for Israel’s need for a nuclear deterrent. 
Israel has actually voiced its support for the NPT, but indicates this treaty has not 
been effective in rooting out nuclear proliferation, with reference to North Korea and 
possibly Iran. Israel has a general distrust concerning external security guarantees 
and their ability to protect and safeguard security interests (Levite, 2010, pp. 161-
162). 
Nuclear ambiguity practiced by Israel and the inability of dominant powers and allies 
of Israel such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States to place sufficient 
pressure on its nuclear status spark much international criticism (Welsh, 1995, p. 10). 
Although Israel’s nuclear weapons are a controversial issue, since the 1960s Israel 
proclaimed that it would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in the 
Middle East (Ami, 2009, p. 1; Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 26). This point links to the widely 
accepted international norm that nuclear weapons should not be used based on its 
destructive consequences – the nuclear taboo. Not only has Israel voiced that it will 
not introduce nuclear weapons, but it has also not tested its nuclear weapons. On 22 
September 1979, a “double flash of light” in the South Atlantic was detected by the 
Vela satellite of the United States. It was speculated that a nuclear test took place in a 
joint effort by Israel and South Africa, but this development was not confirmed 
(Charnysh, 2009, p. 2). Important to note, this does not mean that Israel is any closer 
to signing the NPT; rather the purpose here is to show that the NPT and the non-
proliferation and disarmament norms that it promotes shape international 
perceptions of nuclear weapons even for those outside this treaty. The need that 
Israeli officials feel to hide the country’s nuclear weapons programme although it is 
not an NPT member suggest that there is a strong measure of unacceptability 
attached to the possession of nuclear weapons, which Israel is clearly aware of. 
India has been highly critical of the NPT even before it came into existence. During 
the introductory process of the NPT India was instrumental in shaping its principles 
through NAM. For India, the problem surrounding the NPT was its discriminatory 
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nature and its inability to stop vertical proliferation. The controversial nuclear trade 
agreement between the United States and India was encouraged based on India’s 
good non-proliferation record (Hosure, 2010, p. 442).  
In 2006 the United States Congress passed the Hyde Act to normalise nuclear trade 
with India. For nuclear cooperation to take place India had to satisfy a few conditions 
as specified by a 2005 United States Congress statement. India was required to 
separate military and civilian nuclear facilities and place its civilian nuclear facilities 
under IAEA safeguards, leading to the acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
India and the United States would cooperate to conclude a multilateral treaty in the 
form of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for weapons’ purpose. India was prohibited 
from exporting enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that lacked this 
technology. Moreover, India was requested to join efforts to prevent the spread of 
nuclear technology and subject itself to NSG guidelines. Conditions were attached to 
nuclear cooperation, proving the strength of non-proliferation norms which India 
practices despite being outside the NPT (Pretorius, 2011, pp. 86-88).     
India implements tight controls over its nuclear material and nuclear information, 
preventing states or actors with ill intensions to gain access to these resources 
(Perkovich, 2010, p. 23). India “...has been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons’ 
material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other 
countries” (World Nuclear Association, 2009, n.p.). Non-proliferation is central to the 
NPT as states with nuclear weapons should not enable or aid others in becoming 
future nuclear weapon states. Maintaining a lock on key nuclear information and 
technology is fundamental; this is what India practices. Moreover, since India tested 
nuclear weapons in 1998 it practices a non-first use policy of nuclear weapons. A 
non-first use policy is a negative security assurance (Feiveson & Hogendoorn, 2003, 
p. 3). India has thus been practicing central components of the NPT, although not all 
of them. 
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This case shows despite the centrality of national interests that states can still 
cooperate and reach agreement in ways that serve the common good. Criticism 
regarding the nuclear sharing agreement with India is that the United States should 
have required more concessions from India, for example, signing the CTBT. This 
agreement opened the way for improved United States and Indian relations 
previously at a stalemate. Moreover, the agreement enabled ways to link India to the 
non-proliferation regime.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Despite the many challenges and shortcomings of the NPT, it generally serves the 
common interests of its member states, namely to reduce the risks posed by nuclear 
weapons. For this reason, the NPT is an important international instrument for the 
international community. A world without the NPT can scarcely be imaged by states. 
A world without the NPT may be filled with more uncertainty, more dangers and also 
impacting on sharing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The fact that almost 
all states have joined the NPT and are abiding by their obligations and benefitting 
from the NPT is proof that the treaty is working. The liberal perspective of the NPT 
highlights the moral role and influence this treaty holds, explaining why states were 
against and renounced nuclear weapons, leading to their ratification of the NPT and 
continued non-nuclear commitment. 
Although more efforts are needed in support of nuclear disarmament if the grand 
bargain between member states is not to be undermined, the strength and the 
currency of the NPT is well visible. It holds both legal and moral implications and 
paves the way for cooperation between states to combat the anarchical nature of the 
international system (Dewit, 1987, p. 171). Key to the functioning of this treaty and 
the non-proliferation regime in general is the on-going support of member states 
and the ability to overcome deadlocks in relations as seen during the review 
conferences, which can water down the influence of this treaty. 
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Breakdown in the NPT review conferences does not mean the treaty will fail. Self-
interests (expressed as claims to sovereignty) sometimes come head to head with 
what is considered to be in the common good of all states in this issue-area, but the 
focus of member states so far has come to be aligned within parameters that have 
ensured the survival of the NPT. Although this chapter has not drawn specifically on 
the NPT Review Conference to illustrate the liberal perspective, the point was evident 
in the 2010 Review Conference when the United States President, Barack Obama, 
made significant gestures to right the damage that the Bush administration caused at 
the 2005 Review Conference. Obama changed the nuclear posture of America, 
signed New START and in his Prague speech affirmed America will remain committed 
to nuclear disarmament. Under the Bush administration, its compliance to the NPT 
was questionable, but since the breakdown of the 2005 conference, it seems that 
even the nuclear weapon states have realised the importance of making concessions 
and demonstrating their ongoing support towards the NPT. There seems to be 
recognition that a lack of commitment from their side will hinder the grand bargain 
and affect cooperation between member states. Nuclear weapon states see the 
importance of maintaining compliance to the NPT as non-proliferation is in their 
interest and for this to occur, they need to cooperate under the NPT in a regime 
which bestows its members with benefits but also with obligations.  
The next chapter interprets the NPT from a constructivist perspective incorporating 
the significance of ideas, agents and institutions and their role in influencing state 
behaviour and perceptions. The point above on how to interpret the actions and 
conduct of member states during the NPT review conferences will be given more 
weight in the constructivist chapter.  
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Chapter 6: A constructivist perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter four (a realist interpretation of the NPT) and chapter five (a liberal 
interpretation of the NPT) each produced credible, but seemingly incommensurable, 
interpretations of the NPT. Through the realist lens, nuclear weapons are a symbol of 
power and prestige, but most effectively serve to protect the security interests of 
states. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons promoted stability and peace between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The utility of nuclear weapons lay in its ability 
to deter states from engaging in war, based on the logic of mutually assured 
destruction. In this fashion, the possession of nuclear weapons are necessary, and for 
this reason dominant states have established the NPT to protect their interests, that 
is, preventing other states from going nuclear (non-proliferation) and in turn to 
protect their own nuclear weapons indefinitely.  
Through the liberal lens, the decision to develop nuclear weapons is not rational 
decision making. Under the NPT, the security interests of non-nuclear weapon states 
are protected without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons inflict unacceptable 
damage and for this reason possession thereof is criticised and prohibited, through 
the nuclear taboo. The NPT has a moral role. That is, to protect humanity from the 
dangers of nuclear weapons by limiting its proliferation, and instead encourage 
states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In this way, the NPT is a key 
international instrument, for nuclear cooperation, limiting the spread of nuclear 
weapons, and creating stability between states by building confidence in each other, 
which both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states agree upon. Juxtaposing 
these views offer a different perspective of the NPT and thus provide greater insight 
into this treaty, but at the same time it is impossible to measure which view is a 
clearer and more convincing perspective of the NPT. It is as if at this point, the 
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analysis has reached the same deadlock that E. H. Carr reached in his analysis of 
international politics in his book, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939. 
This chapter aims to provide a way to overcome this deadlock by interpreting the 
NPT from a constructivist perspective. 
6.2 Self-help is not inevitable under anarchy 
 
Both neorealist and neoliberal scholars place an emphasis on anarchy and the central 
role states play in such a system as a unitary actor. For both scholars, cooperation is 
possible in the international system but will encounter obstacles (Keohane, 1984, p. 
62; Keohane & Martin, 2010, p. 70). Taken from this point of view, neorealist and 
neoliberal scholars disagree on relative and absolute gains attained through 
cooperation. Neorealists are guided by relative gains; that is, through cooperation 
the benefits gained will be compared to the benefits other member states acquire. 
This may lead states to question their acceptance to a system where they are 
perceived as losers based on the nature of benefits received in relation to others. A 
prime question emerges, why do states act in self-interested ways under an 
institution or regime? Realists argue that the anarchical nature of the international 
system condemns states to act in self-help ways even at the expense of reaching 
common benefits or interest (Russett, Risse-Kappen & Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 216). Is 
self-help then a natural response to international anarchy or required under this 
system? For constructivists, self-help is an institution created under anarchy but is 
not a natural (inevitable) response to anarchy. According to Wendt (1992, p. 399), 
“An institution is a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests”. 
International anarchy does not necessarily determine how states will conduct their 
affairs. Rather, the process of identity and interest formation has a direct impact on 
how states conduct their behaviour and relate to others in the international system 
(Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Constructivists agree international anarchy (the absence of a 
world government) is a fact but negative conclusions drawn from anarchy (self-help) 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
represents an idea or belief (worldview) that is not a true depiction of reality (Wendt, 
1992, pp. 394-395). That is, states do not have to mistrust the intentions of others. 
Threats are socially constructed; this could occur when decisions are based on 
speculation or based on conceptions of ‘worst-case scenarios’ instead of learning 
through interaction (Wendt, 1992, pp. 404-405). Self-help like sovereignty exists 
because states have internalised and practice self-help. Over time ideas are taken for 
granted and as a result seen as fact, natural or inevitable. Thus, self-help is a notion 
and practice that gives meaning to the world and helps states to understand their 
place in it and how to relate to others. However, it is only one possible notion among 
many that could provide the same function. A major problem with self-help is the 
assumption that security is an individual process. When, in effect, collective security is 
equally possible as pursued in an international or security community brought about 
by mechanisms, such as the NPT and the non-proliferation regime more generally.    
6.3 The role of ideas in the international system: utility of nuclear weapons  
Human beings are involved in a process of “meaning making” to order their 
environment and make sense of the world (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). The social and 
political world as well as rules and institutions are an invention of human 
consciousness. Neorealists place an emphasis on material forces such as military 
power and how that will impact on the pursuit of state interests. The maximisation of 
security from this view is central to safeguarding the national interests of states 
(Hobson, 2000, p. 7; Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 7). For this purpose, nuclear weapons are 
perceived as the ultimate weapon to safeguard national interests. Nuclear weapons 
are physical objects with overwhelming destructive capability so evident during 1945 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
As it was noted in chapter four, in France, under the leadership of de Gaulle, nuclear 
weapons served to bolster its power and enabled France to reach its great-power 
status. Here nuclear weapons are a symbol of strength, prowess and modernity (Van 
Dijk, 2008, pp. 968-969). Ideas and beliefs of prestige and power associated with 
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being in possession of nuclear weapons are widespread and may contribute to the 
proliferation of these weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and the 
Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race due to the perception that the 'other' 
represented a threat to their security interests. The United States perceived itself as 
the leader of the 'free world', with its liberal economic market and the champion of 
freedom and democracy. The United States assumed winning the Cold War 
bestowed it with the moral duty to bring order to the world (Weldes, 1999, pp. 40-
42). The United States’ identity was constructed in opposition to the Soviet Union 
which, was a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party. Under the Communist 
Party, key human rights were denied, such as the right to assembly and freedom of 
speech. States of the Soviet Union were governed by a socialist economic system, 
which favoured public ownership over state enterprises. As a result of their 
ideological differences, a security threat was constructed to justify the possession of 
nuclear weapons. However, once the Cold War ended, and the ideological threat was 
removed it was assumed that the need for nuclear weapons would also cease. This 
development did not occur; the superpowers did not give up their nuclear weapons 
and use arguments that rogue states and terrorist may gain access to nuclear 
weapons as their justification for holding onto their own nuclear weapons. Weldes 
(1999, p. 40) argues that threats are not necessary real; they are constructed. That is, 
nuclear weapon states use the idea of nuclear terrorism to justify their possession of 
nuclear weapons. 
Neoliberals advocate that regimes and institutions are key to shaping the behaviour 
and interests of states. How states perceive the international system has a direct 
impact on how they will respond to international phenomena. Where security is 
perceived as an individual task, cooperation would be prevented or undermined, but 
when security is perceived as collective responsibility cooperation is enhanced. 
Cooperation may then facilitate the process of changing state identity and interests 
(Zehfuss, 2002, p. 57). For neoliberal scholars, regimes address common concerns 
such as non-proliferation and serve to provide information on the activities of 
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member states; thus, confidence-building mechanisms (Søndenaa, 2008, p. 26). From 
the constructivist perspective, member states of the NPT form a security community 
which can potentially reshape security views on nuclear weapons and disarmament. 
Regimes and institutions are based on shared meanings produced through state 
interaction; however, they do not only place constraints on states they also shape 
identity and interests.  
The reconciliation process between France and Germany is a useful case to illustrate 
the above point. The European Union is a political and economic community of 27 
states, responsible for creating stability, peace, economic prosperity and improving 
living standards of its member states. The European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) represented early efforts after World War II to facilitate European integration; 
the European Union traces its origin from the ECSC. France and Germany fought 
three wars in which millions of citizens died, effectively entrenching conflict and 
hostilities where reconciliation looked almost impossible between them. It was only 
in 1951 through the formation of ECSC that reconciliation between them took place. 
Once the Paris Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands the ECSC was formed. Steel and coal were key components for 
warfare and placing them under an independent High Authority became necessary. 
In the Preamble of the Paris Treaty, warfare divided Europe and through the ECSC, 
European integration and stability in relations were possible (Riley, 1998, pp. 85-86). 
This was the first step in reconciling differences between France and Germany and 
forging a European identity to make war between them almost unthinkable. Thus, 
state interests are not objective or unable to change. State leaders make choices and 
work hard to change perceptions that in turn shape and change state behaviour 
about who or what is perceived as threatening.    
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6.4 Governance and order created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
In chapter five of the thesis, the NPT was referred to as a form of international 
governance; this discussion will be furthered through the constructivist lens. Regimes 
for neoliberals are a central platform for exchanging information and committing 
member states to legal obligations, which is hard to realise in an anarchical world. 
Regimes are useful in its ability to address and solve collective issues, which impact 
on state interests and survival, for example nuclear non-proliferation (Søndenaa, 
2008, p. 26; Richardson, 1993, pp. 158-161). After the Cold War policy makers have 
been fundamentality interested in and grappled with how to develop a more stable 
and ordered international system. For the purpose of overcoming the anarchical 
nature of the international system state activity and policy have to be maintained and 
regulated (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 4). Hence, the NPT acts as a form of international 
governance by regulating state activity and policy for those within this security 
community, and for it to function effectively cooperation and transparency in nuclear 
affairs have to be practiced. Buzan (1993, p. 330) uses the term ‘international society’ 
to refer to a group of independent political units (states) which have consented to 
rules and institutions to maintain relations between them. Also, in this international 
society states recognise that this system benefits their common interests and see the 
purpose of maintaining it. 
A fundamental difference between constructivists and neoliberals lay in the emphasis 
that they respectively put on material and ideal interests to explain human conduct. 
Constructivists believe that "...in the social and interpreted world in which (as they 
see it) we live, only ideas matter and can be studied" (Adler, 2005, p. 91). In 
constructivism, ideas are central and determine the interests states pursue and how 
they respond to others. Due to the centrality of ideas in constructivism, the social 
world or reality is made up of a set of ideas and beliefs. Taken from this point, 
regimes and institutions are a product of human consciousness and ideas and not 
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necessary factually based (Adler, 2005, p. 92; Olssen, 1996, p. 278). The NPT is a 
regime, invented and devised by human consciousness; this order is a social 
construction which has become widespread and over time seen as fact. International 
relations are made up of these “social facts” that human beings have agreed on.  
The increasing problem of nuclear proliferation linked to the destructive effects of a 
nuclear explosion required the emergence of an international treaty. It also has to be 
noted the emergence of the NPT was linked to the Soviet Union and the United 
States’ concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons to small states as well as 
preventing allies from going nuclear and using these weapons on each other (Allison, 
1971, p. 209). Collective understandings or shared meanings are visible in norms, 
standards and rules of the NPT; mainly helping to explain why the world is in a 
particular state and how people should employ their “material, abilities and power” 
(Adler, 2005, p. 92). Member states are bound to the NPT through its rules and 
standards, and it is expected they act in good faith towards their obligations (Setear, 
1997, pp. 22-23). 
Regimes and institutions facilitate in providing new ways of viewing ‘the self’ (or own 
state) as well as ‘the other’ (or other states). Through regimes, new identities emerge 
as well as interests according to social norms and rules. Regimes and institutions do 
not only limit behaviour, they realign state interests to appropriate standards of 
behaviour (Søndenaa, 2008, p. 27). To overcome self-help perceptions of the 
international system, a change in the consciousness, identity and definition of state 
interests need to take place. Government officials act as the representatives of the 
state, referred to as its decision makers. It is this group that should be the targets for 
change. This process of change can be facilitated through the NPT which embodies 
norms such as non-proliferation and disarmament. Norms inform member states of 
how they ought to behave (Carranza, 2006, pp. 498-499). 
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The next section draws on the example of Egypt and how the NPT has influenced its 
nuclear decision making process, indirectly or directly contributing to its decision to 
forgo the nuclear weapons option.  
6.4.1 Egypt’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
 
There are a number of factors, which influenced Egypt’s decision to forgo its nuclear 
weapons option and join the NPT. President Anwar Sadat envisioned a peaceful and 
prosperous Egypt and for this goal to occur a peaceful relationship between itself 
and Israel had to transpire as well as drawing closer and aligning itself with the 
United States. 
During 1965 and 1967 Egypt was believed to have contacted China and the Soviet 
Union respectively to acquire nuclear weapons. Egypt approached China and also 
India for access to sensitive nuclear technology but was not successful in this regard 
(Gregory, 1995, p. 21; Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 187). Egypt’s quest for nuclear weapons 
at this time was linked to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons. Rublee (2009, p. 
147) puts the argument forward that the international climate was not conducive for 
Egypt to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Egypt’s nuclear weapons 
programme was hindered by its inability to acquire technology capable of producing 
and reprocessing plutonium and the lack of support from nuclear weapon states 
concerning this goal (Gregory, 1995, p. 24; International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2008, p. 18). This is, however, not an insurmountable factor to curb Egypt’s 
nuclear ambitions if the extent of the nuclear programmes of states, such as Iraq, 
North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel are considered. 
 
In 1981, Egypt finally ratified the NPT, and in 1982 placed its nuclear facilities under 
IAEA inspection (Gregory, 1995, p. 22; Power, 1986, p. 484). Before its accession to 
the NPT, the decision makers of the state and especially President Sadat 
acknowledged the cost for remaining outside the treaty and benefits of being a 
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member state. Egypt largely believed its possession of nuclear weapons would 
undermine its bid to obtain economic aid and conventional weaponry from the 
United States. Since 1978, the United States provided Egypt with foreign aid worth $2 
billion per annum. Egypt also enjoys military cooperation in the form of military 
training programs with the United States. It is for this reason that Egypt did not want 
to jeopardise its relationship with the United States (Das, 2008, pp. 18-19). Egypt’s 
nuclear weapons programme was traded for a relationship with the United States 
because of its standing in the non-proliferation regime and the centrality of the NPT 
as its policy to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Rublee, 2009, pp. 140, 147). 
Through the NPT, Egypt could pursue its broader interest of placing pressure on 
Israel and this country’s nuclear ambiguity as well as improve its regional standing. 
As a member state of the NPT, Egypt gained diplomatic rewards, which too enabled 
it to engage Israel on its nuclear ambiguity and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 20). This was clearly visible in the 
1995 Review Conference when Egypt under the leadership of President Hosni 
Mubarak linked Israel’s accession to the indefinite extension of the NPT (Stein, 1997, 
p. 64). It is argued that the benefits of being a non-nuclear weapon state superseded 
status and prestige associated with being in possession of nuclear weapons (Rublee, 
2009, p. 147).  
Very evident in the Egyptian case was the change in perception towards security 
(Morris & Loh, 2011, n.p.). Interest at this time devalued the nuclear weapons option, 
but mainly it was the change in security perspective by Sadat that impacted on the 
nuclear decision making process. Sadat envisioned a different future for Egypt, one 
that did not involve nuclear weapons. This change in perspective regarding security 
by the national leadership highlights the importance of ideas and how it impacts and 
influences the identity of states as well as its interest (Rublee, 2009, p. 147). 
For constructivists, the decision to give up the nuclear weapons ambition was based 
on a change in the thinking about state interests by the political elite (Rublee, 2009, 
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p. 140). The NPT influenced the nuclear decision making process in the case of Egypt. 
Remaining outside the NPT as well as having a nuclear weapons programme 
threatened the economic and political development of Egypt. It would have been far 
too costly to remain outside the NPT (Rublee, 2009, p. 146). Decision makers of the 
state in Egypt were faced with international pressures as well as domestic pressures 
linked to its energy shortage. The above argument may simply look like a neorealist 
or neoliberal argument that Egypt objectively calculated the costs and benefits of 
acquiring nuclear weapons and rationally came to the conclusion that its interests 
would be better served by forgoing nuclear weapons and joining the NPT. However, 
there is more at stake here. Integrating the NPT into the nuclear decision making 
process changed the interests of Egypt. Through the NPT, Egyptian perceptions of 
security transformed and upon acceding to the treaty, it embraced a new identity of 
supporting non-proliferation and disarmament.  There were perceived benefits linked 
to being an NPT member. Thus, the NPT contributed to create a reality “out there” in 
which Egypt could reconstruct its identity and interests in such a way that giving up 
its nuclear weapon ambition was a ‘rational’ way to secure Egypt (Einhorn, 2004, pp. 
51-52). As such, the NPT enabled the removal of Egypt’s desire to counter Israel with 
its own nuclear weapons and made the option of engaging Israel through 
multilateral forums more acceptable than through mutual assured destruction.  
This transformation in Egypt’s identity, interests, and indeed in what it perceived as a 
rational way to obtain security is clear in its ongoing support toward non-
proliferation and disarmament. Egypt forms part of the New Agenda Coalition and as 
a result uses this forum to push for nuclear disarmament and to balance Israel's 
nuclear capability instead of relying on a nuclear deterrent (Einhorn, 2004, p. 54). 
Egypt's active role in the New Agenda Coalition is also proof of its ongoing support 
of non-proliferation (Johnson, 2010a, pp. 1-2). Realists may argue that Egypt simply 
joined the NPT and uses it as a political tool to embarrass Israel and in such a way 
bolster its position and credibility in the Arab world – notions that confirm a realist 
view of the NPT (Rublee, 2009, p. 143). However, by acting in support of non-
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proliferation and disarmament agents participate in what is called “performative 
actions”, which validates shared norms and common rules about how states should 
conduct affairs. Egypt’s joining the NPT can be interpreted as participating in the 
social construction of a nuclear reality as scripted in the NPT.  
6.5 Deconstructing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conferences  
 
As it has been repeatedly argued in this thesis, NPT review conferences are central 
forums to discuss and reconcile the challenges and strength of the treaty. Review 
conferences review past events, but also have to be forward looking; in this sense, 
officials can learn from the past to set achievable goals for the future (Johnson, 
2010a, p. 4; Samad, 2010, n.p.). Critical events occurring before the review conference 
impact on issues discussed and negotiated between member states. For example, 
after the Gulf War, it was revealed Iraq had been pursuing a covert nuclear weapons 
programme. This was a major challenge to the NPT as it suggested cheating by a 
member state. Realists would argue that cheating is expected, because states engage 
in self-help behaviour and will abuse international institutions to serve their interests, 
even if it means cheating. The perception that states do not take the NPT seriously, in 
turn, may justify other states’ cheating. For example, the lack of support for nuclear 
disarmament by nuclear weapon states influences perceptions and may contribute to 
a loss of faith in the NPT by non-nuclear weapon member states. 
In chapter three (evolution of the NPT), review conferences provided an opportunity 
to review the standard, goals, challenges and the way forward for the NPT among its 
member states. A general observation of NPT review conferences is that they reveal 
the areas of disagreement among member states; that is, over its non-proliferation 
and disarmament principles. Rather, on closer inspection, NPT review conferences 
represent spaces where actors engage in the politics of meaning making. With this in 
mind, in the review conferences actors interpret and negotiate how the NPT should 
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be viewed and in turn how nuclear weapons should be perceived. However, over 
time certain ideas and interests take precedence. Eckersley (2008) argues that, social 
agents (states) use international forums as a platform to disseminate their views in 
order to shape a dominant way of perceiving a particular issue among member 
states. In this context, Eckersley demonstrates that the previous notion (dominant 
thinking) of, for example, economic growth and environmental protection being 
compatible may not necessarily be the case as they are in conflict with each other 
(Eckersley, 2008, p. 24). This argument is particularly useful to understand the NPT 
review conferences as spaces of making meaning and internalising dominant views 
of thinking about the NPT and nuclear weapons. NPT review conferences have been 
used by nuclear weapon states to create common sense understandings of their 
nuclear weapons as legitimate and other states as too ‘irresponsible’ to have nuclear 
weapons, and thus creating an understanding of the NPT as legitimising and 
legalising their nuclear weapons. 
At the 2005 Review Conference, Ambassador John Freeman made a statement on 
behalf of the United Kingdom; he indicated that some states have taken advantage 
of the peaceful application of nuclear technology under the NPT and developed their 
own clandestine nuclear weapons programme. This is a challenge to all states of the 
NPT. In addition, John Freeman said, “...non-proliferation is important in its own 
right”, however, non-proliferation and disarmament are explicitly linked (Joyner, 
2011, p. 43). Ambassador Freedman discussed the danger that non-state actors 
(terrorist) may gain access to weapons of mass destruction (Freeman, 2005, pp. 1-2). 
Moreover, in a statement made by the United States representative, Ambassador 
Norman Wulf to the Preparatory Committee of the NPT in 2002, this sentiment is 
reiterated, "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a primary source of 
global instability and danger... We must work together to reinforce the NPT's 
prohibition on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We must demand strict 
compliance with its terms and support rigorous verification and enforcement 
measures" (Wulf, 2002, p. 2). Ambassador Wulf also notes the dangers of non-
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proliferation and the concern that terrorist groups may capitalise and access 
weapons grade nuclear material from new proliferators. 
These statements highlight the disproportionate emphasis by nuclear weapon states 
of non-proliferation while neglecting nuclear disarmament. Non-proliferation is a 
threat to international peace and security, but so is the possession of nuclear 
weapons by the so-called five legitimate states (China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States). Nuclear weapons in general are threatening, 
heightening concerns of uncertainty and insecurity regardless of its possession by 
North Korea or the United States; no state has a legitimate right to hold nuclear 
weapons. Non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism are by no means inconsequential; 
however, the idea that rogue states and terrorist groups may gain access to nuclear 
weapons have been constructed by nuclear weapon states in such a way to justify 
their possession of nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons by rogue 
states is constructed as threatening given their irresponsibility and unsecure nuclear 
facilities that may be susceptible to terrorist influence. All states of the NPT are 
expected to uphold their treaty obligations. However, it is increasingly visible how 
nuclear weapon states select certain principles, which are given more prominence by 
their representatives (Eckersley, 2008, p. 25).  
The two preceding paragraphs are instances where a common understanding is 
spread among member states in review conferences that the five so-called nuclear 
weapon states have a right to possess nuclear weapons, because other actors may 
have or obtain them and that this is somehow legitimised by the NPT.   
The agency of non-nuclear weapon states at review conferences is also well visible. In 
fact, non-nuclear weapon states use NPT review conferences as a space to contest 
dominant modes of viewing the NPT, that is, that the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons are widely criticised and condemned and their continued possession by 
nuclear weapon states of the treaty is a threat to international peace and security. 
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Until nuclear weapons are totally dismantled and disarmed the world is not safe, as 
its possible use still lurks.   
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the realist and the liberal view of the 
NPT produce credible interpretations of this treaty, but the problem emerges of how 
to reconcile these interpretations. The realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT 
when brought together provide a more holistic view of this treaty in the international 
system and show the direction this treaty has moved towards, which has been 
shaped and influenced by review conferences and by their preceding events.   
6.6 Is the NPT a realist or a liberal instrument? 
 
By examining the realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT it is clear each 
perspective has its merits. Both realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT are 
sound, providing a different viewpoint on the treaty to understand its position and 
purpose in the international system. Hence, taken together, these interpretations 
facilitate an understanding and give meaning to the NPT in a holistic manner. The 
interpretation held by the decision makers of states inform state behaviour and 
action. In the case of India, it largely believed the NPT represented an instrument 
only working to the benefit of nuclear weapon states and to the detriment of non-
nuclear weapon states (realist interpretation). India strongly argued for an end to the 
discriminatory nature of the NPT as disarmament was not considered to be an 
obligation for nuclear weapon states (Goldschmidt, 1980, p. 73). These arguments 
caused India to remain outside the NPT. In contrast, for states such as South Africa, 
the NPT represents a fundamental element of its identity based on its support 
towards non-proliferation and disarmament already visible in the African National 
Congress before it obtained government power in 1994 (liberal interpretation) 
(Purkitt & Burgess, 2005, p. 183).  
To reconcile the realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT the imaginary of a 
swinging pendulum will be invoked to make sense of the treaty amidst the different 
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interpretations thereof. A pendulum is a rod or a weight fixed to a certain point, but 
has the ability to swing freely from right to left. The position of the pendulum 
changes regularly as the forces of gravity alters its momentum and direction. This 
analogy of the pendulum suits the different interpretations of the NPT and helps to 
place them into perspective.  
When looking at the constructed reality of the NPT, it seems the pendulum (NPT) 
swings in the margin between a realist (right) and liberal (left) interpretation at 
particular times in history, but is always caught before it reaches extremes that could 
lead to its ultimate failure. As it was noted in chapter three, North Korea pursued its 
nuclear weapon ambitions under the NPT and developed nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, after the Gulf War, the IAEA brought Iraq’s nuclear weapon ambitions 
to light. These two cases affirm the realist interpretation of the NPT. Here, member 
states advanced their self-interests at the expense of the NPT and used the treaty to 
pursue their nuclear ambitions. Taken from this view, these events would have great 
ramification for the NPT and its upcoming Review Conference in 1995. However, the 
1995 Review Conference was a success, developing a final document supporting the 
Resolution of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. South Africa’s proposal 
calling for the conclusion of the CTBT to be facilitated by the Conference on 
Disarmament, which was linked to the indefinite extension of the NPT created hope 
for its future (Taylor, 2010, p. 23; Leith & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 350-351).  
Member states could cooperate and ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT 
despite disagreement over this issue and efforts by Egypt to stall the Review 
Conference if Israel did not accede to the NPT. Internal divisions and preceding 
events did not deter a positive outcome of the NPT Review Conference, and member 
states could negotiate the way forward for this treaty.  
The build-up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference was further hindered and 
threatened by the United States Senate’s inability to ratify the CTBT in 1999 (Mölling, 
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2010, p. 57). Ratification of the CTBT by the United States would have further 
strengthened the NPT indicating a renewed commitment to this treaty.  
In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. Despite being non-member 
states this development directly threatened the NPT, a treaty hard-pressed to curb 
the development of nuclear weapons, prevent its testing and realise a world free 
from them (UN Security Council, 1998, p. 1). Pakistan largely takes its cue from India, 
and at times mirrors India’s defence posture. It is also the frustration with nuclear 
weapon states and how the NPT is interpreted by them, which are the source of 
conflict and disagreement during review conferences. 
Once again, critical events did not forestall the Review Conference in 2000 or lead to 
its failure. In fact, the NPT was a success, resulting in a final document and the 
conclusion of the widely welcomed 13 practical steps in support of nuclear 
disarmament hailed as a breakthrough mapping out the steps to eliminate nuclear 
weapons and realise a world free from them (Doyle, 2009, p. 139). In 2005, the grand 
bargain of the NPT was threatened and the conference was unable to produce any 
real results. The pre-emptive war doctrine of the United States and its declaration of 
Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil paved the way for the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Threats and challenges posed to the NPT at this time was significant, almost a 
forecast of what was to occur during its 2005 Review Conference. At this time, the 
centrality of nuclear weapons in military doctrines were well visible, plans to 
modernise nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom were put forward, and 
disarmament agreements negotiated between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states during the 1995 and 2000 review conferences were blocked by 
nuclear weapon states.  
Acting in disregard of the NPT by its nuclear weapon states negatively impact on this 
treaty, and the faith member states have in it. Although these developments are 
worrying, which calls into question the compliance of states to the NPT this should 
not lead to the assumption of a meaningless treaty or one that will cease to be 
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significant. Challenges to the NPT influence and shape its direction, but positive 
strides made between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states also impact 
on its perception and direction. At particular times in history disagreements are 
bridged and overcome signalling and intention to work together and remain 
committed towards the NPT.  
As indicated earlier, the NPT also moves between a liberal interpretation. Despite the 
institutionalisation of the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states, member states do cooperate and work together to realise shared 
gains ultimately to the well-being of the NPT and the international community. For 
example, the Resolution of a Middle East Free from Nuclear Weapons, the conclusion 
of the CTBT and the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament, represents 
areas of agreement between member states. The unilateral decision by states to 
disarm their nuclear weapons such as that of South Africa, and forswear nuclear 
weapons as in the case of Argentina and Brazil strengthen the NPT and highlight its 
liberal position and role within the international system. 
According to Kubálková (1998, p. 26), E. H. Carr in his book, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
1919-1939 indicated that realists and liberals were locked in a great debate. It was 
assumed that realists and liberals held contradictory ideas, and for this reason are in 
tension. Instead, realists and liberals are in a relationship and are as a result explicitly 
linked and shaped by each other. Kubálková (1998, p. 30) offers a revisionist view of 
E. H. Carr, who was widely acknowledged as a prominent realist scholar, but rather 
offered a way to reconcile the tension between realists and liberals. From this 
argument, the realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT are not necessarily right or 
wrong; it is not an either or scenario. Taken together they highlight how the NPT has 
evolved as influenced by critical events preceding and during NPT review 
conferences as a result of social agents. At a particular time in history, nuclear 
weapons were largely seen as bestowing those that possessed it with prestige, status 
and power, and nuclear weapons were viewed as legitimate weapons to wage war. 
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Through the development of the nuclear taboo nuclear weapons were criticised and 
delegitimized as an immoral weapon. These interpretations (realist and liberal) are 
influenced and shaped by each other but also show how ideas or knowledge has 
spread to influence how physical entities or reality is perceived and understood 
(Kubálková, 1998, p. 31). It is impossible to have realism without liberalism; if one is 
removed the other will be affected. “Sound political thought and sound political life 
will be found only where both have their place” (Kubálková, 1998, p. 32). 
New ideas will replace old systems of behaviour and perception as reality is 
continually negotiated by social agents. The 1995 and 2000 Review Conference gave 
rise to tangible successes, positively shaping the way of the NPT. In 2005, due to 
disagreements and tension between member states significant ground was lost, and 
the treaty regressed. During 2005, nuclear weapon states may have felt their 
possession of nuclear weapons was threatened, this may explain their behaviour at 
the conference. The NPT moved too far to the right (realist) creating the need for 
member states to cooperate, reiterate their commitment to the NPT and at the 2010 
Review Conference ensure a successful outcome. Taken in this way, the pendulum 
(NPT) swings from right to left and when it moves to the extremes agents and critical 
events will influence its direction. This shift in how the NPT is viewed will continue to 
occur as meaning is always negotiated over time. In Political Science, unlike in natural 
science, there are no objective facts as it is a discipline focused on human behaviour 
and facts are arrived through social negotiation (Kubálková, 1998, p. 33). 
In this way, the NPT is not necessarily a realist or liberal instrument, as each state and 
its decision makers have their own view of the NPT and respond to it accordingly. At 
this point, it is possible to argue that the NPT is what states make of it.  With that in 
mind, there is no set direction for the NPT; the treaty will continue to move between 
these interpretations (realist and liberal) as ideas and beliefs as well as interests 
change.   
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6.7 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is what states make of it 
 
Under the leadership of President George W. Bush, the nuclear weapons of the 
United States acted as a deterrent against those that threatened the United States 
with weapons of mass destruction and conventional military force. Since then the 
Obama administration has changed America’s nuclear strategy (The Guardian, 2010). 
The change in national leadership in the United States and the worldview of Obama 
has an impact on the NPT and the way forward. In 2009, when President Obama 
delivered his now famous speech in Prague this signalled a renewed commitment by 
the United States toward nuclear disarmament. President Obama reaffirmed his 
commitment to a world free from nuclear weapons, to end Cold War thinking and 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy (De Santana, 
2009, p. 340). On 8 April 2010, New START was signed between Russia and the 
United States, a symbolic gesture offering hope in the NPT and also in the non-
proliferation regime. These gestures produced enough momentum towards a 
successful NPT Review Conference convened in 2010 (Zanders, 2010, pp. 7-8; The 
Daily Maverick, 2010).  
According to Johnson (2010a, p. 8), 2010 marked a period in which the “international 
environment” was more favourable to deal with nuclear-related issues. In May 2010, 
at the NPT Review Conference, nuclear weapon states have appeared to make some 
concessions to show that they remain committed to this treaty. This outcome proves 
the point that when the treaty moves to the extremes, it gets brought back by 
member states to ensure its existence and prevent its failure or disappearance.   
Thus, the meaning of the NPT fluctuates and changes according to the time and 
based on the level of commitment shown by its member states. With the 2010 
Review Conference in mind, both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states 
view the NPT as a central instrument in the international system to introduce a 
measure of stability and order. The ongoing support of member states for the NPT 
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and the centrality of ensuring a successful 2010 Review Conference and the 
development of a final document show how significant this treaty is. Despite the 
challenges of the NPT member states could cooperate and ensure the existence of 
this treaty. New life has been breathed into the NPT by nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapon states, and they are of the view that it is better to work within the 
treaty than to work outside of it. The outcome is that both nuclear weapon and non-
nuclear weapon states see the NPT as serving and protecting their mutual security 
interests. This point is echoed in a statement made by the European Union in 2005, 
the NPT is “...an irreplaceable, legally binding instrument for maintaining and 
reinforcing international peace, security and stability" (Johnson, 2005, pp. 25-26).  
The NPT, from a constructivist view can be termed both a realist, and a liberal 
instrument based on the zeitgeist (sprit of the times) and the level of commitment 
shown by member states at particular times in history (Kegley & Blanton, 2010, pp. 
213-214). As specified by Rebecca Johnson, 2010 marked a period in history that was 
more conductive to discussing and dealing with nuclear-related issues. Here, the 
spirit of the times and thinking around nuclear weapons and disarmament has been 
influenced by key agents such as President Obama. The NPT is ultimately what states 
make of it. If states regard this treaty as an indispensable component to the 
realisation of their mutual interests, they will continue to support it, as they have 
done. Agents will continue to shape regimes and structures according to their 
perceived interests, and this is true for the NPT. Consequently, during the 
introductory process of the NPT, it represented a realist instrument to maintain a 
favourable nuclear order for the United States and the Soviet Union by safeguarding 
their nuclear weapons and effectively preventing other states from gaining this level 
of military power (holding a monopoly over nuclear weapons). Thus, it would be in 
the interests of dominant powers to maintain the status quo (Carranza, 2006, p. 493). 
Even so, over time more and more states began to associate themselves with this 
treaty, increasing its currency as an international instrument. Non-nuclear weapon 
states of the NPT are not forced into signing this treaty. The normative principles 
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embodied within the NPT such as the norm of disarmament can be used by non-
nuclear weapon states to criticise nuclear weapon states and remind them of their 
commitment to dismantle their nuclear weapons under Article VI (Evans & 
Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78).  
There is a host of agents influencing the direction of the NPT; hence challenging the 
assumption of a treaty largely benefiting nuclear weapon states (dominant powers) 
only. 
The NPT is impacted and shaped by ideas of key agents such as the United States 
President Obama, non-nuclear weapon states through groups, such as the New 
Agenda Coalition as well as non-governmental organisations, such as the Acronym 
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation 
Studies, the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, the Institute for 
Security Studies, and various activist groups, such as the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament in the United Kingdom, to name but a few. There is a wide range of 
actors all seeking to influence and impose their meaning onto the NPT. Powerful 
agents may set the tone of the NPT and influence its position, but the regime or 
structure also has a life of its own, which is not solely dependent on dominant 
powers and exercise influence over member states. This statement is proven by the 
fact that nuclear weapon states were committed towards a successful 2010 Review 
Conference based on their perception of the treaty and its position in the 
international system. The NPT is a source of international governance and 
cooperation and agreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon 
states. In this regard, since member states cannot fathom a world without the NPT it 
should be clear that this treaty embodies perceptions that exercise influence over 
states and how they view security even though at particular times some member 
states disregard its principles and standards.  
In turn, the NPT’s ability to restrain the system of self-help and inform state 
behaviour through its norms and standards in the field of nuclear weapons and 
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disarmament depends on whether member states desire the treaty to play this role. 
The level of support and compliance shown by member states towards the NPT will 
ultimately influence the strength and direction of this treaty. Whether the treaty is a 
realist or a liberal instrument will ultimately be decided by states (and their view of 
the nuclear order, itself influenced by the NPT). States will decide through their 
constructed lenses what role the NPT should play in the international system and 
confirm this through their behaviour and activities. It is their shared experiences, and 
the meanings associated to phenomena that will determine the position and level of 
importance associated to the NPT. For this reason, the NPT is what states make of it. 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
At particular times in history, the NPT moves from a realist to a liberal perspective. 
With that in mind, the NPT is both a realist, and a liberal instrument based on the 
perceptions of international actors and how they relate towards this treaty. 
Ultimately, states will determine the level of importance associated to the NPT which 
is based on their practices and commitment to this treaty. Thus, the NPT is what 
states make of it. Critical events occurring before review conferences largely 
influence its direction and perception but also the activities and behaviour of 
member states within this multilateral forum will directly impact on the NPT itself, 
negatively or positively. Nevertheless, before the NPT moves to extremes where its 
existence is threatened it gets brought back to a position where both nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states can agree on the way forward for this treaty. 
A constructivist view of the NPT reveals that the ideas and thinking of states 
regarding the NPT will have a great impact on its role and position in the 
international system, but that these ideas are themselves also impacted by the 
structure that the NPT has brought to the nuclear order. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This chapter will provide a summary of the core arguments of the thesis in an 
attempt to answer in the final analysis the question that the thesis aimed to answer, 
namely to what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help under 
international anarchy by using respectively a realist, liberal and constructivist lens to 
interpret the NPT. 
The NPT has played an instrumental role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and proposed a world free from these weapons since it entered into force. 
The NPT with its rules and standards of behaviour requires member states to stop 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and for the five nuclear weapon states to 
eventually disarm their existing nuclear arsenals. Another component of the NPT is 
the sharing of nuclear technology and material for peaceful civilian purposes. These 
three components of the NPT represent a grand bargain between nuclear weapon 
and non-nuclear weapon states. An inability by member states to uphold their treaty 
obligations affects the confidence states have in this treaty, thus serving as a 
justification for non-members to remain outside this treaty and ultimately affecting 
the goal of the NPT, that is, to realise a world free from nuclear weapons.  
A central problem concerning the NPT is how it should be interpreted and 
implemented. The interpretation and implementation of the NPT is a contested arena 
among nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. This is made evident in NPT 
review conferences. With this in mind, to answer the research question, that is, to 
what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help through its standards and 
norms in the field of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament, it is 
necessary to delve into how member states and non-member states alike have 
perceived, internalised and responded to the NPT. Through the application of the 
three International Relations theories namely, realism, liberalism and constructivism 
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light can be shed on how states perceive the NPT and also what role this treaty 
serves in the international system. 
NPT review conferences represented practical cases highlighting how member states 
perceive and relate to the NPT, by highlighting double standards, favouring of 
certain NPT components (for example arguing non-proliferation should take 
precedence over disarmament). Offering a realist, liberal and constructivist view of 
the NPT proffered explanations for why nuclear weapon states have been slow to 
disarm their nuclear weapons, why some states have forgone the nuclear weapons 
option (for example Argentina and Brazil) and why some states choose to remain 
outside the NPT and become nuclear states themselves (for example, India, Israel and 
North Korea). As it was argued in chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the NPT) 
the NPT is what states make of it, that is, states, through their behaviour and activity 
will determine the role and standard of the NPT in the international system (whether 
it will be instrumental to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts or not). The 
phrase, ‘the NPT is what states make of it’, points to the different perceptions that 
exist among states and its decision making apparatus regarding this treaty. For that 
reason, offering an alternative to a realist view of the NPT by contrasting it with a 
liberal and a constructivist perspective was cardinal to the research project.   
Despite the widely accepted view among states that nuclear weapons inflict 
unacceptable damage and for that reason their development and use are taboo, 
nuclear weapons hold a prominent role in military doctrines. For some states (the 
nuclear five, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan), nuclear weapons bestow 
prestige, status and power and serve to protect their national interests through a 
nuclear deterrent. Realist scholars argue that the utility of nuclear weapons were 
evident during the Cold War ensuring peace and stability between the superpowers. 
The Cold War ideological threat has been replaced by the threat of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to rogue states and also to terrorist organisations; this serves as 
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a justification for nuclear weapon states to hold onto their nuclear weapons 
indefinitely.  
It became evident at NPT review conferences that nuclear weapons hold a prominent 
role in the international system as attention was constantly shifted away from nuclear 
disarmament and more emphasis was placed on the nuclear threat posed by terrorist 
organisations and rogue states (for example in the 2005 NPT Review Conference). 
When the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s calls for a disarmament clause was not 
widely supported by the United States and the Soviet Union. The above point is 
further strengthened by a statement made by Tony Blair in 2007, that the NPT gives 
Britain the right to hold nuclear weapons, for that reason nuclear disarmament is not 
seen as a priority for the five nuclear weapon states. These examples represent 
instances where dominant states have imposed and shaped thinking around the NPT 
and nuclear weapons, compromising the goal of a nuclear weapons free world.  
The idea that nuclear weapons safeguard national security (sovereignty) is at logger 
heads with norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. It is at this point where 
liberal scholars offer an alternative to the limited role realist have associated to 
norms and international institutions, with specific reference to the NPT. 
Scholars such as Tannenwald (2007, pp. 362-363) have highlighted the significance of 
the nuclear taboo and its role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons, combating 
perceptions of prestige and power associated with these weapons. In this way, the 
moral standing of the NPT through the nuclear taboo served as a method to 
challenge the utility of nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo describes the destructive 
nature of a nuclear explosion or war and for this reason portrays its use as a threat to 
humanity. Nuclear weapons are inhumane according to the International Court of 
Justice and the ICRC, and for that reason should be banned. Hence, remaining non-
nuclear is a moral imperative. Stigmatising nuclear weapons as inhumane goes a 
long way to deconstruct and discredit value and meaning associated with them as a 
source of power, prestige and status. Non-nuclear weapon states in full compliance 
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with the NPT prove nuclear weapons need not necessarily be required to safeguard 
national security. Security can be protected without nuclear weapons; in fact, nuclear 
weapons create more uncertainty and insecurity. This humanitarian approach 
regarding nuclear weapons reveals the moral imperative of this treaty but the NPT 
also has legal implications. 
Under the NPT, member states are governed by the same rules and norms creating a 
sense of continuity in the international system on how states should conduct their 
activities. Verification systems such as the IAEA safeguards enable member states to 
monitor each other’s compliance toward using nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes. Furthermore, taken together with the NSG, sensitive nuclear technology is 
safeguarded through export controls, and by verifying member states’ commitment 
toward IAEA safeguards, trust is established that nuclear technology is not used for 
military purposes, hence protecting international security. 
The NPT has imposed a certain measure of order (governance) in the international 
system and thus combats or reduces the institution of self-help. International 
anarchy (the absence of a world government) is a reality, but through international 
institutions and regimes insecurity can be addressed and improved through 
structures (NPT) geared towards cooperation. Norms and standards of non-
proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons challenge self-help and views of 
prestige and power associated with nuclear weapons. In chapter five (liberal view of 
the NPT) and chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the NPT), Argentina, Brazil, 
Egypt and South Africa were used to demonstrate how this treaty influenced and 
shaped the nuclear decision making process. Hence, emphasising the idea that the 
NPT, through its norms and standards of behaviour has the ability to influence and 
shape perceptions on security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Even though 
states may join the NPT to advance self-interests as in the case of Egypt to use the 
treaty against Israel, once the treaty is ratified, they are committed to its rules and 
standards increasing the barrier of non-proliferation. When states act in non-
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compliance with the NPT, it results in sanction, international pressure and 
condemnation and intervention by the UN Security Council. 
Through ratification of the NPT, trust between member states is strengthened, 
creating a condition where member states can view each other as friends instead of 
foes. Identities and interests are transformed, for example, through the New Agenda 
Coalition Egypt played a meaningful role in nuclear disarmament. In this way, so-
called permanent fixtures such as ideas of power and prestige associated with 
nuclear weapons are capable of being transformed; offering hope and the possibility 
of arriving at a nuclear weapons free world. According to Karp (1992, p. 7), 
“...permanent fixtures of the international system can be changed, that mankind is 
not condemned to perpetuate structural conditions”. 
Through a critical analysis of the NPT, that is, from a realist and a liberal perspective 
it was revealed how this treaty has evolved and was shaped by key agents 
throughout its history. As noted in chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the 
NPT), both the realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT are sound and offer a 
different and holistic perspective of the NPT. With the swinging pendulum image of 
the NPT in mind state views regarding this treaty, security, nuclear weapons and 
nuclear disarmament are not fixed, they are able to change. In this way, the NPT is 
not a realist or liberal instrument; it is what states make of it. On the other hand, it 
can be said that states cannot envision a future without the NPT in it, thus this treaty 
holds a unique role and level of influence in the international system. This statement 
is proven by the fact that when it appeared the NPT was on the decline since its 2005 
Review Conference, states, through their action and behaviour instilled hope in this 
treaty and ensured a successful 2010 Review Conference. As both nuclear weapon 
and non-nuclear weapon states alike seek to shape dominant ways of viewing the 
NPT at review conferences it should not be forgotten that the NPT has a life of its 
own. 
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On closer inspection of the NPT this institution has a life of its own, able to influence 
its member states and non-member states. The cases of Argentina, Brazil, South 
Africa, India and Israel to an extent highlight the influence the NPT has over state 
perceptions regarding nuclear weapons. As new ideas surface and perceptions 
change new commitment would be shown towards the NPT. However, this does not 
mean that the NPT is without its challenges and obstacles.  
Disarmament of nuclear weapons remains a stumbling block at NPT review 
conferences, calling into question the commitment of nuclear weapon states toward 
this treaty. By the same token, non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT cannot use this 
treaty to promote their nuclear weapon ambitions, in the case of Iraq, North Korea 
and currently suspected by Iran. Nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states are 
equally responsible for the standard of the NPT and have to reaffirm and remain 
committed members of this treaty.  
Nevertheless, the NPT is distinguished from other treaties as being the only 
international instrument to commit nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament. In 
such a way, non-nuclear weapon states can use the treaty to place pressure on 
nuclear weapon states to disarm. What is evident is a renewed level of commitment 
by nuclear weapon states toward the NPT and efforts to arrive at a more balanced 
treaty. Thus, for now the NPT has been brought closer to the liberal interpretation 
where member states can work together and agree on the way forward. 
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